

Leaders, Perceptions, and Reputations for Resolve

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Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy in the Department of
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ABSTRACT

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Abstract

For scholars of international relations, reputation for resolve – the belief that an actor will stand firm in future disputes – has served as a seminal explanation for the outcome of interstate crises. Scholars studying state reputation remain divided as to which characteristics of the state determine reputation for resolve. Recent scholarship questions this traditional state-centric view of international relations, indicating leaders can be as influential as states in international affairs. My dissertation investigates whether individual leaders can develop reputations for resolve independently from the states they serve. In doing so, my dissertation bridges the state-centric and leader-centric literatures, contributing to our understanding of both reputations for resolve and the impact of individual leaders on international politics. My theory focuses on reputation development as I examine which information decision-makers use to make assessments of resolve. As leaders are the primary arbiters of foreign policy and interact substantially with each other during international crises and negotiations, I conclude that leaders should be able to develop independent reputations for resolve based on their behavior while in office. I further theorize that, due to the ways in which individuals access and process information, a leader's early actions while in office will matter more in assessments of his/her resolve, making initial reputations difficult to change.

To test my theory against alternative hypotheses, I employ a multi-methods research design using experimental surveys, statistical duration analysis, and a historical

case study. The experiments focus on the internal causal mechanisms by which individuals process information to make predictions of a leader's resolve. To test the external validity of my theory, I employ a duration analysis to examine how the resoluteness of a leader's response to a crisis helps prevent that leader from being a target of future crises. Finally, the case study uses process tracing methods to investigate the extent to which individual leaders develop reputations for resolve over time. Through these multiple methods, I find robust evidence that leaders do develop reputations for resolve independently from their state's reputation. The experiments indicate that leader behavior is influential on perceptions of resolve even when accounting for state-based characteristics. Furthermore, I find that participants are more likely to seek out and prioritize leader-based information. I also find that early perceptions of resolve have a significant impact on later perceptions. The duration analysis indicates that the resoluteness of a leader's behavior can affect his/her risk of future crisis onset. Finally, the case study shows that potential challenger leaders do take leader-based information into account when making assessments of resolve and that a leader's early behavior is particularly influential to the development of his/her reputation for resolve. Based on this evidence I conclude that leaders can develop reputations for resolve. These reputations are primarily based on a leader's statements and behavior, even when controlling for state-based variables, and are resistant to change once formed.

Dedication

For my parents, Ann and Chris Lupton

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1. Leaders, Perceptions, and Reputations for Resolve: An Introduction

Policy-makers repeatedly and consistently adhere to the belief that perceptions of resolve – the will to remain determined and committed to a course of action - during interstate crises and conflicts have the potential to dissuade future aggressors.¹ For scholars in the discipline of international relations, reputation for resolve – the belief that an actor will behave resolutely in future disputes - has served as a critical explanation for state conflict behavior and the outcome of interstate crises. According to traditional deterrence scholars, demonstrating resolve to one’s adversaries should make a state an unattractive target of aggression, providing a strong incentive for states to develop a reputation for resolute action. Indeed, Thomas Schelling ([1966] 2008) argued that a state’s reputation for resolve is “one of the few things worth fighting for” (124).

According to Schelling, states should be concerned about their reputations and actively work to demonstrate their resolve during interstate disputes. To date, nearly the entirety of the literature on reputations for resolve has focused on the attribution of reputations to states and the effect of reputations for resolve on conflict behavior (Arce and Sandler 2009; Crescenzi 2007; Crescenzi, Kathman, and Long 2007; Huth 1997; Mercer 1996; Press 2005; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Wiegand 2011). While the literature on state reputation

¹ For example, at a meeting in June 2012 regarding the ongoing Syrian crisis in the Middle East, United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stressed the need for the U.S. and its allies to remain “resolute” in their foreign policy and security positions in the region (Department of State 2012).

for resolve assumes that lower-level actors, such as individual decision-makers, cannot develop these reputations of their own, recent scholarship has questioned the pervasive state-centric paradigm in international relations, stressing the importance of leaders to international conflict through the crucial role individual decision-makers play in determining state behavior and foreign policy (Bak and Palmer 2010; Byman and Pollack 2001; Chiozza and Goemans 2003; Kowert 2002; Malici 2008; Saunders 2011; Wolford 2007). Furthermore, deterrence scholars have long suggested that actors other than the state may acquire reputations for resolve (Huth 1997; Jervis 1976; Jervis 1982-1983). Recent research also indicates that leaders are often assessed separately from their states' characteristics and behavior (Gelpi and Grieco 2001; Wolford 2007; 2012). However, scholars have yet to systematically examine whether individual leaders are perceived as resolute (or irresolute) independently of state-based perceptions of resolve.

My dissertation addresses this gap in the literature regarding the relative importance of leaders and states by examining whether leaders may acquire reputations for resolve that are independent from the state. The purpose of my dissertation, therefore, is to determine if leaders are perceived as distinct from the state in their resolve and to understand how a leader's statements and behavior contribute to these leader-based reputations. In the next chapter, Chapter 2, I explain why leaders should be able to develop their own reputations for resolve and put forth a theory addressing the specific process by which these leader-based reputations develop. More specifically, I

consider how decision-makers use information regarding a leader's statements and behavior in their assessments of a leader's resolve. Accordingly, my research focuses on the process by which these reputations develop over time, enhancing our understanding of reputations for resolve.

1.1 Questions to Be Addressed

My dissertation focuses on the following overarching question: Can leaders develop reputations for resolve independently from their state's reputation for resolve? To answer this question, I examine where decision-makers look for cues regarding how a leader or state will behave in a crisis or dispute. More specifically, I consider which factors and characteristics decision-makers take into account when making judgments about an actor's resolve since identifying the types of information decision-makers use when making assessments of resolve provides insight into which actors develop these reputations. Such information may include leader statements and behavior, state conflict history, or other state-based characteristics such as relative power capability, state interest, or regime type. If decision-makers only rely on state-based factors, such as state conflict histories or state power, it would be reasonable to conclude that the actions of individual leaders do not matter for perceptions of resolve and that leaders do not develop reputations based on their statements and behavior. Conversely, a strong reliance on a leader's statements or actions would indicate that these individual factors are indeed influential and would suggest that individual leaders may be able to develop

reputations for resolve that are independent of both their predecessors and the state. In addition, I also examine how the informational cues identified above are synthesized to make determinations of resolve. For instance, I consider whether some cues, such as information gathered during early interactions, are more influential than others in the decision-making process. In the empirical chapters, I examine the extent to which decision-makers rely on various pieces of information and how this information is used in making assessments of resolve.

Accordingly, the focus of my investigation is to understand where decision-makers look for information regarding resolve and how this information is processed when making assessments of how an actor will behave in the future. Scholars studying reputations for resolve among states have identified key variables including past conflict histories and state interest that may affect these state-based reputations. Analogous variables may have similar effects at the individual level, particularly regarding an individual leader's past actions. It may also be possible for both a leader and a state to independently acquire reputations for resolve. In other words, the development of reputations for resolve may not be an either-or, all-or-nothing process. It may be a very real possibility that states maintain a reputation for resolve while individual leaders also acquire reputations for resolve. Similarly, it is also feasible that both individual-level factors, such as leader behavior, and state-level factors, such as state interest, may work in tandem or interact to affect the development of reputations for resolve. Through my

research and analysis, I identify the potential interactions of these variables and the extent to which leaders may develop reputations for resolve separate from the state.

1.2 Implications

These questions carry strong implications for the study of leaders and conflict as well as how policy-makers think about and address these issues. If the empirical evidence indicates that decision-makers do not look to leader-based information when making their assessments of resolve, this suggests that individual leaders may not be important for conflict in this regard. In the context of the study of international relations, this would indicate that the prevalent state-centric paradigm does hold strong analytical leverage for understanding conflict. Accordingly, the renewed scholarly focus on the behavior and characteristics of international leaders as a contributing factor to the onset of conflict and as an explanation for policy outcomes may be misguided. Furthermore, if leaders do not develop reputations of their own, questions are raised as to the extent to which international leaders hold each other accountable for their actions. If decision-makers do not consider the past actions of an opposing leader when making assessments of resolve during crises, does this give leaders a carte-blanche when it comes to their international actions? If so, what are the ethical implications of such behavior? Should democratic electorates, in particular, be concerned about the foreign policy actions of their leaders? Finally, such a result would suggest that the consistent emphasis among policy-makers regarding the efficacy of individual leaders in

international relations may be inappropriate. Rather, this result would suggest that policy-makers should focus on state-based characteristics, not leader-based factors, and leaders should be less concerned with the effects of their own behavior.

However, if my results show that decision-makers do focus on leader-based factors, scholars need to continue to further incorporate the role of leaders into the study of international conflict. If reputations for resolve are tied to leaders and not states, this suggests that theories of deterrence and coercion should focus not only on the state, but also on the actions of individual leaders to understand crisis bargaining and conflict processes. Previous research finding that state reputation for resolve does not affect conflict may indeed be valid. However, these scholars may be incorrect in their conclusion that resolute actions and reputations do not matter for international politics. Rather, if I find that reputations for resolve are attributed to leaders, scholars must consider how the reputations of individuals affect the onset, duration, and intensity of international conflict. In addition, this attribution of reputations to leaders, not just states, would also require a change in scholarly thinking about resolve. As Mercer (1996) so adeptly puts it: "If state leaders acquire reputations, then a change in the leadership of state B may mean a change in the reputation B has, as well as a change in the reputations that B ascribes to others" (26). Accordingly, scholars must not only consider how the perceived reputations of target leaders change with leadership transitions, but also how these leadership changes can affect the target's perceptions of others.

This result would also carry important implications for the conduct of foreign policy and statecraft. Most notably, policy-makers must be acutely aware that their actions are being carefully assessed as soon as they take office. States that have recently undergone or frequently experience leadership transitions (such as democracies) will need to be prepared to face challenges and potential crises from international adversaries or competitors. It is during this time that new leaders need to be especially deliberate in consistently and firmly communicating their policy goals, preferences, and resolve to other leaders. Alternatively, this also means that leaders are not bound by the mistakes (or accomplishments) of their predecessors. Rather, new leaders may have the opportunity to establish reputations for resolute action based on their own behavior while in office. In the concluding chapter of this work, I provide further policy implications drawn directly from my empirical results.

1.3 Methodological Approach

In order to determine the extent to which decision-makers rely on leader-based or state-based information when making assessments of resolve as well as how this information leads to a concurrent reputation for resolve, I focus on periods of leadership change as well as observe the development of a single leader's reputation over time. By examining the informational cues decision-makers use to predict the behavior of new leaders after a leadership transition, I can determine the extent to which decision-makers rely on state-based or leader-based factors when making assessments of a new leader's

resolve. In addition, by investigating the development of a single leader's reputation over time, I can determine how decision-makers process information to form perceptions of a leader's resolve through recurrent interactions. In the next chapter, I present a theory of why decision-makers will look to a leader's statements and behavior when making assessments of resolve. In addition, I put forth conditions under which decision-makers may look for various cues regarding a leader's resolve and how this information is processed when making assessments of resolve. In the subsequent chapters, I test my theory against other theories of reputation development using a multi-methods approach combining evidence from experimental surveys, a large-N duration analysis, and a qualitative case study to discern where perceptions of resolve form and how these perceptions change over time. As I explain more thoroughly in the next chapter, through this combined multi-methods approach I provide a rigorous test of my hypotheses and draw conclusions regarding the extent to which leaders can develop reputations for resolve independently of their state's reputation for resolve.

1.4 Defining Reputation for Resolve

In the next chapter, I review the literature regarding reputations for resolve more fully, but it is first necessary to clearly define reputation for resolve as a concept.

Broadly, a reputation for resolve is the belief that an actor will behave resolutely in the future. Mercer (1996) defines reputation for resolve as the extent to which a state is believed to "risk war to achieve its objectives" (1). Within the discipline, reputation for

resolve is most prominently operationalized in terms of an actor's past behavior. For example, Tingley and Walter (2011) measure reputation for resolve as "a belief by another that a player who fought a challenger in the past will continue to fight challengers in the future, given a sufficiently similar situation" (346). To further clarify the concept of reputation for resolve, I will explain the two main components – reputation and resolve - individually.

1.4.1 Reputations

Beginning with the concept of reputation, scholars in the discipline of international relations define reputation as an assessment or judgment "that is then used to predict or explain future behavior" (Mercer 1996, 6).² According to Mercer (1996), one of the foremost scholars on reputation for resolve, reputation has two necessary components. First, in order for a reputation to form, a behavior must be attributed to an actor's character, not to the situation. Without this dispositional inference, reputation simply cannot form as an actor's behavior may be perceived to be dictated by the environment and outside of the actor's full control. Second, reputation also requires the belief that an actor will behave similarly in the future (Mercer 1996, 6-7). Accordingly, reputations at their core are meant to be predictive as they are the basis for understanding how actors will behave in future interactions. Reputation is conceptually

²Tomz (2007b) frames reputation in terms of the interpretation of information as reputation is "an impression others hold about [an actor's] preferences and abilities" (10). Other scholars in the field broadly define reputation in terms of past action. For example, Miller (2003) and Sartori (2005) define reputation as the judgments regarding past behavior that are used to predict future behavior.

distinct from behavioral expectations, however, as reputation is the foundation on which such expectations are based and then acted upon. Reputations act as a heuristic – an informational short cut – that carry information about the expected behavior of another actor in future situations. They function as a filter for information, helping actors to process an overwhelming amount of data that is revealed during interactions. Accordingly, reputations not only allow actors to organize new incoming information, but also increase the efficiency and speed of judgments regarding how another actor will behave in uncertain situations.

This is particularly important, I argue, as reputation is a relative concept rooted in perceptions (Axelrod 1984; Jervis 1976; Mercer 1996; Sharman 2007; Tang 2005). A leader or state does not own their reputation; rather, that actor's reputation is based on how others perceive and interpret its behavior. Accordingly, a state or leader may have distinct and varied reputations depending on the issue at hand and whose perception is measured (Miller 2003). Reputations may vary due to the content of information by which future judgments are made (Miller 2003; Tomz 2007b). Such information may include leader or state traits, past behavior, or situational factors (Jervis 1976).³ I argue there are multiple pathways in which a reputation may develop as decision-makers can process the same information in different ways or use varied information in their

³ Jervis argues that predictions regarding an actor's intentions are based on both past behavior and situational factors. While Mercer argues reputation is based solely on dispositional characteristics, Miller suggests that reputations may be influenced by both dispositional and situational factors.

assessments of resolve. Scholars within international security, however, most commonly define reputation in terms of state past action, and debate the effects of various factors including direct and indirect conflict histories on reputation development. In Chapter 2, I review this literature more closely.

1.4.2 Resolve

Resolve, like reputation, is also relational and perception-based. An actor is defined by others as resolute not based on the actor's privately held information, but on how its actions or characteristics are interpreted by others (Tang 2005). A state may privately know that it is resolute, but if it fails to communicate this resolve effectively to others, it may not be perceived as resolute. Furthermore, it is this perception of whether or not an actor is resolute that may affect future behavior. This psychological interpretation of resolve is debated within the international security and deterrence literature. Rationalist approaches to resolve argue that reputation for resolve is self-evident as all parties know the target's behavior and draw the same conclusions regarding the target's resolve from that behavior. While the target's resolve is initially privately held, once that information is revealed through the target's actions, there is little room for interpretation. An action is either resolute or irresolute, and all parties will agree on this assessment. Thus, there is no analytical need to study the interpretation of behavior. In contrast, the psychological models of reputation

development, upon which my work builds, focus on the ways in which behavior is interpreted as resolute or irresolute and how various factors may confound this process.⁴

Despite this debate, scholars have a largely agreed upon definition of resolve. Scholars characterize resolve as the extent to which an actor is willing to “risk and sacrifice to reach specific objectives” (Jervis 1976, 52). The essence of resolve, in the context of international security, is a belief that an actor is truly determined to achieve its goals and persevere through international crises and disputes, even during the onset and conduct of militarized conflict. At the root of this determination is a willingness to endure hurt and pain during these crises and disputes (Schelling [1966] 2008, 32). Accordingly, resolute actors are those that are perceived as willing to face costs and assume a high amount of risk in confronting these potential costs.

In the context of state reputations for resolve, these costs are typically defined in terms war fighting as scholars most frequently define resolve as “the extent to which a state will risk war to achieve its objectives” (Mercer 1996, 2).⁵ Indeed, reputations for resolve are most often discussed in the international relations literature in terms of a state’s willingness to fight as demonstrating resolve requires costly signaling, and war fighting is incredibly costly for states (see Glaser 2010). In this context, however, resolve is not synonymous with obstinacy or militancy as it is not purely based on risk

⁴ See Byman and Waxman 2002, Mercer 1996, and Tang 2005. See also McCalla (1992) for a discussion of the need to incorporate perceptions into studies of crisis behavior more generally.

⁵ See also Powell 1990 and Sartori 2005; Glaser (2010) argues that resolve can be communicated without the use of all-out military conflict so long as a response is sufficiently costly.

acceptance. For example, an actor may communicate its resolve and still accept a negotiated resolution to a dispute if the terms of settlement are acceptable. In such instances, demonstrating resolve can lead adversaries to avoid war and propose settlements that the resolute party finds amenable. In the next chapter, I critique the discipline's definition of resolve in terms of war fighting and argue it is possible for actors to demonstrate their resolve without resorting to the use of force or the onset of militarized conflict.

1.4.2.1 Resolve vs. Credibility

Within the international security literature, resolve is often linked to questions of credibility, and it is important to distinguish between these two concepts. Like reputation and resolve, credibility is also based on perceptions and is, therefore, relational. Credibility is a judgment as to whether or not an actor will follow through on its threats and promises. Questions of credibility are linked to issues of trust and believability (Kouzes and Posner 1993; Kilgour and Zagare 1991; Tang 2005). While questions of resolve address commitment and determination to a course of action, issues of credibility focus on the extent to which an actor's statements or potential actions are believable. In terms of deterrence theory, an actor's perceived resoluteness contributes to an actor's perceived credibility. If an actor is not perceived to be willing to face costs to achieve its goals, there is little reason to believe that it will follow through on its threats

or promises.⁶ Indeed, other scholars have defined credibility as “consisting of capability, interest, and resolve” (Tang 2005, 38). However, credibility is not based exclusively on perceptions of resolve. Rather, additional factors may influence the extent to which an actor is deemed credible.

To further clarify, the distinction between resolve and credibility can be thought of in terms of a poker game. Placing a large bet demonstrates that a player is committed to playing a hand as the player has raised the stakes and invested in its cards. It may even signify that the player is confident in its ability to win the hand. However, there are other factors, such as indications of bluffing, that may affect whether or not other players at the table believe the player has a winning hand. In these instances, while the player has shown its resolve to play out the hand, the player may not be able to demonstrate it has a winning hand based solely upon its bet.

1.5 Proceeding Chapters

The analogy above highlights an important consideration: an actor can communicate its resolve, but still be forced to fight in some instances. Accordingly, the scholarly focus on the impact of reputation for resolve by examining the onset of militarized conflicts and the outcome of these conflicts neglects to consider whether or not reputations for resolve form to begin with. As I will discuss further in the next

⁶ The link between resolve and credibility suggests there is the potential for negative consequences in trying to establish reputations for resolve. Most notably, the necessity to be perceived as resolute in order to be deemed credible may increase an actor’s susceptibility to over commitment and leave an actor vulnerable or exposed in other areas.

chapter, my dissertation addresses the development of leader-based reputations for resolve, not the effect these reputations have on international conflict.⁷ With this focus in mind my dissertation proceeds as follows. In the next chapter, Chapter 2, I present my theory of leader-based reputations for resolve. In this chapter, I clearly put forth my argument as to why leaders can develop reputations for resolve based on their statements and behavior as well as the causal process by which these reputations develop over time. In addition, I carefully address alternative arguments and approaches to the study of reputations for resolve, including the prevailing focus on past state conflict histories. The chapter concludes with a thorough discussion of my multi-methods approach to testing alternative theories and my theory of the development of leader-based reputations for resolve.

In Chapters 3 and 4, I use experimental surveys to test the extent to which perceptions of resolve are rooted in leader-based or state-based factors. The emphasis of these experiments is to provide greater confidence regarding the relationship between variables and the causal mechanisms by which reputations form and develop, a task which is especially well-suited to experimental design (McDermott 2002). In addition, these surveys isolate the effects of particular factors on perceptions of resolve, providing a more thorough understanding of how individuals process information regarding

⁷ I focus on the development of leader-based reputations for resolve as it is necessary to first establish both if and how leaders develop these reputations of their own before examining how these leader-based reputations affect the timing, onset, and outcome of international crises and conflict.

resolve. These two chapters complement each other as the first set of experiments in Chapter 3 focuses on periods of leadership change to determine if new leaders may develop reputations for resolve, while the second set of experiments presented in Chapter 4 follows the development of a single leader's reputation through increasingly high stakes interactions. The experiments in Chapter 4 also directly test my hypotheses regarding the ways in which these reputations develop over time.

In both these chapters, I find strong support for my hypotheses. I will show in Chapter 3 that leaders are able to develop reputations for resolve independently of the state. Most notably, participants' perceptions of a leader's resolve are based on a leader's statements and behavior while in office. Furthermore, while I find evidence that state-based factors (primarily past state behavior and state interest) may also be influential on perceptions of resolve in certain contexts, leader-based information remains statistically significant even when controlling for state-based factors. Chapter 4 indicates that leaders can develop robust reputations for resolve based on their statements and behavior. Furthermore, this chapter more clearly delineates between the effects of a leader's statements and a leader's behavior while also testing my hypotheses regarding the ways in which individuals access information to make decisions regarding resolve.

In Chapter 5, I present a statistical analysis to examine how the resoluteness of a leader's response during one crisis affects that leader's risk of being the target of a future crisis. According to the logic of reputation for resolve, resolute behavior should make

an actor a less attractive target of aggression and, therefore, less likely to be targeted in the future. In this statistical analysis, I consider how leader behavior, state behavior, and other state-based factors may affect the amount of time that passes until a target is engaged in a future crisis. This analysis complements the experimental chapters by rooting the research design in real world historical data. In addition to finding support for my primary hypothesis, the statistical analysis also sheds light on the importance of the level of analysis used by scholars as I find key differences in the impact of variables across leader-based and state-based models.

In the final empirical chapter, Chapter 6, I conduct an intensive historical case study using process tracing methods. The case study focuses on Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's perceptions of the resolve of U.S. Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy through a period of recurrent crises. In the case study, I test my primary hypothesis regarding the ability of leaders to develop independent reputations, as well as my hypotheses regarding which information leaders seek out and how this information is used in the development of these reputations. Through the case study, I find strong support for my main hypothesis as Khrushchev looked to both Eisenhower and Kennedy's actions while in office when making judgments about each leader's resolve. In addition, the case study highlights a particularly interesting interaction between a leader's attempts to signal resolve and that leader's communicated interest in the issue under dispute.

In Chapter 7, I present my conclusions regarding the ability of leaders to develop reputations for resolve as well as the ways in which these reputations form over time. In the concluding chapter, I both discuss my results from the empirical chapters and suggest avenues of future research based on these findings. I also present the critical policy implications of my dissertation results. More specifically, I explain the substantive importance, for policy-makers, of my finding that individual leaders can develop reputations for resolve, and I discuss how policy-makers can best communicate their resolve to potential challengers, especially considering my finding that early actions are highly influential on perceptions of resolve. Finally, I address the scholarly implications of my work, particularly regarding how scholars conceptualize resolve and the need for scholars to more fully incorporate the role of international leaders into their research.

2. A Theory of Leader-Based Reputations for Resolve

The prevailing approach to the study of reputations for resolve centers upon the ability of states to develop reputations for resolve and the effect these reputations may have on international conflict. Few scholars have examined the possibility that individual leaders may also be able to develop these reputations independently of the state. In this chapter, I begin by examining both the literature on reputation for resolve in international relations and the scholarship on the role of individual leaders in international conflict. I merge these two literatures to present a theory of why and how individual leaders may acquire such reputations. In doing so, I present hypotheses drawn from both the existing literature and my own theory of reputation development to answer two primary empirical research questions: Where do decision-makers look for cues as to how resolutely a leader or state will act in a crisis or dispute? What factors and characteristics do decision-makers take into account when making these judgments regarding resolve? I assert that leaders are capable of developing reputations for resolve independently of the state as decision-makers will look to leader-based factors when making assessments of a target's resolve. I further argue that the ways in which individuals seek out and internalize information will affect the process by which these individual reputations for resolve develop.

2.1 Reputations for Resolve in International Relations

International relations scholars have devoted much study to state reputations for resolve, particularly within the context of deterrence and compellence strategies.¹

General deterrence logic dictates that a state with a reputation for irresolute action may be challenged more readily than if it maintained a stronger reputation for resolve (Schelling [1966] 2008). To put it in Schelling's language, a reputation for action is highly valuable and effective at deterring threats, while a reputation for inaction can leave a state more vulnerable. These perceptions of resolve, according to Schelling's paradigm, can significantly impact interstate conflict by making states more or less attractive targets of aggression. Deterrence theorists stress this model by suggesting that a reputation for resolve deters adversaries from issuing threats and launching military attacks as well as enables a state to issue more credible threats of its own in the future (Huth 1997; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett 1993; Lebow 1981; Wiegand 2011, 103).² While reputation for resolve is prominent to deterrence theory, scholars have found mixed results regarding its impact on international conflict.

In perhaps the most frequently cited critique of the study of these reputations, Snyder and Diesing (1977) question the extent to which states can actually form reputations for resolve and doubt the substantive effects these reputations may have on

¹ See Arce and Sandler 2009, Davis 2000, and Press 2005 for an overview of this literature.

² See the introductory chapter for a discussion of the difference between credibility and resolve.

international conflict. They argue the potential costs of crisis bargaining are too high for statesmen to rely on the past behavior of states when making decisions. Other research finds that reputational effects are contingent upon state power and/or interests (Press 2005; Clare and Danilovic 2012). This may suggest that reputations for resolve do not form as states acquire reputations for strength instead (Press 2005). Furthermore, powerful states may be less able to credibly commit to being non-aggressive in the future (Sechser 2010).³ Accordingly, context may be a powerful tool in determining both how reputations form and the impact such reputations have on interstate conflict. This argument is strongly supported by Mercer (1996) who posits that, in different contexts, behavior can be attributed either to a state's natural disposition or to the circumstances of a specific situation.⁴ In certain circumstances, reputations may not have a significant impact on state behavior or may simply fail to develop. Additionally, reputational concerns alone may not be strong enough to constrain state behavior, particularly in periods of heightened uncertainty or perceived strategic weakness (Downs and Jones 2002; Lebow 1983).

³ Sechser's work combines issues associated with future reputation and state power, finding that weaker states that are reputation-conscious will not appease a strong challenger for fear of future challenges. Stronger states should offer incentives for weaker reputation-conscious states to prefer appeasement. However, these stronger states are not only more likely to underestimate the amount of side payments necessary to off-set the target's reputation costs, but are also less credible in future interactions due to their strength.

⁴ Mercer's theory predicts that undesirable behavior will be given a dispositional attribution, while desirable behavior will be given a situational attribution. Allies may only acquire reputations for irresolute action, while adversaries may only acquire reputations for resolute action.

In contrast, other scholars find empirical evidence suggesting state reputation does affect conflict initiation, conduct, and outcome. Weaker states in particular may have incentives to demonstrate their resolve and forge reputations for resolute action to deter potential aggressors in the future (Sechser 2010). Reputations can also serve as an important calculus in the alliance formation of states as evidence indicates states consider the past actions of potential alliance partners (Gibler 2008; Crescenzi et al 2012). While these scholars remain divided as to what factors are most salient for the development of reputation for resolve, these reputations are most commonly defined by the past actions of states (Lebow 1981; Schelling [1966] 2008). More specifically, reputations for resolve are primarily based on state conflict histories and can directly affect conflict initiation (Crescenzi 2007; Crescenzi, Kathman, and Long 2007; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2011). Furthermore, states utilize both direct and indirect conflict histories when determining an adversary's resolve, although direct conflict histories appear to be more salient and influential than indirect conflict histories (Crescenzi 2007; Crescenzi, Kathman, and Long 2007; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett 1993). Additional evidence indicates that concerns about one's future reputation can affect state behavior (Clare and Danilovic 2010; Sechser 2010; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2011; Wiegand 2011). States often invest in their reputations for resolve through both the initiation and escalation of conflict, suggesting states value their own reputations (Clare and Danilovic 2010; Walter 2006). Accordingly, the concept of reputation for resolve remains central to

the study of international relations and the conduct of international conflict (Powell 2006; Press 2005; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2011).

2.2 Individual Leaders and International Conflict

While scholars of reputation for resolve have closely studied state reputation, my analytical focus on individual leaders is strongly supported by other parts of the international relations literature. A large body of research indicates that individual high-level foreign policy decision-makers are critical to the study of international relations. Most importantly, this scholarship demonstrates that these leaders can significantly impact state conflict behavior, especially through foreign policy. While these decisions are influenced by domestic political and institutional constraints (see Bueno de Mesquita 2001, Chiozza and Goemans 2003, and Ghosn, London, and Palmer 2008), leaders are the primary arbiters of state foreign policy, and by extension, actively influence state behavior. Leaders can directly shape the conduct of war through their foreign policy agendas, especially in political systems where these elites have greater leverage over foreign policy decisions (Byman and Pollack 2001; Chiozza and Goemans 2011; Jones and Olken 2005; Saunders 2011; Ziv 2012). Scholars find that differences among individual leaders can account for a variety of policy outcomes, including UN voting patterns (Dreher and Jensen 2009), foreign economic policy (Jones and Olken 2005), international cooperation (Smith 2009), nuclear proliferation (Fuhrmann and Horowitz 2012; O'Reilly 2012), and conflict initiation and escalation (Bak and Palmer 2010;

Enterline and Williams 2010; Horowitz, McDermott and Stam 2005; Horowitz and Stam 2011; Malici 2008; Renhson 2006; Saunders 2011).

Leaders are particularly influential during crisis bargaining where the preferences of individual decision-makers may directly lead to policy outcomes (Foyle 2003; Jackson and Morelli 2007; Post and George 2004). In these situations, differences among individuals regarding privately held information, including individual levels of resolve, can make the difference between peaceful crisis resolution and the outbreak of militarized conflict (Bak and Palmer 2010; Wofford 2007). Unique differences among leaders, both in their characteristics and behavioral choices, may better account for dynamic changes in international relations where more static theories fail to account for such variations (Byman and Pollack 2001; Hudson 2005; Jervis 1976; Post 2008; Post and George 2004; Schafer and Crichlow 2010; Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962). Furthermore, the importance of individual differences among decision-makers becomes more significant and pronounced under periods of high stress and uncertainty (Hudson 2005). Despite the prevalence of this growing body of literature, scholars have yet to either fully examine whether leaders develop reputations for resolve or demonstrate that leaders actually develop reputations vis-à-vis other leaders.

2.2.1 Foundations of Leader Reputations

While my primary research question – whether leaders may develop reputations for resolve independently of the state - has been put forward by key scholars in passing,

it has yet to be systematically studied. As early as the mid-1970s, Jervis (1976) acknowledged that actors other than states may be tied to conceptions of resolve (48-49) and later explicitly posed the question of where reputations may adhere: "To start with, does reputation attach to the decision-maker, the regime, or the country?" (Jervis 1982-1983, 9). However, Jervis leaves the answer to this critical question open for other scholars to pursue. Likewise, Huth (1997) presents the possibility that actors besides states may acquire reputations by asking the reader to consider the question: "Reputation for whom?" More recently, Davis (2000) questions if individual statesmen might seek independent reputations, but also leaves this line of inquiry unanswered.

The leader-centric literature in international relations has laid the foundation for a study of leader-based reputations for resolve. Scholars find evidence that leaders are concerned with their own reputations (Press 2005; Tang 2005),⁵ and studies show that leaders can develop individual reputations for credibility and honesty (Chiozza and Choi 2003; Guisinger and Smith 2002). Other studies examine how new leaders are perceived as a function of when they are tested and challenged by other international leaders. These scholars find new democratic leaders are more likely to be engaged in foreign policy crises early in their tenure as would be adversaries test their response to obtain private information about the new leader, including individual levels of resolve

⁵ While Press finds that reputations are based on assessments of strength rather than past actions, his case studies show that leaders are preoccupied with their own reputations for resolve, regardless of whether or not these reputations actually form.

(Bresslauer 1983-1984; Gelpi and Grieco 2001; Wolford 2007; Potter 2007). In addition, Wolford (2007; 2012) has more explicitly addressed the issue of whether leaders can develop independent reputations by examining the timing of international crises. He finds that assessments regarding the resolve of a current leader and his potential successor can impact the timing of challenges. Wolford's model suggest that self-interest comes into play when potential challengers form these assessments, but it remains unclear as to how a challenger determines the resolve of a potential successor who has yet to take office. As a whole, these studies suggest that leaders may acquire reputations for resolve that are independent from both states and other leaders.

2.2.2 Critiques of the Leader Centric Approach

Despite strong evidence as to the value of such a line of investigation, my analytical focus on individual leaders is not without critique. The primary criticism drawn from the extant literature (primarily from realist scholars) is that differences among statesmen will be mitigated by external international constraints (see Waltz 1979). Thus, individuals will have little effect on the conduct of international relations as they are subservient to the actions of states. Drawing from the literature on domestic politics and international relations, other scholars have argued that institutions may condition and mitigate the effect of individual leaders, particularly in political systems, such as democracies, where there are checks on any one individual's power and

influence (see Foyle 2003, Kowert 2002, and Schafer and Crichlow 2010 for an overview of the literature).⁶

While these critiques hold value, especially regarding the importance of external influences on state behavior and the role of domestic constraints on leader influence, other scholarship directly addresses these concerns and disputes the notion that leaders are subservient actors in the international system. First and foremost, the issue is not as clear-cut as many scholars would lead readers to believe. Both external and internal stimuli may affect state behavior (Jervis 1976), but studying only the effect of external factors by focusing on the international system leads to a deficient understanding of internal variables, such as domestic institutions and individual leaders. Accordingly, Vasquez (1998) advocates scholars study both domestic-level and individual-level influences on foreign policy decision-making, demonstrating how leadership change may alter foreign policy decisions. Second, scholars have repeatedly shown the decisive importance of leaders and other high-ranking foreign policy decision-makers to state behavior (e.g. Byman and Pollack 2001, Chiozza and Goemans 2011, Jones and Olken 2005, Saunders 2011, and Ziv 2012). Theories which examine only external stimuli cannot account for the dynamic nature of foreign policy. Instead, a full understanding of how these policies are shaped by focusing on individual-level factors provides insight

⁶ For example, many scholars have studied the effects of public opinion and the ability of the public to constrain elite behavior. See Powlick and Katz (1998) for an overview of this literature. For more critiques of the individual level of analysis and rebuttals, see Byman and Pollack (2001).

into why states pursue specific actions (see Foyle 2003). Third, and with regard to institutional constraints, scholars have also shown that individual leaders can often influence these institutions or circumvent them altogether. For example, work from diversionary war theory suggests conditions under which domestic institutional constraints on leader behavior can be sidestepped (see Levy 1988). Furthermore, even in democracies, major foreign policy changes are unlikely to be successful if they are not also approved by the primary leader (Ziv 2012). Finally, institutional theories do not account well for sudden fluctuations in policy choices. To explain these “abrupt changes in political patterns,” scholars need to look to individual leaders (Kowert 2002, 6).

Other scholars take the significance of leaders a step further, arguing that individual leaders are *the* most important actors in international politics. Malici (2008) strongly expresses this sentiment as he argues “the most important aspect of international relations is how leaders represent themselves and their enemies” (3). Wofford (2007) asserts that leaders should be “the fundamental units of analysis in international relations” (772). Similarly, Mitchell (1981) suggests the study of international leaders may best account for outcomes of international conflict, especially with regard to conflict resolution (see also Foyle 2003). At a minimum, the recent explosion in leader-centric research demonstrates the rising prevalence of this alternative level of analysis.

2.3 Current Problems with the Study of Reputations for Resolve

Like these scholars, I argue that leaders are critical actors in international politics. My research questions bridge the theoretical gap between the role of individual leaders and reputations for resolve among states in international relations. Answering these questions is critical to the study of international conflict. Much of the discrepancy among scholars as to whether or not reputation actually matters for international relations is due to a lack of understanding of the process by which reputations form (see Davis 2000). While some scholars have examined the formation and development of reputation for resolve (Crescenzi 2007; Mercer 1996), many scholars studying reputations for resolve consider such reputations *ex-post* as they often attribute changes in behavior to reputations for resolve without first showing if and how a reputation developed. In contrast, I examine the decision-making process within individuals to understand *ex-ante* how an actor's resolve is perceived and how a reputation develops over the course of multiple events. This focus on reputation development provides substantial leverage towards a fuller understanding of reputations for resolve. My theory illustrates the relational process by which reputations for resolve form by considering the following question: what information do decision-makers seek out and process when making assessments of resolve?

Despite a resurgent interest in the study of reputations for resolve, the process by which actors gain these reputations remains poorly understood (Davis 2000; Mercer

1996; Senese and Vasquez 2003). While the conceptual definition of a reputation indicates that past behavior should be the basis for expectations of future behavior, it remains unclear which types of behaviors affect reputation for resolve and to what extent. Logically, consistently acting resolutely or irresolutely should lead to an appropriate reputation, but what happens to reputation for resolve when an actor sends mixed signals by acting resolutely in one instance and irresolutely in another? What constitutes a sufficiently similar situation upon which reputation is judged? Is this similarity driven by common state-based characteristics (such as relative power or regime type), the issue under dispute, the time between disputes, etc.? Furthermore, what types of actions lead to an actor being perceived as resolute - is it the strength of response, the appropriateness of response (i.e. reciprocity; see Morrow 1989), or the speed with which a response is given that matters for reputation development? Finally, can actors develop reputations for resolve in disputes short of war or militarized conflict? Scholars within the discipline have not fully addressed these questions, and much ambiguity remains in our understanding of the specific mechanisms by which reputation for resolve develops and affects conflict.

As previously noted, scholars overwhelmingly define resolve in terms of war fighting. I argue this narrow definition limits our study and understanding of the process by which reputations for resolve develop and the conditions under which these reputations can affect conflict. The literature's connection between war fighting and

resolve stems from the application of resolve as a concept to explain militarized interstate conflict and the centrality of costly signals to the communication of resolve (see Glaser 2010). The analytical focus of scholars studying reputation for resolve remains centered upon militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) or threats of violence. In this regard, defining resolve in terms of willingness to risk war is appropriate. However, it may also be possible for actors to demonstrate their resolve on issues that are unlikely to directly lead to war, such as lower level disputes and crises based on non-militarized issues. Many international crises are less intense than MIDs as they do not involve either the threat or use of militarized force. In their analysis of coercive threats, Downes and Sechser (2012) find that relatively few of the crises coded in the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset constitute compellent threats in which the threat of force was either explicit or implied (116 incidents; 11.6%), but a surprising number of crises were non-militarized disputes (349 incidents; 34.9%). Similarly, nearly half the cases analyzed (144 incidents; 49.0%) were “minor skirmishes and border violations” (Downes and Sechser 2012, 462). Focusing only on instances in which the threat or actual use of force was used misses the majority of crisis interactions within international relations.

In these less intense cases, resolve can still be communicated if an actor demonstrates its commitment and determination to achieving a specified goal. This may include more appropriate responses to lower-level threats and disputes, such as standing firm in negotiations, increasing diplomatic pressures, or using other tools of

coercion including economic sanctions. Defining resolve solely in terms of war fighting misses these lower-level interactions and, I argue, fails to capture the essence of resolve during the majority of state interactions. Defining resolve more generally as the willingness to face costs to achieve a stated goal allows for a more thorough examination of the roots of resolve. Such a definition avoids potential issues of conflating resolve with militancy and frames resolve in terms of determination and persistence rather than belligerence.

Furthermore, scholarly definitions that frame resolve purely in terms of war fighting imply that reputation for resolve can only develop during these more intense conflicts. This definition and focus adheres to the bargaining model of war whereby war fighting reveals information about the adversary's resolve that could not have been revealed without conflict. In this context, disagreement over a state's level of resolve contributes to the onset of militarized conflict and engaging in such conflict can reveal private information regarding each state's resolve (see Fearon 1995; Reiter 2003). This predominant focus relies on the rationalist conception of reputation for resolve whereby there may be incentives for states to exaggerate their resolve, but resolve becomes self-evident once revealed through state behavior (see Reiter 2003). As noted earlier, such an approach fails to take into account the interpretation of informational cues that may signal resolve. If states or leaders can signal their resolve through lower-level interactions and disputes, it can be argued that, by the time these states reach the point

at which violence is a viable option, assessments of resolve may no longer matter for conflict. In these instances, crises which have escalated to the use of violence may involve targets that have already failed to demonstrate their resolve through earlier action or challengers who do not value the target's resolve in their decision-making calculus. Accordingly, scholars should not expect resolve to matter in these conflicts (and many scholars find resolve does not matter for these disputes). Conversely, leaders (or states) that consistently communicate their resolve through lower intensity interactions or crises, such as through negotiations, should be able to avoid violent conflict in the future by building a foundational reputation for resolute action. By examining only the instances in which militarized disputes occur, scholars may be missing the interactions that lead an actor to build a reputation for resolve. Accordingly, scholars may only be testing for the effects of these reputations among actors that signaled they were irresolute in earlier lower-level interactions.

My analysis, in contrast, traces the development of reputation for resolve from the beginning of a leader's time in office through crises, disputes, and major negotiations to understand the foundations of reputation for resolve. I examine the development of reputations for resolve through not just war fighting and militarized conflict, but also during high-level negotiations and other crisis interactions that may not end in a show of militarized force. Recent work on diplomacy and reputations supports this focus. For example, Sartori (2002) finds states are able to signal which issues are most important to

them through diplomatic interactions and, in doing so, increase the chance they will prevail on these issues in the future. Similarly, Trager's (2010) results indicate diplomatic communications can affect whether a state is considered to be a potential threat and whether that state is perceived as resolute. Guisinger and Smith (2002) link diplomatic statements, resolve, and individual leaders to show that diplomacy is an effective strategy for signaling resolve when leaders are held domestically accountable. Finally, Ramsay (2011) finds that information regarding resolve revealed through diplomacy can affect the probability of two states going to war. By broadening my analytical focus to include crises and negotiations at different levels of intensity, I am able to discern both which factors decision-makers rely on when making assessments of resolve and how this information is used to predict future behavior. In doing so, I can take into account the extent to which both dispositional, such as leader or state behavior, and situational factors, such as the issue under dispute, may influence the development of reputations for resolve. This approach provides for a fuller understanding and stronger test of the extent to which leaders may develop reputations for resolve.

In addition, current measurements of reputations for resolve may be unable to fully account for dynamic changes in reputation. Scholars have delved into two main independent variables to explain reputation for resolve: state power and state conflict histories. State power – at least from a relative standpoint – is quite static. Popular measures of state power, particularly the CINC index, have changed little for many

states (including major powers) over years of data collection. State conflict histories offer a more dynamic explanation for reputations for resolve, yet many states enjoy relatively peaceful existences. Even those states that engage in more conflict still see periods of stability. This begs the question: are conflict histories relevant after five, ten, or even fifteen years? Critics of reputation for resolve would certainly argue such histories are outdated and unreliable.

In contrast, individual leaders may act as a catalyst for change. The emergence of new leadership or differences in leader action can be dynamic and may better account for observed changes in reputation for resolve. As discussed earlier, other scholars have found strong evidence that individual leaders exert control and influence over foreign policy, acting as the catalyst for change in this regard. These differences at the individual-level could be a source of change at the state-level as well. As these conditions vary, one may observe changes in the reputations of either leaders or states. Wolford (2007) explains this dynamic clearly: "Longitudinally, observations on a state may be contaminated by the rise and fall of multiple leaders each of whom takes office without a reputation and acts to develop one, and the effects of reputation will appear nonexistent" (774). Furthermore, it is logical to suspect that leaders may develop their own reputations for resolve given their influence and control over foreign policy decision-making. As these individuals largely determine the behavior of states during international crises and disputes, other leaders should look for informational cues

regarding an individual leader's reputation for resolve rather than relying on state reputation for resolve. Looking only to state reputation cannot sufficiently inform potential challenger leaders as to how a target leader may react. When studying reputation for resolve through the lens of individual leaders, scholars must consider the decision-making process by which information regarding a leader's resolve is accessed, processed, and used to make judgments. My theory of reputation for resolve considers the process by which reputations form by combining considerations of a leader's past actions and a state's communicated interest with cognitive limitations, resulting in a theory that is unique from current approaches to the study of reputation for resolve. Accordingly, I assert that individual leaders can develop independent reputations for resolve based on their actions while in office, leading to the following hypothesis:

H₁: Individual leaders can develop reputations for resolve independently of the state. These perceptions of resolve will be based on the current leader's communicated resolve through his statements and actions while in office.

My theory of leader-based reputations is presented more thoroughly later in this chapter. Before discussing the details of my theory, I engage alternative hypotheses drawn from the extant literature on reputations for resolve in international relations.

2.4 Alternative Approaches

Alternative hypotheses regarding the ability of leaders to develop reputations for resolve independently of the state can be drawn from existing scholarship focusing on both system-level behavioral determinants and domestic politics. The most prominent

theory on state reputations assumes that reputation for resolve is based on a state's past actions. Scholars find that states utilize both direct and indirect conflict histories with their opponents when determining an adversary's resolve, although indirect interactions are less influential (Crescenzi 2007; Crescenzi, Kathman, and Long 2007; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2011). Further research supports the argument that a state's reputation is based on past actions as states that renege on alliance commitments find it more difficult to obtain alliance partners in the future, while states that have honored their alliance commitments are more likely to find willing alliance partners (Crescenzi et al 2012; Gibler 2008). This leads to the following hypothesis:

H₂: Reputations for resolve will be attributed to states, not leaders. These state reputations for resolve will be based on the past actions of that state.

Additional alternative theories focus on the context of the dispute and the way in which information regarding the dispute is processed to determine reputation for resolve. Assessments of resolve may be based on the relationship between the challenger (the actor making assessments about another's resolve) and the target. According to Mercer's theory of reputation development (1996), undesirable behavior is given a dispositional attribution, while desirable behavior is attributed to the situation. In the context of reputation for resolve, allies may gain reputations for backing down but not for standing firm, while adversaries may acquire reputations for standing firm but not for backing down. Accordingly, allies may only have reputations for irresolute action, while adversaries may only acquire reputations for resolute action. An additional

alternative hypothesis based on other research indicates that beliefs about whether an actor is resolute or irresolute cannot be reinforced; only changed (Tomz 2007b).

Accordingly, reputations for resolute or irresolute action should not become more robust through repeated confirmation. These two hypotheses regarding reputation development are as follows:

H₃: A target can only gain a reputation for being resolute and cannot gain a reputation for being irresolute.

H₄: Reputations cannot be reinforced, only changed.

Two additional alternative hypotheses rest in the literature on the effects of state interest and power on reputation for resolve (see Clare and Danilovic 2012; Press 2005).

The state interest hypothesis asserts that actors simply do not acquire reputations for resolve; rather, assessments of resolve are based on whether or not it is in the state's interest to follow through on a threat or promise. A state that has a major strategic interest in adhering to its threat or promise will be more likely to be viewed as resolute, but will acquire a reputation for being strong rather than resolute. Accordingly, decision-makers should base their assessments of an adversary's resolve on communicated state interest in the dispute, not on the actions of individual leaders.

Press (2005) argues state capability is also a deciding factor beyond state interest. This hypothesis suggests that perceptions of a target's resolve should be based on a state's ability to protect itself against threats. Accordingly, targets with a relatively stronger military than the challenger should be perceived as more resolute, while target states at

a military disadvantage should be perceived as less resolute. This leads to the following hypotheses regarding state interest and relative military power:

H₅: Reputations for resolve will be based on communicated state interest over an issue under dispute.

H₆: Target states with a relatively stronger military will be viewed as more resolute, while states with a relatively weaker military will be perceived as less resolute.

A final alternative approach may focus on the regime type of states. While this is not a major theory in the literature on reputations for resolve, previous studies suggest the timing and initiation of crises may be tied to regime type as democratic leaders may be viewed as more resolute during interstate crises. Scholars argue that audience costs, the ability of domestic constituents to punish leaders who back down from threats, increase the perceived resolve of democratic leaders (Fearon 1994; 1997). This accountability mechanism increases the stakes for democratic leaders in both the issuing and defense of military challenges (Gelpi and Grieco 2001; Chiozza and Goemans 2011). In theory, these public commitments tie the hands of democratic leaders, allowing these leaders to effectively and credibly signal their resolve during crisis bargaining (Schelling 1966; Fearon 1994; 1997; Schultz 1999; Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001; Haynes 2012). Accordingly, a regime-based hypothesis would argue that, due to the institutional structure of democracies (see Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003), democratic leaders should be perceived as more resolute than non-democratic leaders. This leads to the following hypothesis regarding regime type:

H₇: Democratic leaders will be perceived as more resolute than non-democratic leaders.

It is important to note, however, that other work suggests there may be caveats or limitations to this hypothesis. Most notably, there may be instances in which these accountability mechanisms fail to generate high enough costs to be effective or these audience costs may simply not manifest themselves within democracies (Weeks 2008). It may also be possible for both sides, regardless of regime type, to use public commitments during crisis bargaining (Tarar and Leventoglu 2009; Weeks 2008), reducing this democratic advantage. In the empirical chapters, I test each of these competing hypotheses against my theory of reputation development. In doing so, I find strong support for some hypotheses and little support for others.

2.5 Leader Interaction Theory of Reputation

In contrast to these alternative hypotheses rooted in state-based factors, I argue that leaders should be the level of analysis when studying the development of reputations for resolve. As previously noted, it is logical to conclude that leaders should be able to develop individual reputations for resolve given their influence and control over foreign policy decision-making. Even in political systems where there are constraints on any one individual's ability to determine foreign policy, primary leaders (such as the President or Prime Minister) remain the public faces of a state's foreign policy. Furthermore, these and other high-ranking individuals interact repeatedly during high-level negotiations on issues pertaining to foreign policy. As such, it would

be reasonable to believe that international leader's look to each other's reputations for resolve rather than rely only on state reputation when making assessments about the resoluteness of a target's response. Accordingly, I theorize that individual leaders should be able to develop reputations for resolve independently of the state and that the reputations of these individuals should be based on their behavior while in office.

Even more so, other work demonstrates that international leaders view each other as critical to the conduct of foreign policy and the driving force behind state behavior. The literature on foreign imposed regime change, in particular, demonstrates the large extent to which international leaders are perceived to have a significant, if not exclusive, influence over the foreign policies of their states (see Downes 2009; Peic and Reiter 2011; Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter 2008). The overwhelming belief in the importance of individuals leads states to engage in conflict to replace leaders in other states in the hopes of achieving better interstate relations and more favorable policies abroad. If decision-makers did not believe that other leaders were the main actors controlling foreign policy, they would not bother to expend the resources to have these leaders in other states replaced.

Furthermore, previous studies of state reputation have inadvertently stressed the importance of leader perceptions in their evidence. For example, Press (2005) utilizes the perceptions of individual leaders as a measurement for the reputations of states. In his case study on Nazi Germany, for example, Press considers how Hitler and his top

military advisors (often individually) perceived the credibility and resolve of the Allied states, using this evidence (from the individual-level perspective) to argue that Germany (at the state-level) had a particular perception of Allied credibility and resolve. While this does not invalidate Press's results regarding the impact of power and interest on reputations, it does show a pre-existing reliance on leader perceptions within the literature on reputation for resolve. It further demonstrates that individual leaders look to the behavior of other leaders when making assessments of resolve. It is these perceptions that I examine in my study of the development of reputations for resolve among individual leaders.

In examining these perceptions, I propose an information processing-based theory that explains both why decision-makers look to a leader's statements and behavior to make assessments of resolve and how these leader-based reputations for resolve develop over time through multiple interactions. I call this theory of reputation development the Leader Interaction Theory of Reputation. My theory focuses on the perceptions of individual leaders, considering both what pieces of information leaders use when making assessments of another leader's resolve and how this information is processed in determining these reputations. My theory can best be thought of as a merging of past actions theories and cognitive information processing models. I also assert that context can have a significant influence on these perceptions, particularly the relative importance of the issue at hand, for cognitive reasons. I argue that decision-

makers base their assessments of another leader's resolve on that leader's statements and behavior while in office. Due to cognitive biases, however, these assessments will not be perfectly updated. As I will explain in full, once an individual has made a judgment about another leader's resolve, he is more likely to maintain that assessment by interpreting new evidence in accordance with the original perception (Cottam 1986; Janis and Mann 1977; Jervis 1976; Jonas et al 2001; Klayman 1995).

2.5.1 Perceptions and Individual Decision-Making

To understand the extent to which individual leaders can develop independent reputations for resolve, I focus on the perceptions of decision-makers by examining where they look for signals regarding the resolve of others. Within this context, the perceptions of these leaders are particularly important as individual decision-makers respond to their perceptions of an incident, not the objective reality (Cottam 1986; de Rivera 1968; Gries and Christensen 2001; Hymans 2010; Reger and Huff 1993). These perceptions can be unique to individuals and may vary based on whose perception is examined (Dickson 2009; Herrmann 1986; Kaufmann 1994; O'Reilly 2012; Renshon 2006; Stein 1988).⁷ Even more so, such perceptions not only influence policy choices, but also "define the context and criteria for evaluating policy successes" (Herrmann 1986, 873; see also Farnham 1990; Stein 1988). In order to determine whether individual leaders can

⁷ For example, Herrmann (1986) finds that perceptions among American decision-makers regarding the extent to which the Soviets were a threat, even within the same administration, varied greatly across individuals.

develop independent reputations, I analyze the origins of individually held perceptions regarding resolve and examine how information about a target leader's resolve is used to make judgments about that leader's future behavior.

Scholars within political science and international relations have relied heavily on insights from cognitive psychology to understand this decision-making process within individuals. The literature on foreign policy decision-making, in particular, has seen a recent resurgence in the application of cognitive models to elite political behavior (see Aquilar and Galluccio 2011, Astorino-Courtois 2000, Berejikian 2004; Boettcher 2004, Crichlow 2005, Dickson 2009, Helfstein 2012, Jervis 2006, Krebs and Rapport 2012, O'Reilly 2012, Renshon 2006, Renshon and Renshon 2008, Rosati 2000, Sandal et al 2011, Schafer and Crichlow 2010, Stern 2004, Suedfeld and Jhangiani 2009, Tetlock and Goldgeier 2000, Vis 2011, Yetiv 2011, Ziv 2011, and Ziv 2012).⁸ These models stress the importance of information processing among decision-makers as this process is critical to both the creation and development of an individual's perceptions (Janis and Mann 1977; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Malici 2008; Roberts 1988; Suedfeld 1992). Furthermore, understanding how leaders select and use information is central to determining the extent to which these elites matter in international politics as this

⁸ This list is not exhaustive. Furthermore, it only includes those scholars from 2000 onward who explicitly examine cognitive information-processing theories within the context of international relations and individual level decision-making.

process can affect decision outcomes (Crichlow 2005; Geva, Mayhar, and Skorick 2000; Herek, Janis, and Huth 1987; Hermann et al 2001; Kowert 2002; Malici 2008).

2.5.2 Cognitive Biases

One of the most pervasive and robust findings from within cognitive psychology is the individual's reliance on heuristics, or mental shortcuts. Scholars within international relations have used theories of these cognitive biases to explain misperception in international relations, particularly in regard to deterrence calculations (Crichlow 2005; Jervis 1976; 2006; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1985; Rosati 2000; Suedfeld and Jhangiani 2009; Yetiv 2011). As individuals have a limited cognitive capacity and rely on these decision-making shortcuts, their perceptions and judgments become simplified in several ways. First, an individual's attention capacity is limited and reduced (Suedfeld 1992, 437). These cognitive constraints limit the ability of individuals to perform a complete and rational information search. It is simply neither feasible nor desirable, some scholars argue, for individuals to pay attention to all available information.⁹ Instead, individuals selectively, and often unconsciously, choose which information to pay attention to and internalize. Even those individuals that are more cognitively open-minded, and able to process larger amounts of information, selectively choose which information they attend to (Pomerantz, Chaiken, and Tordesillas 1995).

⁹ It can also be argued that it is rational for individuals to rely on heuristics, since the large amount of information needed to perform an extensive information search would make a timely decision difficult.

This reduced information search is magnified during periods of high cognitive stress, such as when there is an overwhelming amount of information to process or the costs of making an incorrect decision are particularly high (Blay, Kadous, and Sawers 2012; Hansen and Hegelson 1996; Huber, Huber, and Bär 2011; Maoz 1997; Weber and Johnson 2009; Weiss 1982).¹⁰ Recent work in neuroscience finds that different chemical signals sent to the brain, conditioned upon the type and extent of stress, affect an individual's attention setting and information processing consistent with these cognitive theories (see Ogawa et al 2010 and Yu and Dayan 2005). High levels of uncertainty lead decision-makers to rely heavily on heuristics. These decisions, however, are not necessarily worse than a decision made through a rational approach. Instead, scholars find that these decisions made via heuristic processes are often more accurate than decisions made with a more exhaustive information search (Dhami and Harries 2010; Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; Johnson, O'Brien, and Sung 2010; Volz and Gigerenzer 2012). Within political science, scholars have debated the extent to which high levels of stress and risk affect these cognitive limitations (see Renshon and Renshon 2008 and Maoz 1997).

Recent work supports the presence of this cognitive bias in political elites. Astorino-Coutois (2000) finds that individuals in high-threat situations will seek out

¹⁰ This manner by which individuals conduct a reduced information search further distinguishes my argument from a rationalist one as rationalists would argue that individuals should seek out more information during times of stress or high uncertainty in an effort to make a better informed decision.

more information, but high-stakes conditions cause individuals to seek out less information. More recently, Schafer and Crichlow (2010) find that exhaustive information searches are more likely at the group and bureaucratic levels of decision-making, but top-level individual decision-makers are biased in both their information search and processing.

Second, this limited information search affects the ability of individuals to seek out new information once a judgment is made. In particular, individuals prefer new information to conform to their pre-existing beliefs.¹¹ They tend to not only seek out information that confirms these beliefs, but they also discount new contradictory information or force this new information to conform to their pre-existing beliefs. This is known within the cognitive psychology literature as cognitive dissonance theory and confirmation bias. This process produces overconfidence in an individual's beliefs, leading to stronger and more robust initial perceptions (Hetzler 2010; Rabin and Schrag 1999; Rosati 2000). Recent work from neuroscience shows that the cognitive dissonance created by conflicting information creates a bio-chemical reaction in the brain, causing both physical and emotional distress within individuals (Carter et al 2009). Experiments indicate this desire for cognitive consistency is so strong that an individual may "come to believe with near certainty in a false hypothesis despite receiving an infinite amount

¹¹ Once again, my argument differs from a rationalist choice argument as rationalists would suggest that individuals are open-minded in both the information they seek out as well as the way this new information is processed.

of information” (Rabin and Schrag 1999, 37; see also Gawronski and Strack 2004, Jonas et al 2001, and Simon, Snow, and Read 2004). This confirmation bias often remains robust even when the initial impression is shown to be unfounded (Gilbert 2002, 180).

This desire for cognitive consistency leads individuals to value their first impressions (known as the first impression bias) and to judge later interactions off of this initial assessment (known as the anchoring bias) (Epley and Gilovich 2010; Hetzler 2010; Janis and Mann 1977; Jervis 1976; Mussweiler 2001; Rosati 2000). This tendency to compare later events to an initial judgment is unconscious and difficult to change. Even when individuals become aware that their initial impressions may be incorrect or are incentivized to alter these perceptions, it is difficult to adjust these initial judgments. Furthermore, such attempts at adjustment often remain insufficient (Epley and Gilovich 2004; 2006). In addition, individuals may believe they have altered their impressions, when in reality, their initial assessments still hold (Chapman and Johnson 2002). During periods of increased cognitive stress, this adjustment process becomes even more difficult (Gilbert et al 1998). The first impression bias is often exacerbated when a decision-maker must consider complex information from a multitude of sources (Rabin and Schrag 1999). This effect has a neurological basis as the regions of the brain active during initial assessments encode early information as both more meaningful and more “heavily weighted in later interactions” (Freeman et al 2009). Even more so, more thorough initial information searches do not affect how this information is integrated

with previous knowledge or how the information is retrieved (Tetlock 1983). In other words, even more rational initial decisions are still subject to the first impression and anchoring biases.

To overcome these biases, new information must be perceived as both salient and highly important (Wickens and Hollands 1999). When new information meets these criteria, individuals increase their attentiveness, making them more likely to accurately incorporate such information and adjust their assessments accordingly (Kaufmann 1994). This is known as the salient information bias (Hetzler 2010), and it is particularly applicable to the study of foreign policy and crisis decision-making. The large, and sometimes overwhelming, amount of information individual foreign policy decision-makers must process leads these individuals to rely heavily on the heuristics mentioned above. Issue salience works as an attention getting mechanism, causing these elites to focus more fully on issues that are deemed particularly important, especially with regards to their domestic constituents (Oppermann and Spencer 2013). This not only causes foreign policy elites to focus more carefully on specific information; it can also affect foreign policy agenda setting (Geva, Mayhar, and Skorick 2000; Geva and Skorick 1999; Herek, Janis, and Huth 1987; Miler 2009; Soroka 2003).

While one may think that political elites are able to transcend these cognitive biases and engage in more rational decision-making, scholars find that elite decision-makers are indeed subject to these psychological constraints (Bougher 2012; Shimko

1994). As Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam (2005) put it: "There is no reason to believe that national leaders are excluded from the psychological insights applied to individuals in general" (663). Within the realm of American politics, Miler (2009) finds that legislative elites rely on easily accessible information that is both biased and incomplete when making policy decisions. In international relations, scholars find that even the highest-level decision-makers, such as top advisors and even heads of state, are susceptible to the confirmation, first impression, and anchoring biases (Mandel 1984; Suedfeld 1994; Kaufmann 1994; Oppermann and Spencer 2013; Renshon and Renshon 2008; Vertzberger 1990). For example, Renshon (2006) finds that these cognitive biases among leaders can help explain the motivations and timing of preventative wars.

Other scholarship from outside of political science confirms that even experts use heuristics and are susceptible to these biases (Das and Teng 1999; Haley and Stumpf 1989; Koehler, Brenner, and Griffin 2002; McCaughey and Bruning 2010; Purkitt and Dyson 1988; Schwenk 1988; see also Aquilar and Gallucio 2008, Houghton 2009, and Post and George 2004). This natural reliance on heuristics, however, is not necessarily detrimental to decision-making. Rather, this process can improve decision-making by producing higher quality decisions, and elites can use these cognitive biases quite effectively (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; Hafner-Burton, Hughes, and Victor 2011; Lau and Redlawsk 2001). When applying these cognitive theories to political science, however, scholars must recognize that external factors, such as situational context and

strategic considerations, may also play a role in influencing elite decisions (Stein 1988; Maoz 1997; Tetlock and Goldgeier 2000). Indeed, in applying these theories of cognitive psychology to leader interactions, my theory takes these additional factors into account.

2.5.3 A Theory of Leader-Based Reputations for Resolve

Applying these theories from cognitive and political psychology suggests that reputations for resolve may develop non-linearly over time. As new leaders come into office, potential international challengers will have relatively little information regarding the new leader's resolve simply due to the fact that the two leaders have not yet interacted. Furthermore, what little information potential challengers do have about the new leader will be both incomplete and uncertain. As these leaders begin to interact, the potential challenger (the perceiver) will look for clues regarding the new target leader's level of resolve. This is most readily revealed through the testing of the new leader with foreign policy challenges. Due to cognitive limitations, early direct interactions with the target leader will have a greater effect on the challenger's assessment of the target's resolve. Once a target leader has established a reputation, cognitive biases make it difficult to change this perception. It will take a significant event containing a considerable amount of contrary information for a leader's reputation to be dramatically

altered (see Jervis 1976, 239-271 and Reiter 1996).¹² This leads to a critical hypothesis for my theory regarding the development of reputations for resolve:

H₈: Once a leader's reputation for resolve has formed, it will be difficult to change. Accordingly, early interactions are critical to the development of a leader's reputation for resolve.

Furthermore, issues that are communicated to be of strong interest to the target leader will be more substantive to the development (or alteration) of a reputation for resolve. Due to cognitive limitations, individuals will focus their attention on issues that they are told are important and worth their attention by their adversaries, becoming more vigilant in their information processing of these issues. This makes both their search for information more thorough and their assessment of this information less biased (Janis and Mann 1977). It is during conflict over these issues of communicated strategic importance that the challenger is most likely to learn and dramatically change his belief about the target's resolve, particularly since these interactions carry greater reputational costs for the target leader. This leads to a second key hypothesis for my theory of leader-based reputations for resolve:

¹²Reiter argues learning is driven by "formative" events, such as significant foreign policy successes or failures directly between states. In addition, my argument is unique from a rational choice based argument. A rational choice argument suggests that observers simply update information rationally (i.e. whether a target is more/less resolved) base on new information (e.g. the target's behavior in the last interaction). Observers should not weigh early information more than later information, as my theory predicts. A prospect theoretical argument would include an explicit and probabilistic calculation of risk, whereby leaders would update their assessments around a reference point based on previous successes or failures after each instance.

H₉: The target's communicated level of interest in an issue will influence the development of a reputation for resolve. Issues that are communicated to be of great strategic importance to the target will carry more weight in the view of the challenger, and the target's behavior during these disputes will be particularly influential to resolve.

My theory of leader-based reputations, therefore, argues that reputations for resolve are based on the past actions of leaders, mediated by cognitive limitations, and conditioned by the communicated strategic value of an issue under dispute.

2.5.3.1 Information Uncertainty and Issue Salience

One of the key analytical considerations of my theory is how important interactions between leaders are to the challenger leader's assessment of the target leader's resolve. In particular, it is important to consider how information uncertainty can affect attentiveness and interact with cognitive limitations to solidify (or change) a reputation for resolve. My theory stresses direct interactions between the challenger leader (the leader who will initiate a crisis or dispute and whose perception I examine in the empirical chapters of this dissertation) and target leader as these will be most salient in the challenger's assessment of the target's reputation for resolve. As these interactions occur directly between both leaders, the challenger will be more attentive to information revealed during these interactions, making these direct interactions more influential in assessments of resolve. This argument is supported by studies examining state reputation for resolve in which direct state interaction was revealed to be more salient to reputations than indirect action (Crescenzi 2007; Cresenzi, Kathman, and Long 2007).

Accordingly, a target leader's reputation for resolve will quickly emerge based on his initial actions in office as target leaders enter office with incomplete informational cues regarding their resolve. This notion is strongly implied in the current literature regarding leadership transitions and international crises, which shows that new leaders are targeted early in their tenure in an effort by challengers to obtain clues regarding the new leader's resolve (Gelpi and Grieco 2001; Bresslauer 1983-1984; Wolford 2007). My theory also argues that direct interactions, particularly over issues which the target leader communicates to be of high strategic importance, that occur early in the challenger's and target's relationship will be most influential for the target leader's reputation for resolve due to cognitive limitations described in the previous section. Furthermore, these assessments based on direct interaction will carry the least amount of uncertainty for the challenger as he will be most confident in these judgments.

When a challenger leader encounters an experienced target leader with whom he has not directly interacted with in a crisis situation, the challenger may look to the target leader's interactions with other leaders to garner cues about the target leader's potential resolve. These indirect interactions will not be as influential to the leader's reputation for resolve as direct interaction between the two leaders would be. Such information, however, may act as a proxy for reputation for resolve. These situations may help the challenger to evaluate the target leader's resolve, but there will still be much more uncertainty in the mind of the challenger leader as to whether he has correctly assessed

the target's resolve. Previous studies of reputation for resolve among states, for example, show indirect action influences reputation, but not as strongly as direct interaction (Crescenzi 2007; Crescenzi, Kathman, and Long 2007; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2011).

During crises, challenger leaders may also face new target leaders who do not have experience while in office. In these situations uncertainty regarding the target leader's resolve is highest. To ameliorate this high uncertainty, the challenger will look for clues regarding the target leader's potential resolve. The challenger may consider if the target leader has any international experience – such as holding highly visible office prior to taking the leadership position – to obtain clues regarding the new leader's potential resolve while in office. For example, in Chapter 6, I consider whether Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev looked to U.S. President John F. Kennedy's senatorial record when making initial assessments of the new president's resolve. If the target leader has not previously held highly visible office, the challenger may look elsewhere for clues as to the target leader's potential resolve. In such situations, challenger leaders may rely on the target state's past behavior for signals as to the target leader's potential resolve.

Regardless of where the challenger leader looks for clues in this situation – be it in the target leader's interactions with other leaders or by focusing on state past action – this assessment of the target leader's resolve may be trumped in future assessments by direct interaction with target leader as these uncertain assessments do not produce robust reputations for resolve. This is due to the fact that such information carries the

highest amount of uncertainty. The use of these uncertain clues regarding how a target leader may act in a particular situation may vary from how the target leader will act when faced with an actual crisis. We can think of the level of uncertainty regarding the challenger leader's ability to correctly predict the level of resolve of the target leader as directly related to the experience level of the target leader and the type of interaction the two leaders have had, as illustrated in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Uncertainty and the Source of Reputation for Resolve

Level of Uncertainty of Challenger's Assessment of Target's Reputation	Least Uncertain	Target has experience while in office. Target and challenger have interacted directly in a previous crisis. Target's reputation is based on previous direct interaction with challenger.
	Less Uncertain	Target has experience while in office. Target and challenger have not interacted directly in a previous crisis. Target's reputation is based on actions with other challengers (indirect interactions) or on state past action.
	Most Uncertain	Target is new to office and does not have experience. Target and challenger have not interacted directly in a previous crisis. Target's reputation is based on actions prior to office (if applicable) or on state past action.

Evaluations of resolve that are made under the most uncertain conditions will be replaced by those with lower levels of uncertainty whenever possible. This imperative to replace uncertain information with more trustworthy information is driven by the cognitive biases discussed earlier in this chapter. Accordingly, challenger leaders will be eager to reduce this cognitive uncertainty with more reliable assessments of the target leader's reputation for resolve. Once confident assessments of resolve have been forged,

however, these judgments can be difficult to change. Thus, the strongest and most durable reputations for resolve come from direct interactions with experienced leaders, particularly on issues of significant strategic importance to the target leader.

2.5.4 Theory Applicability

My Leader Interaction Theory of Reputation contributes to our understanding of how leaders interact and perceive each other during international crises. It not only illustrates how target leaders can develop reputations for resolve based on their actions while in office, but is also useful for understanding other leader-based interactions. Most notably, my Leader Interaction Theory of Reputation is also applicable to target assessments of challengers. For the purpose of this work, however, I have limited my analysis to challenger leaders' perceptions of target leaders as this is the most common approach in the international security literature. Future scholars should consider the extent to which challengers may also carry reputations for resolve. The processes by which these challenger leaders acquire reputations for resolve should not differ from the development of a target's reputation for resolve. In addition, my Leader Interaction Theory of Reputation is not limited in applicability to the interaction of states. Rather, its focus on the process by which individuals develop reputations for resolve vis-à-vis other individuals can be utilized to understand non-state interactions as well as intrastate conflict. This includes state to non-state leader interactions as well as non-state to non-state leader interactions. For example, this theory could be particularly fruitful in the

study of terrorism, particularly in understanding how terrorist leaders evaluate a state's reputation for resolve or a specific leader's reputation for resolve. Such an analysis would illuminate how terrorist leaders, such as top-level Al-Qaeda decision-makers, evaluate American actions in determining these reputations for resolve. My theory is also not limited to the realm of international conflict. Rather, it may also be applied to the field of international political economy and other areas which require leaders and states to act resolutely during negotiations and crises.

Furthermore, the policy implications of my theory suggest that, as early interactions matter most, policy-makers should work to communicate their resolve early in their tenure when facing a new international challenger and should be particularly stringent in their communication of resolve on issues of high strategic value. This further suggests that policy-makers need to be clear in communicating which issues are most important to them as these are the issues upon which their behavior will be most salient to the development of their reputations. In addition, my theory indicates that it may be detrimental for international leaders to bluff early in their tenure, particularly on issues of high strategic value, as the costs of getting caught bluffing may be too high for leaders to sustain. As I hypothesize reputations for resolve are robust and resistant to change, leaders cannot afford to be caught bluffing and to be perceived as irresolute during early interactions, especially on issues that they have communicated to be of high strategic importance.

2.6 Methods

To test these hypotheses and determine the extent to which individual leaders can develop reputations for resolve independently from the state, I employ a multi-methods approach incorporating experimental surveys, a statistical duration analysis, and a qualitative case study. The experimental surveys test the extent to which an individual's perceptions of resolve are based on leader-based or state-based factors, such as past state behavior, state interest, relative military power, or regime type. The purpose of the experiments is to provide greater confidence in the causal relationship between key variables, one of the primary strengths of experimental design (Druckman 2011; Kuperman and Ozkececi-Taner 2006; McDermott 2002). Accordingly, the two experiments I use isolate the effects of these factors on perceptions of resolve, providing a fuller understanding of how individuals process information regarding resolve. The statistical analysis and case study complement the experiments by rooting the research design in real world data. Using duration analysis, I examine how the resoluteness of a target leader's response affects the amount of time that elapses before that leader is the target of another international crisis. According to the logic of reputation for resolve, target leaders which respond resolutely to a crisis should be less vulnerable in the future and should enjoy longer periods of time before being the target of a future crisis. The statistical analysis tests for the effect of leader behavior on the timing of future crises to examine the extent to which leaders may develop reputations for resolve based on their

behavior while in office. With regards to the case study, I use process tracing methods to follow the development of two leaders' reputations for resolve through various negotiations and crises. In the case study, I examine where the challenger leader seeks-out information regarding each target leaders' resolve. Accordingly, I examine the extent to which the challenger leader relies on leader-based or state-based factors when making assessments of resolve. This tests the validity of my theory in the context of the specific case. Through this combined multi-methods approach, I provide a rigorous test of my hypotheses and draw conclusions regarding the extent to which leaders are able to develop reputations for resolve that are independent of the state.

2.6.1 The Experiments

Through the experimental work, I use two distinct survey experiments to test my hypotheses. The first set of experiments is a traditional survey experiment in which participants read a scenario and make assessments based on what they have read. The information in the scenario varies based on the treatment or control group and condition to which the participant is randomly assigned. By comparing the responses of participants across groups and conditions, I assess the effects of key variables on perceptions of resolve. This experiment asks individuals to make judgments about the resolve and behavior of an original leader. Participants are then informed a leadership transition has taken place in the opposing state and are asked to make the same assessments about a new leader in the same opposing state. Accordingly, this

experiment tests the ability of new leaders to develop reputations for resolve. More detailed information regarding this experiment including experimental design, procedure, and results is presented in the next chapter.

The second experiment employs the Dynamic Process Tracing Environment (DPTE), which allows researchers to analyze the decision-making process within individuals in complex situations (Redlawsk and Lau 2009). In this experiment, I manipulate the type of information participants can access in making assessments of a leader's resolve. Like the first experiment, participants are randomly assigned to different groups and conditions in which they can access information regarding leader-based and/or state-based factors. However, instead of simply varying the information put forth in the scenario (as done in the first experiment), the DPTE allows participants to decide which information they wish to access before answering questions based on the scenario. By manipulating both the type of information participants can access and the content of that information, I am able to determine the effect of this information on participants' decisions and also follow the participant's decision-making process as participants decide which information they believe is important enough to view. In doing so, this experiment goes beyond the typical treatment effect experiment by enabling participants to prioritize the information they seek out and to use this

information to make informed judgments.¹³ This second experiment, presented in Chapter 4, also varies from the first experiment as it follows the development of a single leader's reputation for resolve over time through various negotiations and crises. Accordingly, this second experiment tests the causal mechanisms of my theory, such as the extent to which early information is influential on later perceptions of resolve.

The combination of these two experiments provides an in-depth test of both the ability of leaders to develop reputations for resolve and the process by which these reputations develop over time. The first experiment, presented in Chapter 3, tests for the extent to which new leaders can develop reputations for resolve independently of both the state and their predecessors. In addition, this experiment tests for the effects of leader-based vs. state-based factors on perceptions of resolve. The second experiment, presented in Chapter 4, examines the extent to which these leader-based vs. state-based factors affect the development of a single leader's reputation over time through repeated interactions. It also examines the extent to which early perceptions of resolve are influential to the development of reputation. Taken together, these two experiments provide an in-depth understanding of how individuals process information regarding resolve, how original and new leaders develop reputations for resolve, how these

¹³ This environment is similar to the Decision-Board Platform. While I originally planned to use the decision-board, I found there to be technical limitations to the types of questions I could ask with this platform. The DPTE provides more flexibility in this regard.

reputations change over time through repeated interactions, and how different variables affect these perceptions of resolve.

As I discuss more fully in the next chapter, these experiments are particularly appropriate to the study of decision-making. While there are differences between leaders and the populations available for study (see Berejikian 2004), elites and sample populations are often strikingly similar in the ways in which they access and process information to form perceptions (Druckman 2011; Herrmann, Voss, and Ciarrochi 1997, 405; Krebs and Rapport 2012, 540; Tetlock and Goldeier 2000). Other researchers have shown that experimental analysis can be a particularly powerful tool in examining the perceptions and information processing of individuals in the context of foreign policy analysis and decision-making (Astorino-Courtois 2000; Geva and Skorick 1999; Keller and Yang 2008). More specifically, the types of experiments I employ allow researchers to understand the sequential decision-making process within individuals and further our understanding about how this process affects behavioral outcomes (Hermann and Ozkececi-Taner 2011). Furthermore, these experimental results are bolstered with evidence from other research methods. This multi-methods design and its accompanying results can be a powerful tool toward a fuller understanding of international relations phenomenon (Druckman 2011). This use of multiple methods is particularly useful to “overcome the limitations of relying on any single approach” (McDermott, Wernimont, and Koopman 2011).

2.6.2 Statistical Duration Analysis

To complement the experiments, I also employ a large-N duration analysis in Chapter 5 to examine how a leader's behavior in one crisis affects the risk of that leader being targeted again in the future. According to the logic of reputations for resolve, a resolute response by a target leader to a crisis trigger should make that leader a less attractive target of aggression in the future. These resolute target leaders should either not be targeted again in the future or should enjoy longer periods of time before facing another challenge when compared to those leaders who responded less resolutely. As such, while the statistical duration analysis cannot test for the direct mechanisms by which reputations for resolve develop over time, it can examine the effect of leader behavior on the timing of future crisis onset to provide insight into the extent to which leaders can develop reputations for resolve based on their behavior. In the statistical analysis, the main dependent variable is the amount of time that elapses between the end of one crisis and the start of a new crisis with the same target leader (or state). The main independent variable is the resoluteness of the target's response to the primary crisis trigger. As discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 5, I employ multiple constructs to measure resolve, including the target's main crisis management technique and the relative resolve of the target's primary initial response to the crisis trigger. In addition, I include multiple control variables to test alternative hypotheses, such as the relative military capabilities of the target and challenger, the target's regime type, and the

target's interest in the dispute. Accordingly, this statistical analysis determines if the variables and concepts I identify as critical to the development of reputations for resolve are "relevant to larger populations of cases" (George and Bennett 2005, 35). To conduct this analysis, I merge the International Crisis Behavior actor-level-dataset with the *Archigos* dataset containing information regarding the leaders of states,¹⁴ resulting in a dataset consisting of directed-leader-dyad information for each international crisis. I then apply a Cox proportional hazard model to the data to conduct a statistical duration analysis to test for the effect of a target's response to a crisis on the amount of time that elapses before the target is engaged in another crisis.

2.6.3 Case Study

The case study complements the experiments and statistical analysis by further exploring the causal mechanisms by which reputations for resolve form and change over time (George and Bennett 2005, 21). The case selected - the set of foreign policy crises between Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and American Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy - meets specific criteria chosen to provide the strongest and most rigorous test of my theory. To select this case, I focused on states engaged in recurrent conflicts, better known as enduring rivalries.¹⁵ I chose this case from this subset of dyads as these recurrent conflicts pose the greatest opportunity for a state

¹⁴ An overview of the Archigos data can be found in Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009.

¹⁵ For a more full explanation of enduring rivalries, see Goertz and Diehl 1993.

reputation for resolve to form. As these states have engaged in multiple crises over various administrations, there is a longer history of conflict between the two states, and thus a greater opportunity for a state reputation for resolve to develop. Unlike cases in which the states have only been engaged in one or two crises, it is much more likely that these enduring rivalries will have a state-based reputation for resolve and, thus, a greater likelihood that leaders will rely on this state-based reputation when making assessments of new leaders. As such, these cases pose a more stringent test for the development of leader-based reputations for resolve as the finding that challengers do rely on leader-based information, rather than a state reputation for resolve, will be more meaningful in these cases. In addition, choosing cases from recurrent crises allows for a better examination of if and how different leaders develop reputations for resolve through recurrent crises as many of these rivalries engage in repeated disputes over the same issue across multiple administrations. Finally, to ensure that I accurately chose a case based on these factors, I examined the merged *Archigos* and ICB dataset to verify that the case chosen does meet the criteria discussed above.

In analyzing this case, I use process tracing methods to track the development of a reputation for resolve for each president over time. Process tracing focuses on the particular sequence process by which events unfold in a single case and provides an excellent test of competing theories (George and Bennett 2005, 13). In my case study, I focus on reconstructing the decision-making process used by Premier Khrushchev and

analyze which information he used in making evaluations of each president's resolve. To help control for issues such as personality and other factors intrinsic to individuals, I observe how the perceptions of a single challenger leader change with leadership turnover in the target state. That is, I hold the challenger (Khrushchev) constant and examine his perceptions of an original target leader (Eisenhower) and then a new target leader (Kennedy) after a leadership turnover has occurred in the target state.¹⁶ In my analysis, I employ primary documents, such as speeches, letters, and communiqués, to determine the challenger's perceptions of each target leaders' resolve over time (see George and Bennett 2005, 94).

2.7 Conclusion: Putting It All Together

Each of the subsequent chapters tests specific hypotheses drawn from both my theory and alternative theories of reputation for resolve. To begin, the first set of experiments focuses on the ability of leaders to develop reputations for resolve separate from their states and leadership predecessors. By focusing on periods of leadership turnover, this experiment assesses the extent to which participants' perceptions of a new leader's resolve are rooted in the previous leader's reputation. In addition, it directly tests for the effects of a leader's statements and behavior on that leader's reputation for resolve as well as the extent to which these perceptions may be driven by state-based

¹⁶ As my research question focuses on the development of reputation for resolve, I focus on Khrushchev's perceptions, not on his actions or behavior.

factors. The second set of experiments further tests the impact of leader-based and state-based factors on perceptions of resolve. Even more so, this second set of experiments focuses on the causal mechanisms by which a reputation for resolve develops for a single leader through recurrent and escalating interactions, while also differentiating between the effects of a leader's statements and actions on perceptions of resolve. The statistical duration analysis further addresses the extent to which leader-based and state-based factors affect the ability of targets to communicate their resolve. Finally, the case study bridges the hypotheses tested in the previous chapters by delving further into the causal mechanisms underlying the development of a leader's reputation for resolve. Furthermore, the case study focuses on the extent to which a challenger leader relies on state-based or leader-based information when making assessments of target leader's resolve. Through this multi-methods approach, I present a rigorous test of both my theory of the development of leader-based reputations for resolve as well as alternative theories of resolve derived from the international relations literature.

3. The Development of Reputations for Resolve among Leaders: A Leadership Transition Survey Experiment

In the previous chapter, I hypothesized that leader's should be able to develop their own reputations for resolve independently of both the states which they serve and their leadership predecessors. I further theorized that these reputations will be based primarily on a leader's statements and actions while in office. Furthermore, these reputations should form quickly as early interactions will be particularly influential in the development of these reputations due to the ways in which individuals seek out and process information pertaining to resolve. In the empirical chapters, I test my theory of the development of leader-based reputations for resolve against alternative explanations using a multi-methods approach, including experimental surveys, a statistical duration analysis, and the process tracing of a historical case study.

In the first set of experimental surveys, presented in this chapter, I assess the effects of key variables on perceptions of an individual leader's resolve.¹⁷ This set of experiments addresses two critical empirical questions: 1) Are participants' assessments of a leader's resolve based on that leader's statements and behavior? 2) How are these perceptions of resolve affected by the inclusion of state-based factors? Accordingly, this first set of experiments considers whether reputations for resolve among leaders can develop independently of state behavior and other state-based factors, such as state

¹⁷ These variables are drawn from the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2.

interest, regime type, and relative military power. Accordingly, this first set of experiments directly addresses several hypotheses put forth in the previous chapter, including the ability of leaders to develop reputations based on their own actions, the impact of a leader's behavior on his reputation for resolve, and the alternative explanations that these reputations may instead be driven by state-based factors. To do so, the experiments presented in this chapter focus on periods of leadership transition to compare how perceptions of an original leader and a new leader in the same state may be conditioned by leader-based or state-based factors. The second set of experiments, presented in the next chapter, complement this first set of experiments by examining the process by which reputations for resolve form for a single leader over time. Taken together, these two experiments provide insight into whether leaders may develop reputations for resolve, how these reputations develop, and how other factors may condition these reputations.

3.1 Survey Experiments in International Relations

The experimental surveys presented in this chapter consider how information regarding leader-based and state-based factors affects perceptions of a target leader's resolve. I employ a series of scenario-based factorial experiments in which participants are asked to make assessments of a leader's resolve during a hypothetical foreign policy crisis. By comparing the responses of participants across treatment and control groups, I am able to determine the extent to which perceptions of resolve are based on a leader's

statements and behavior or are driven by state-based factors, including state conflict history, state interest, regime type, and relative military capability. The use of a factorial scenario-based survey experiment, in which experimental scenarios contain multiple treatment conditions, allows for the testing of several independent variables within each scenario (Ludwick and Zeller 2001). While these scenarios are simplifications of reality, they are particularly useful in testing competing hypotheses (Taylor 2006), such as my Leader Interaction Theory of Reputation and alternative approaches drawn from the extant literature.

3.1.1 The Use of Experiments in International Relations

Recent work in international relations has seen an explosion in the use of experimental methods, particularly experimental surveys, to study various phenomena, including elite behavior. For example, these types of experiments have been particularly fruitful in the study of bargaining behavior (Dickson 2009; Druckman 2011; Tingley and Walter 2011), and scholars employing these studies have extrapolated their findings using sample populations to understand and explain elite behavior. The primary concern expressed by scholars regarding the use of out-of-sample populations to study elite behavior is the appropriateness of experimental methods for the study of international relations. Most notably, some scholars within the discipline assert there are limitations to the use of experiments, particularly regarding external validity (see Berejikian 2004). This concern derives from the environmental settings in which

experiments are conducted and the differences between population subject pools and the populations of interest to scholars.¹⁸ Accordingly, they argue that it is difficult to extrapolate experimental results to other out-of-sample populations.

Other scholars, however, provide a compelling argument as to why experiments are helpful in understanding elite behavior and decision-making even when relying on samples composed of the general public. First, there are certain questions for which experimental work can be especially enlightening. Foremost among these is the internal decision-making processes within individuals. Experimental methods, including the experimental surveys I employ, are helpful in understanding the applicability of cognitive models of decision-making (Herrmann, Voss, and Ciarrochi 1997, 405). While the subject populations utilized by researchers are not perfectly representative of elites, political elites look surprisingly like average citizens in the way they cognitively process information (Krebs and Rapport 2012, 540). Where elites differ most from subject populations is in their strategic decisions and behavioral choices (Mintz, Redd, and Vedlitz 2006). However, elites remain similar to subject populations in the ways in which they access and process information, and political elites are not necessarily more rational than subject populations in their decision-making (Druckman 2011; Krebs and Rapport 2012; Mintz, Redd, and Vedlitz 2006). As Tetlock and Goldeier (2000) put the

¹⁸ For an overview of the debate regarding internal and external validity in international relations experiments see Hudson and Butler 2010.

issue: “Although they may forget the fact, or try to persuade us to forget it, policy makers are still human, all too human” (88).

With this in mind, my experiments consider the development of reputations for resolve, not the effect these reputations have on international conflict. My analytical focus is on the way in which reputations for resolve develop and whether individual leaders are perceived as independent from the state in their reputations for resolve.

Accordingly, I ask participants about their assessments and perceptions of a hypothetical leader’s resolve. I do not ask participants to make strategic decisions about how reputation for resolve may affect potential conflict. Furthermore, the structure and content of the surveys is not dependent on the decisions participants make during the questionnaire. Thus, my interest lies not in how participants will behave; rather, my focus is how they perceive and think. Researchers with a similar analytical focus have successfully employed experiments to understand the perceptions and information processing of individuals in the context for foreign policy analysis and decision-making (Astorino-Courtois 2000; Geva and Skorick 1999; Keller and Yang 2008). In particular, the use of these experiments allows researchers to understand decision sequences during the decision-making process to increase our knowledge about how policy preferences affect these decision-making processes as well as policy outcomes (Hermann and Ozkececi-Taner 2011).

3.1.2 Addressing Internal and External Validity

To further address potential concerns, I take specific steps in the construction of both the scenario and the survey as a whole to increase the internal and external validity of the experiment. First, more diverse and heterogeneous subject pools can increase our confidence in experimental results. Due to their convenience and ease of use, researchers typically rely on student populations in their experimental work. While studies find that student samples often closely resemble the general population in both their political awareness and reliance on heuristics during decision-making tasks (Kam 2005), other scholars express concern over the generalizability of results based exclusively on these populations (Kuperman and Ozkececi-Taner 2006; Mintz, Redd, and Vedlitz 2006). In order to improve the external validity of experimental results, researchers recommend using more diverse and heterogeneous subject pools composed of populations outside of university students (Chandler, Mueller, and Paolucci 2013; Druckman and Kam 2011; McDermott 2011). In accordance with this suggestion, I administered my experiments not only to student subject pools at Duke University and North Carolina State University, but also to a large online sample through Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). This particular online study pool has similar demographics and response quality to other non-student samples, including those surveyed via telephone such as the ANES (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 2011; Chandler, Mueller, and Paolucci 2013; Paolucci, Changler, and Ipeirotis 2010).

One of the main concerns with the AMT subject pool in particular, however, is the potential for decreased response quality as AMT respondents take surveys at home in an uncontrolled environment. This may increase the likelihood that respondents are distracted while completing the survey. I address this concern in several ways. Access to the survey was limited to AMT respondents with a history of high quality responses (a greater than 95% approval rating on all previous studies) and who reside in the United States (see Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012; Rand 2012). As an additional bolster to improve response quality, participants from all subject pools were explicitly asked to carefully read the scenario. Each respondent also answered a factual question based on the scenario to ensure participants both read and understood the survey (Chandler, Mueller, and Paolucci 2013). Only the responses of participants who answered this factual question correctly were included in the analysis. Finally, respondents were told they could earn a bonus during the survey to incentivize participants into paying closer attention to the questionnaire (Chandler, Mueller, and Paolucci 2013).¹⁹

Second, researchers can employ constructs within the survey to help increase both internal and external validity. One of the best ways to maximize internal validity is through the use of “strong control, careful design, and systematic measurement” (McDermott 2011, 34). I include appropriate control questions, such as questions

¹⁹ Participants were told they would receive a bonus credit or payment for correctly predicting the resolve of an opposing leader. This was deceptive as all participants received this payment regardless of their assessments and predictions. This deception and the accompanying surveys were approved by IRBs at both Duke University and North Carolina State University.

measuring participants' beliefs regarding the efficacy of individual leaders and the appropriate use of force. Including these controls helps to account for potential inherent biases from respondents' pre-existing beliefs that may affect their survey responses. In addition, I use multiple measures for both these control variables and the dependent variable – the extent to which a leader is perceived to be resolute. By asking these questions in multiple ways, my confidence that the participants understand the content of the survey and are coherent in their beliefs greatly improves (see McDermott 2011).

Regarding concerns of external validity, researchers can take measures to ensure the survey mimics the real world as closely as is reasonably possible (Druckman and Kam 2011). My experimental work does this in several ways. To begin, I use monetary incentives to motivate participants to remain intellectually invested in the survey (see Dickson 2011). The second set of experiments in particular (see Chapter 4) mimics the real world trade-off between decision quality and the resources spent in making the decision (see George 2006, 73). In addition, participants in the surveys receive step-by-step instructions in both the introductory prompt and the accompanying scenarios, and participants are randomly assigned to experimental and control groups (Dickson 2009, 929). These deliberate measures increase the internal and external validity of my survey.

With these considerations in mind, this chapter proceeds as follows. I begin by first explaining the experimental procedure and describing the scenario construction in depth (the full experiment can be found in Appendix A). I then present the results of

each of the experiments in this series, assessing the effect of leader behavior, state history, state interest, regime type, and relatively military capability on leader reputations. Finally, I consider additional influences that may affect participants' perceptions of leader resolve. I end the chapter by drawing general conclusions from my experimental results.

3.2 The Survey: Experimental Procedure

To begin the study, participants are given a consent form explaining the basic structure of the survey and any potential risks or benefits. All participants in the internet-based survey were asked to read a scenario and make assessments based on what they read. As I argue that changes in perceptions of resolve will be most pronounced following periods of leadership transition, the survey design is iterative, providing participants with information about an original leader and then giving participants information about a new leader that has just taken office (and replaced the original leader) in the same state. This iterative design enables me to directly assess the impact of differences in independent variables across the two-part scenario (Ludwick and Zeller 2001; Kuperman and Ozkececi-Taner 2006).

Prior to reading the scenario, participants are asked a series of control and demographic questions. After reading each part of the scenario, participants answer an identical set of questions regarding their assessments about each leader's resolve and predictions as to how each leader would react to a potential threat. By comparing

respondents' answers based on each part of the scenario, I am able to statistically determine the extent to which assessments of resolve were based on variations across scenarios. In between the two stages of the scenario, participants are also asked a factual question based on the scenario to check for reading comprehension and attention (Chandler, Mueller, and Paolucci 2013).²⁰ The survey concludes with basic demographic questions regarding gender, age, and education as well as a debriefing.

3.2.1 Deception

As part of the survey procedure, I used a monetary incentive to encourage participants to read the survey more closely and to be more intellectually and emotionally invested in the survey (Dickson 2011; Druckman and Kam 2011; Chandler, Mueller, and Paolucci 2013). Participants were told that making correct assessments and predictions about each leader's resolve and behavior would earn them an additional bonus credit or payment depending on their subject pool. However, all participants received this bonus regardless of their choices. This deception was explained to participants during the debriefing and was approved by the Institutional Review Boards at both Duke University and North Carolina State University.

²⁰ Respondents who incorrectly answered this question were dropped from the analysis.

3.3 The Survey: Survey Design

3.3.1 The Scenario

In the survey, participants are asked to read a two-stage scenario in which they take the role of the leader of an unnamed state.²¹ Participants are told they are currently engaged in an ongoing foreign policy crisis with a neighboring state over a piece of land that is rich in mineral resources along their shared border. While both sides have been engaged in negotiations, little progress has been made. As such participants are told they can issue a threat to try to end the dispute more quickly. Before doing so, they need to predict how the opposing state would respond to this threat. They are then given information regarding leader-based and/or state-based factors depending on the group and condition to which they are randomly assigned. The basic scenario for the first stage is as follows, while additional information is added based on the group and condition to which the participant is assigned:

You are the leader of a state. For the past year, you have been trying to negotiate with the leader of a neighboring state over who should control an area of land along your shared state border that is rich in mineral resources. Whoever controls this land will get both more power and resources. You have been unable to reach a compromise. Your advisors say you can issue a threat to send military forces to the area to try to end the dispute. Before you decide to issue this threat, you need to correctly predict how the opposing state would respond to this threat.

After answering a series of questions regarding how resolutely they believe the opposing leader is and how the opposing leader would respond to the threat,

²¹ I chose not to use real states as to avoid any confounding issues due to pre-existing beliefs about a particular state.

participants read the second stage of the scenario. At the beginning of this stage, they are informed as to how the original leader acted (either resolutely or irresolutely). This second stage of the scenario informs participants that a new leader has just taken office in the opposing state, and the participant can once again issue a threat to try to force a settlement. They are then given appropriate information based on their assigned group and condition. The basic scenario for the second stage is as follows:

Several months have passed a new leader has just taken office in the opposing state. Once again, your advisors say you can issue a threat to send military forces to the area to try to end the dispute.

After reading this second part of the scenario, participants answer the same series of questions regarding the new leader's resolve and predicted response to a potential threat. Each condition is given during both the initial stage and the second stage of the scenario to ensure participants receive each treatment equally.

In constructing the final scenario, I took several considerations into account to make the scenario both realistic and relatable to participants. First, I was careful to avoid the use of technical terms or discipline specific jargon (Sue and Ritter 2012, 72). Earlier versions of the scenario and questionnaire relied too heavily on specific terminology that even well-educated participants from outside the discipline were unfamiliar with or could misinterpret. Second, I chose a straightforward issue under dispute in order to avoid confusion and make the scenario feel more realistic (Druckman et al 2011, 19).

Pretesting of the final questionnaire indicated that participants thought the scenario was believable, realistic, and engaging.²²

3.3.2 Treatment Groups

This set of scenario experiments consists of one 2x2 experimental survey, three separate 2x2x2 factorial experimental surveys, and one 2x2x3 factorial survey. Each experiment uses the same scenario and procedure, only varying in the information participants received. For the first experiment, participants receive information regarding the resolve, or type, of both the opposing state's original leader (Leader 1) and the new leader (Leader 2). Each leader is either resolute or irresolute. For the original leader, participants are told, based on the condition to which they are assigned, that "during negotiations, the opposing leader has consistently stood firm and not backed down on his state's claims to the area" (resolute type) or that "during negotiations, the opposing leader said he would like to end the dispute quickly and may not be willing to risk war over the issue" (irresolute type). Participants also receive similar information regarding the resolve of the new leader in the second stage of the scenario. They are told that either this new leader made public statements that "he will stand firm and protect his state's claims to the area" (resolute type) or that he said "he would like to end the

²² The original survey was based off the ongoing crisis in the South China Sea, in which an "archipelago of islands" was under dispute. After interviewing participants during pre-testing, it became clear that the original scenario had several confounding variables that were unaccounted for and was overly complicated. Instead, the final scenario is based on a simpler border dispute with which participants would be more familiar. It would be interesting, however, in future iterations of this work to examine how the specific issue under dispute, not just the priority of the issue, affects perceptions of resolve.

dispute quickly and may not be willing to risk war over the issue" (irresolute type).²³

This experiment tests the primary hypothesis of my theory (H₁): individual leaders can develop reputations for resolve and that these reputations will be based on the leader's actions or statements while in office. Within the context of this experiment, leaders that have communicated their resolve should be perceived as more resolute than those leaders who have indicated they may be less firm in their commitments.

As this experiment focuses on periods of leadership transition, assessments of the new leader's resolve are based on that leader's statements, not behavior. As this leader is new to office, there would not have been an opportunity for the participant to directly interact with the new leader. Accordingly, this set of experimental surveys does not distinguish between the effects of statements and behavior on reputation for resolve. The second set of experimental surveys, presented in the next chapter, does make such distinctions as it follows the development of a reputation for resolve over time for a single leader. The first set of experimental surveys presented here focuses instead on the extent to which leaders are able to develop independent reputations for resolve based on their statements and behavior.

²³ While using gender-based language is often frowned upon, the original question wording used the gender neutral "they." This led some participants to believe they were judging multiple leaders in the opposing state. The masculine pronoun "he" was chosen as the overwhelming majority of world leaders are male. It would be interesting in future studies to explore whether the gender of the opposing leader has any effect on participants' assessments.

Each of the experiments evaluating the effects of state-based factors on perceptions of resolve use the same scenario and leader-based information as Experiment 1 but contain additional information regarding state conflict history, state interest, regime type, or relative military capability. By comparing responses across groups for which participants only receive leader-based information and groups that receive additional state-based information, I can determine the extent to which perceptions of leader resolve are conditioned by these additional state-based factors. For Experiment 2, participants are also given information regarding state conflict history – resolute or irresolute. Participants are told that in the past the state has either “stood firm in similar situations” (resolute history) or “backed down in similar situations” (irresolute history). This experiment addresses the hypothesis that reputations for resolve will be attributed to states, not leaders, and will be based on state past action (H₂). Accordingly, if reputation for resolve is influenced by state behavior, and not solely based on leader action, a leader’s reputation for resolve should be conditioned by a state’s reputation for resolve. Participants who receive the state resolute condition should perceive each leader as more resolute than those who receive either the state irresolute condition or those assigned to the leader information only groups.

For Experiment 3, participants are given information about each leader’s behavior as well as information about the opposing state’s interest in the dispute – high or low. Participants are told the disputed area “is a high priority for the opposing state”

(high interest) or “the other state would like to control the area, but the leader has indicated there are other foreign policy issues that are of a higher priority right now” (low interest). This tests the hypothesis (H₅) that perceptions of resolve will be influenced by communicated state interest over an issue. If leader reputation for resolve is conditioned by state interest, participants in the high interest group should perceive each leader to be more resolute than those who receive either the low interest condition or those assigned to the leader information only groups.

The fourth experiment, Experiment 4, provides participants with information about each leader’s behavior as well as the regime type of the opposing state – democratic or non-democratic. Participants are told the opposing state is either “a democracy with an elected leader” (democracy) or “not a democracy, and the current leader has taken power without being elected” (non-democracy). This experiment considers the extent to which regime type may affect reputations for resolve (H₇). If regime type affects reputation for resolve in a manner consistent with previous scholarly findings, participants assigned to the democracy condition should perceive each leader to be more resolute than those who are assigned to the non-democracy condition or those assigned to the leader information only groups.

The final experiment, Experiment 5, was added after the initial round of survey responses. As I will discuss later in this chapter, participants were asked at the end of the survey what additional information they would have liked to be more confident in

their assessments. A fairly large number of respondents (approximately 26% of the original sample) indicated they would have liked information regarding state military capabilities. Accordingly, additional groups were added for the second round of survey responses which included information regarding relative state military capabilities.²⁴ This final experiment was a 2x2x3 factorial survey as the opposing state was either stronger than, weaker than, or equal in strength to the participant's military. Accordingly, this experiment tests the extent to which relative military capability can affect perceptions of resolve as it examines whether target leaders with a military advantage are perceived as more resolute than those leaders with lesser military capabilities (H_6).

Finally, within each experiment, participants were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. These control groups included information about only the independent variable for each experiment: the original leader (Leader 1: resolute/irresolute), the new leader (Leader 2: resolute/irresolute), state history (resolute/irresolute), state interest (high/low), regime type (democracy/non-democracy), or relative military capabilities (stronger/weaker/equal). Additionally, one control group provided participants with no information beyond the basic scenario. The inclusion of

²⁴ The surveys were conducted in two parts as funding was secured at two different time points. Based on the survey programs used, however, respondents were only allowed to access the survey once.

these control groups allows for the direct comparison of the effects of each treatment on participant responses (Gaines, Kuklinski, and Quirk 2007; Taylor 2006).

3.3.3 Dependent Variables

The main dependent variable in my analysis is the extent to which each leader is perceived to be resolute. Extensive pre-testing was again particularly helpful in determining question wording in this regard. In the original questionnaire, participants were directly asked about each leader's resolve. However, in the context of the survey participants took this to mean how likely they believed each leader was to resolve – or settle – the dispute, which is the direct opposite of how the question was intended. To remedy this, the final questionnaire uses two common synonyms in the international relations literature to measure perceptions of resolve: determination and toughness. Directly after reading each scenario, participants are asked to rank the appropriate leader on a scale in terms of their toughness and their determination:

How much determination do you the opposing leader will show in response to this threat?

How tough or weak do you think the opposing leader will be in response to this threat?

For each question, responses were clearly labeled along a five-point ordinal scale (Krosnick 1999; Pelham and Blanton 2007; Sue and Ritter 2012). For example, subjects could indicate the leader was “very tough, tough, neither tough nor weak, weak, or very weak.” The responses to these two questions were then averaged to create a combined

measure of each leader's perceived level of resolve. The use of multiple constructs to measure the dependent variable increases response reliability as well as both internal and external validity (McDermott 2011; Krosnick 1999; Pelham and Blanton 2007, 91).

To determine if these perceptions of resolve translate into reputations for resolve, participants are then asked to predict how they believe the opposing leader will react to a threat to send military forces to the disputed area. Participants were asked: "How do you think the opposing leader will respond to this threat?" In response, participants could indicate they believed the opposing leader would stand firm and continue negotiations, escalate the conflict by sending their own military forces to the area, or back down to the threat and agree to a settlement.²⁵

Participants were also asked how confident they were in this belief and presented with a four-point labeled scale ranging from very confident to very unconfident. Finally, participants were asked, given how they believe the leader would react, if they would actually issue the threat (yes/no). At the end of the second set of questions after the second stage of the scenario, participants were solicited with an open-ended question asking what additional information they would have liked to be more confident in their beliefs. The purpose of this question was to gain further insight into how participants came to their assessments about each leader, what information

²⁵ Here too the original language was changed as the first questionnaire phrased the final option as "capitulate," which many respondents, including those who were highly educated, were unfamiliar with. The response options for this question were randomized.

they considered important in their decision-making process, and if there were any omitted variables that may be critical in their reasoning. As mentioned earlier, based on these responses, an additional treatment group was created containing information on state military capabilities. Furthermore, and as I will discuss later in this chapter, responses to this open-ended question were particularly sophisticated, increasing my confidence that participants both understood the subject matter and were attentive during the survey.

3.3.4 Control Questions

Before reading the scenario, participants answered a series of demographic and control questions, designed to measure specific pre-existing biases that may influence participants' responses in the survey. For the demographic data, participants indicate their political leanings on a seven-point scale ranging from "Extremely Conservative" to "Extremely Liberal." They are also asked their political affiliation (Democrat, Republican, Independent, Other, or No Preference). To gauge their interest in and attention to international politics, participants are asked on a five-point scale how interested they are in international affairs and how closely they pay attention to international events. In addition, participants are asked about their primary news source and how often they pay attention to the news.

As the survey asks participants to make assessments about international leaders and their responses to military threats, the control questions take into account the extent

to which participants believe international world leaders are important actors in the international system as well as their views regarding the acceptability of the use of military force. To measure participants' views on the relative importance of world leaders, participants were asked to indicate on a five-point scale how strongly they agreed or disagreed with the following statements:

International leaders are important and have a large impact on international events.

It doesn't really matter who is in office. A country would end up with the same policies regardless of the person in office.

Similarly, to measure the extent to which participants were opposed to or supportive of the use of military force, respondents were asked how strongly they agreed or disagreed with the following statements:²⁶

Sometimes the only way to solve a problem between states is through military force.

The use of military force only makes problems worse.

States should be able to talk things out and reach a peaceful solution to their problems.

Each control measure included multiple questions to increase reliability, and the values of each were then averaged to create a composite measure for analysis (Pelham and Blanton 2007). Furthermore, for all response scales throughout the survey, each answer choice was clearly labeled (Sue and Ritter 2012, 65). Finally, at the end of the survey, participants were asked to indicate their age, gender, and education level.

²⁶ These questions were taken from Tomz (2007a), with permission.

3.4 Participant Selection and Assignment

The experiments were administered to subject pools at both Duke University and North Carolina State University as well as through the Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) subject recruitment platform. Participants from both universities were compensated with course credit, while participants from the AMT pool received a total of \$0.85 for their participation in the approximately 10-minute survey.²⁷ The AMT study pool recruits its own participants from a variety of backgrounds. This provides a more diverse participant pool than subject pools typically available at universities (Mason and Suri 2012; Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010). Furthermore, AMT subject pools, in particular, have been shown to have both high internal validity and high response quality (Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010; Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 2011). This use of multiple subject pools increases the heterogeneity of subject participants, positively affecting the external validity of the experiments (Maxwell and Delaney 2004; McDermott 2011; Chandler, Mueller, and Paolacci 2013).

Participants from each subject pool self-selected into the survey and were then randomly assigned to a treatment or control group and condition (see Taylor 2006; Sue and Ritter 2012). Each participant accessed the online survey through their own computer device. As participants took the survey outside of a laboratory, multiple steps were taken to increase response quality. For the AMT population specifically,

²⁷ This is above the average hourly pay rate for AMT. Previous studies find that realistic compensation rates do not improve response quality (see Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 2011).

respondents were limited to US residents only to ensure comparability across samples (Chandler, Mueller, and Paolucci 2013; Rand 2012). Access to the survey was also limited to only those AMT workers with a 95% or higher approval rating on previous surveys within the AMT platform (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012). Furthermore, across all subject pools, participants were asked to pay attention to the survey, were shown their progress in the survey, and were told they would receive a bonus for making correct assessments (Chandler, Mueller, and Paolucci 2013; Couper, Traugott, and Lamias 2001).

3.4.1 Participant Demographics

The final sample (N=2,470)²⁸ was 43.27% female and 56.73% male. Participants were well educated as 41.89% held a bachelor's degree or higher and an additional 48.38% had completed some college.²⁹ Accordingly, over 90% of the sample had at least some college education. Ages ranged from 18 to 74 (median = 30.35).³⁰ The total sample skewed slightly liberal with 56.62% of the sample identifying as some form of liberal in political leaning and 41.1% identifying as members of the Democratic Party. In contrast, 45.82% of the sample considered themselves some form of conservative with only

²⁸ Participants answered a factual question based on the information in the scenario. Those who incorrectly answered this question were excluded from the analysis and are not included in this total. The sample breaks down as follows: Duke University (N=35), NCSU (N=216), AMT (N=2,219).

²⁹ This also includes those currently working towards a college degree such as those students in the university pools.

³⁰ The AMT sample was older than the university samples. The average age for AMT participants was 31.36 while the student pools averaged 21. AMT participants were better educated as 46.63% of participants held a bachelor's degree or higher and 42.63% had completed some college. Finally, the AMT sample was also more politically liberal (liberal=57.28%; conservative=20.78%; Democrat=57.77%; Republican=15.14%) compared to the student samples (liberal=50.62%; conservative=27.98%; Democrat=27.5%; Republican=40.2%).

17.69% identifying themselves as Republican and 30.93% of the sample identified as Independents. Finally, the sample for this survey was quite interested in international politics with 61.34% of participants indicating they were either somewhat or very interested in international affairs and 47.95% of participants indicating they either closely or very closely followed international events. Later in this chapter, I consider the potential effects of participants' political preferences and interest in international politics on perceptions of leader resolve.

3.5 Results and Discussion

In the discussion that follows, I present the results for each of the experiments beginning with the effect of a leader's statements and behavior on perceptions of resolve. I then analyze each of the state-based experiments in turn. For each experiment, I first analyze respondents' answers regarding how tough and determined they believe each leader to be by comparing the data across experimental groups. This provides insight into whether individual leaders are perceived as resolute based on their behavior and statements as well as how a leader's perceived level of resolve is affected by state-based factors. I then analyze participants' responses regarding how resolutely they believe each leader would respond to a potential threat, directly addressing the ability of individual leaders to develop reputations for resolve. Finally, I examine the effect of additional factors, such as the pre-existing beliefs held by participants, which may also influence these perceptions of resolve.

3.5.1 Experiment 1 - Leader Reputations

To determine the extent to which perceptions of each leader's resolve are based on the behavior and statements of that leader (H_1), I compared responses across groups of participants who only received information regarding the original and new leaders' resolve. Through this analysis, differences in perceived level of resolve should only appear where each respective leader is of a different type (resolute or irresolute) based on their behavior and statements presented in the scenario. For example, participants in the Resolute/Resolute (Original Leader/New Leader) group should not vary from participants in the Resolute/Irresolute group in their assessments of the original leader's resolve. However, those in the Resolute/Resolute group should view the new leader as more resolute than those in the Resolute/Irresolute group. Figure 1, on the next page, presents the means and confidence intervals of each group for both the original leader and new leader's perceived level of resolve. Additionally, Appendix B contains tables with the test statistic and p-value of the Wilcoxon rank sum-tests for all five experiments.³¹

The results, as show in Figure 1 on the next page, reveal striking differences in participants' assessments of the resolve of each leader based on the condition to which participants' are assigned. By comparing the mean responses and confidence intervals of those respondents assigned to different groups in which the leader signaled divergent

³¹ The Wilcoxon rank-sum test was used over independent t-tests as the data was non-parametric and ordinal.

resolve, I test for the effect of leader statements and behavior on perceptions of resolve.

As the graph below indicates, divergent perceptions of resolve only appear across groups for which each respective leader signaled differing resolve.




Figure 1: Perceived Level of Resolve - Leader Information Only Groups

When comparing the mean responses for those participants who received the resolute leader condition (the dots indicated with an “R”) across each column, the graph shows that there is no significant difference across groups. However, there is a significant difference across each column when comparing the mean level of resolve for those respondents who received the resolute condition (the dots indicated with an “R”) and the irresolute condition (the dots indicated with an “I”). Even more so, these differences in perceived level of resolve are highly significant ($p < 0.001$). In accordance with hypothesis H₁, those leaders who signaled their type as resolute in the scenario through

their behavior and statements were indeed viewed as significantly more tough and determined than leaders who signaled their type as irresolute. This result was consistent across groups. These findings provide strong support for the hypothesis that perceptions of an individual leader's resolve will be based on his statements and actions while in office.

As a robustness check, I tested for spill-over effects in which the original leader's resolve may affect the perceived level of resolve of the new leader. I compared assessments of both the original and new leaders' resolve among participants who only received information about the original leader (Original Leader: Resolute or Irresolute; New Leader: No information). While there are significant differences in perceptions of the original leader's level of resolve in this comparison ($z=5.3867$; $p=0.000$), there is no significant difference in how participants perceived the new leader ($z=-0.450$; $p=0.653$). This indicates that perceptions of the original leader's resolve do not carry over to affect perceptions of the second leader's resolve. Accordingly, this suggests that new leaders are perceived as distinct in their resolve from their predecessors even when participants have no information regarding the potential resolve of the new leader.

These differences in perceived level of resolve presented in Figure 1 continue to manifest themselves in participants' predictions regarding the response of each leader to a potential threat, as show in Figure 2 on the next page.




Figure 2: Predicted Threat Response - Leader Information Only Groups

While there is little difference across treatment groups as to how participants believe respective leaders of the same type will respond to a potential threat (as shown by comparing the dots labeled with an “R” across each column to each other or comparing the dots labeled with an “I” across each column to each other”), respective leaders that vary in their signaled resolve are viewed differently in the predicted strength of their response (as shown when comparing the dots labeled with an “R” across each column to those labeled with an “I”). Across each of these groups, the effects are significant ($p < 0.001$; $p < 0.05$) and run in the predicted direction as participants expect resolute leaders (dots labeled “R”) to be more likely to stand firm or escalate the conflict in the face of a threat than irresolute leaders (dots labeled “I”).

I tested once more for potential spill-over effects in which perceptions of the new leader's resolve may be affected by perceptions of the original leaders resolve by comparing the appropriate control groups. Interestingly, the data suggests that the behavior of the original leader may influence predictions of the new leader's behavior, although this effect is not strongly significant. When comparing those participants that only received information about the original leader's resolve, there is a highly significant difference in the predicted threat response of the original leader ($z=5.705$; $p=0.000$). Participants are more likely to predict that resolute original leaders will either escalate the conflict or stand firm in the face of a threat. In contrast, participants believe that irresolute original leaders will be more likely to back down or stand firm in the face of a threat. When examining these participants' beliefs regarding how the new leader - for whom they did not receive any signaling information about resolve - would behave, participants appear to rely, to a certain degree, on the behavior of the original leader as new leaders with a resolute predecessor are predicted to be more likely to stand firm ($z=-1.783$; $p=0.075$). If these spill-over effects were robust however, they should also manifest themselves across other experimental groups for which participants only received leader-based information. This effect may be due to the fact that assessments of the original leader's resolve are based on that leader's behavior while in office, but assessments of the new leader's resolve are based on this leader's statements only, which may be perceived a less credible and a less costly signal of resolve. In the next chapter, I

further investigate the differing effects of statements versus behavior on a leader's reputation for resolve.

Overall, the results from Experiment 1 are both robust and striking. Differences in signaled resolve based on leader statements and behavior in the scenario not only affect whether leaders are perceived as resolute, but also influence the predicted threat response of leaders. Accordingly, these results strongly suggest that expectations of future behavior are based on the statements and actions of each individual leader while in office. In other words, leaders are able to develop reputations for resolve in accordance with their own previous behavior and statements. Furthermore, perceptions of each leader's resolve are independent of the actions of that leader's predecessors.

3.5.2 Experiment 2 – State History

The results of Experiment 1 indicate that leaders are perceived as independent in their resolve from other leaders and that their reputations are based on their own behavior and statements while in office. However, current theories of reputation development suggest that state-based factors, not leader-based factors, are the driving forces behind reputation for resolve. To test for the effects of state-based factors on leader reputations for resolve, I compare control groups in which participants only receive state-based information to groups that receive both state-based information and leader-based information. In doing so, I measure the base-line effect of state-based information on resolve to which I can then compare the effect of both state-based and

leader-based information. Accordingly, I can determine the effect of this leader-based information on perceptions of resolve given the state-based condition. If leader behavior does not influence reputation for resolve and these perceptions are based solely on state-based factors, there should be no significant difference in the responses of participants who only receive state-based information and participants who also receive leader-based information.

In the second set of experiments, I consider the effect of state conflict history on leader reputation (H_2). To determine the baseline effect of state past action on perceptions of leader resolve, I first compared the responses of participants who were only given information about state history (State Resolute vs. State Irresolute). The results indicate that state history affects perceptions of the level of resolve of the original leader ($z=5.362$; $p=0.000$), but not of the new leader ($z=-0.052$; $p=0.958$). In accordance with the state-centric view of reputation for resolve, this suggests that original leaders from a state with a reputation for resolute action will be perceived as more tough and determined than if the state were irresolute in the past. However, I find that once accounting for leader-based factors, the effect of state history on the perceived level of a leader's resolve largely diminishes (as shown in Figures 3 and 4 on the next page).




Figure 3: Perceived Level of Resolve – Resolute State History Groups




Figure 4: Perceived Level of Resolve – Irresolute State History Groups

If reputations for resolve are indeed based exclusively on state past behavior, additional information regarding a leader's statements and behavior should have no significant effect on participants' perceived level of leader resolve. The results of the cross-group comparisons, however, clearly suggest that leader behavior is a significant conditioning factor. By comparing the mean values of perceived resolve and confidence intervals in the fifth column of each graph where participants only received information regarding past state behavior (the black and grey dots labeled "SR" and "SI") to the responses in which participants also received information about leader behavior in addition to state behavior (the black and grey dots labeled "R" and "I"), the graphs indicate that, across each group comparison in which responses are labeled by the same color dot, leader behavior has a consistent effect on perceived level of leader resolve, even when accounting for state past behavior. Leaders who positively signaled their resolve in the scenario were significantly more likely to be viewed as tough and determined ($p < 0.001$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.05$) in all but two instances. Similarly, leaders who indicated they would not act resolutely were viewed as significantly less tough and determined ($p < 0.001$; $p < 0.01$). These results indicate that even when accounting for past state behavior, leader action does significantly impact perceived resolve in accordance with my primary hypotheses. Resolute statements and behavior by leaders significantly increase the perceived level of resolve of a leader, while irresolute behavior

and statements significantly reduce this perceived level of resolve even when controlling for state reputation.

Tests regarding the baseline effects of state history on the predicted threat response of a leader echo these findings. When only given information about a state's prior actions, state history affects the predicted threat response of the original leader ($z=3.946$; $p=0.000$), but not of the new leader ($z=1.180$; $p=0.238$). Original leaders from a state with a history of resolute action are perceived as more likely to stand firm or escalate the crisis. A different pattern emerges, however, when leader-based factors are also included in the analysis (as shown in Figures 5 and 6).




Figure 5: Predicted Threat Response - Resolute State History Groups




Figure 6: Predicted Threat Response – Irresolute State History Groups

As these figures show, resolute leader behavior has little effect on the predicted threat response of leaders once state history is included in the analysis. Resolute leader behavior (dots labeled with “R”) neither bolsters the reputation of leaders coming from states with a history of resolute action (dots labeled with “SR” in Figure 5), nor does it improve the reputation of leaders from states with a history of irresolute action (dots labeled “SI” in Figure 6). In contrast, irresolute leader behavior, as indicated by dots labeled “I,” does have a highly significant effect. As shown by comparing those dots labeled “I” to those dots labeled either “SR” or “SI” of the same respective color, irresolute leaders are significantly less likely to be predicted to stand firm or escalate the conflict regardless of past state behavior ($p < 0.001$; $p < 0.05$). These results from Experiment 2 suggest that, even when controlling for state reputation, both the

perceived level of a leader's resolve and a leader's reputations for resolve are dependent upon leader statements and behavior. While resolute leader behavior only significantly enhances the perceived level of a leader's resolve, irresolute leader behavior has a significantly negative effect on both perceived level of resolve and reputation for resolve regardless of previous state behavior. In this regard, irresolute leader behavior is particularly influential to reputation development.

3.5.3 Experiment 3 – State Interest

To test the extent to which perceptions of resolve are influenced by state interest (H₅), I also consider the effect of a state's communicated interest in the issue on perceptions of an individual leader's resolve. Like the previous experiment, I compared state interest information only groups (High vs. Low) to respective groups that also received information about leader behavior. Tests regarding the baseline effect of state interest indicate that state interest has a significant effect on the perceived level of resolve for both the original leader ($z=5.471$; $p=0.000$) and the new leader ($z=2.478$; $p=0.013$). Accordingly, a high interest in the dispute leads participants to believe the opposing leader will be tougher and more determined, while a low communicated interest in the dispute reduces this belief. However, when additional information regarding leader behavior is included, a strong pattern emerges indicating that these perceptions of resolve are driven by leader action (as shown in Figures 7 and 8 on the next page).




Figure 7: Perceived Level of Resolve – High State Interest Groups




Figure 8: Perceived Level of Resolve – Low State Interest Groups

As these graphs show, leader-based factors are once again a significant conditioning factor on the perceived level of a leader's resolve. Even when accounting for state interest, leader behavior has a consistent effect on perceptions of resolve. Leaders who positively signaled their resolve (dots labeled "R") are perceived as significantly more tough and determined ($p < 0.01$; $p < 0.05$) overall when compared to the responses of participants who only received information regarding state interest (dots labeled "H" and "L"). Participants who received state interest information and signals that the leader may be irresolute (as indicated by dots labeled "I" in the first four columns of Figures 7 and 8) were significantly less likely ($p < 0.001$; $p < 0.01$) to perceive the leader as tough and determined than those participants who only received information regarding state interest (dots labeled "H" and "L" in the last column of Figures 7 and 8). As such, the effect of irresolute leader behavior is highly significant across all groups. These results indicate leader action significantly impacts the perceived level of leader resolve, even when accounting for state interest in the dispute. Examining the effect of state interest and leader behavior on the predicted threat response of leaders further supports these findings (as seen in Figures 9 and 10 starting on the next page).

I once again tested for the baseline effects of state interest on the predicted threat response of leaders by comparing those groups that were only given information regarding the opposing state's interest in the dispute. This test reveals that while there is no significant baseline effect of state interest on reputations for resolve for the original

leader ($z=0.010$; $p=0.992$), there is a significant effect on the new leader ($z=2.793$; $p=0.005$).

Accordingly, those participants who received the high state interest condition were more likely to predict the opposing leader would stand firm or escalate the crisis than those participants who received the low state interest condition. The addition of information regarding leader behavior, however, has a highly significant conditioning effect on the predicted threat response of leaders as shown in Figures 9 and 10 below.




Figure 9: Predicted Threat Response – High State Interest Groups




Figure 10: Predicted Threat Response – Low State Interest Groups

Interestingly, the effects of resolute leader behavior are inconsistent. In some instances it positively and significantly affects a leader's reputation ($p < 0.001$; $p < 0.05$), but in other instances it has no significant effect (as shown by comparing the dots of the same color labeled "R" to those labeled "H" and "L" in the figures above). Conversely, irresolute leader behavior has a consistently significant effect on a leader's predicted threat response even when controlling for both high and low state interest (as shown by comparing dots of the same color labeled "I" to those labeled "H" and "L" in each figure). Participants who received the irresolute leader condition in addition to the state interest condition were less likely to believe the opposing leader would stand firm or escalate the conflict ($p < 0.001$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.05$). Overall, these results indicate that perceptions of a leader's resolve are dependent upon a leader's statements and behavior,

even when accounting for state interest. While resolute leader behavior consistently enhances the perceived level of a leader's resolve, irresolute leader behavior has a consistently significant and negative effect on both perceived level of resolve and reputations for resolve.

3.5.4 Experiment 4 – Regime Type

For the fourth experiment, I examined the effect of regime type on perceptions of a leader's resolve (H_7). Like the previous two experiments, I compared regime type information only groups to respective groups that also received leader-based information. When comparing control groups that were only given information regarding the opposing state's regime (Democracy vs. Non-Democracy) to determine the baseline effect of regime type, there was a less significant effect for the original leader ($z=-1.864$; $p=0.062$) than for the new leader ($z=1.965$; $p=0.050$). While regime type has a significant baseline effect on perceptions of leader resolve, it is unclear from this initial analysis as to the substantive effect regime type has on perceptions of resolve. For the original leader, non-democratic leaders are perceived as slightly more resolute, but for the new leader, democratic leaders are perceived as more resolute. While the substantive effects of regime type alone are unclear, the addition of leader-based information indicates these perceptions of resolve are conditioned by leader statements and behavior, as demonstrated in Figure 11 and Figure 12 on the next page.




Figure 11: Perceived Level of Resolve – Democracy Regime Type Groups




Figure 12: Perceived Level of Resolve – Non-Democracy Regime Type Groups

The results from this analysis indicate that, when controlling for regime type, leader behavior can have a significant effect on perceptions of resolve. As shown in the

figures above, a leader positively signaling his resolve does not have a consistent effect on perceptions of resolve when compared to those participants who only received information about regime type (as seen by comparing dots of the same color labeled “R” to those labeled “D” and “N”). However, leaders whose behavior and statements signal irresolute action are significantly less likely to be perceived by participants as tough and determined across regime types (as shown by comparing dots of the same color labeled “I” to those labeled “D” and “N”). This result is highly significant ($p < 0.001$) and consistent across all groups. Accordingly, these results once again suggest that leader action significantly impacts the perceived level of a leader’s resolve and does so in the predicted direction, but only when the leader has signaled his type as irresolute.

Before examining the effect of regime type and leader behavior on a leader’s predicted threat response, I tested for the baseline effects of regime type among participants who only received information regarding the state’s regime type. While participants who receive the democracy condition are significantly more likely to believe the original leader will be less resolute in his response ($z = -4.307$; $p = 0.000$), they are more likely to believe a new democratic will respond resolutely – yet this effect is not significant ($z = 1.342$; $p = 0.180$). This result, coupled with the baseline effects of regime type on perceived level of resolve, is puzzling as democratic leaders are predicted to act less resolutely than non-democratic leaders. The current literature, in contrast, predicts that democratic leaders should be viewed as more, not less, resolute than their non-

democratic counterparts. One could argue this finding may be due to the inability of participants to distinguish between democratic and non-democratic leaders.

To address this potential issue, I examined the responses of participants assigned to the regime type treatment groups regarding any additional information they would have liked to be more confident in their beliefs and predictions. Analyzing these responses provides insight into the decision-making processes within these individuals and allows for an examination of participants' level of understanding of the distinctions between democracies and non-democracies. Participants who were told the opposing state was a democracy were particularly interested in receiving more information about public support for the conflict. Typical responses from participants assigned to this group included: "How did the citizens in the opposing country feel about the dispute?" and "What does public polling in the other country say?" Similarly respondents assigned to the non-democratic regime condition wanted to know more about how the new opposing leader came to power: "Did the second leader overthrow the first?" "How did the second leader gain power?" This high level of response quality suggests that participants are aware of the differences in regime types as well as the mechanisms by which democratic leaders are meant to be held accountable. This finding indicates that these results are likely not due to a lack of participant comprehension of the issues.

While the effects of regime type alone on leader reputation are somewhat ambiguous, leader-based factors have a strong effect on the predicted threat responses

of leaders, even when controlling for regime type, as shown in Figure 13 and Figure 14 below.




Figure 13: Predicted Threat Response – Democracy Regime Type Groups




Figure 14: Predicted Threat Response – Non-Democracy Regime Type Groups

Resolute leader behavior appears to have no significant effect on the predicted threat responses of leaders when controlling for regime type (as shown by comparing those dots labeled “R” to dots of the same color labeled “D” and “N”). In contrast, irresolute leader behavior has a consistently significant effect on a leader’s predicted threat response regardless of regime type (as shown by comparing dots labeled “I” to dots of the same color labeled “D” and “N”). For both democratic and non-democratic leaders, signaling irresolute behavior significantly reduced participants’ beliefs that the leader would stand firm or escalate the conflict ($p < 0.001$). Overall, these results indicate that both the perceived level of a leader’s resolve and a leader’s reputation for resolve are dependent upon leader statements and behavior even when accounting for regime type. While resolute leader behavior only significantly affects perceived level of resolve, irresolute leader behavior has a consistently negative impact on both the perceived level of a leader’s resolve and reputations for resolve among both democratic and non-democratic leaders.

3.5.5 Experiment 5 – Relative Military Capability

For the final experiment, I consider the effects of relative military power on perceptions of a leader’s resolve (H_6). Unlike the previous experiments, the relative military capability treatment groups contained three potential conditions: the opposing state was either stronger, weaker, or of equal military strength to the participant’s state. To determine the baseline effects of state power on perceptions of leader resolve, I

conducted three separate comparisons among those participants assigned to the capability information only treatment groups. When comparing the perceived level of resolve of leaders from states whose military is stronger than the participant's military and the resolve of leaders from states whose military is weaker than the participant's, there is a clearly significant effect for both the original leader ($z=1.978$; $p=0.048$) and the new leader ($z=3.030$; $p=0.002$). In both instances, leaders from states with a relatively stronger military were considered more resolute. Interestingly, participants who were told the opposing state had a stronger military were significantly less likely to perceive the opposing leader as resolute than participants who were told their military was of equal strength to the opposing state. This finding that leaders from a more powerful state are viewed as less resolute than leaders from a state of comparable military strength is highly significant for the original leader ($z=-2.888$, $p=0.004$), but insignificant for the new leader ($z=-1.109$; $p=0.268$). Similarly, participants who were told the opposing state had a weaker military perceived both the original leader ($z=-4.552$; $p=0.000$) and new leader ($z=-3.800$; $p=0.000$) as significantly less resolute than participants who were told their military was of equal strength to the opposing state. The addition of leader behavior information reveals further interesting patterns on perceptions of resolve, as shown in Figures 15, 16, and 17 starting on the next page.




Figure 15: Perceived Level of Resolve – Opposing State’s Military Stronger Groups




Figure 16: Perceived Level of Resolve – Opposing State’s Military Weaker Groups




Figure 17: Perceived Level of Resolve – Militaries Equal Strength Groups

These results indicate that leader behavior significantly impacts a leader's perceived level of resolve when accounting for relative military capability. Once again, irresolute leader behavior appears to have a more consistent impact on perceptions of resolve than does resolute leader behavior. While leaders who positively signaled their resolve in the scenario are more likely to be perceived as tough and determined overall, the effects of resolute leader behavior vary based on the state's relative military capability. Resolute leader behavior has the most significant and consistent impact when the opposing leader's military is weaker than the participant's military (as shown by comparing those dots labeled "R" in Figure 16 to those labeled "ME" of the same color). In these instances, participants who were also told the leader had positively signaled his resolve were more likely to view the opposing leader as resolute ($p < 0.001$; $p < 0.01$;

$p < 0.05$). Resolute leader behavior also appears to condition participants' perceptions of leader resolve when the opposing state's military is stronger than the participant's military, but this effect is less consistent (as shown by comparing those dots labeled "R" in Figure 15 to those of the same color labeled "MS"). Conversely, resolute leader behavior has no significant impact on perceived level of a leader's resolve when relative military capabilities between the participant's state and the target state are comparable. In contrast, however, irresolute leader behavior has a consistently significant effect regardless of the relative military capability of the opposing state in the scenario (as shown by comparing those dots labeled "I" to those of the same color in the fifth column of each figure). With the exception of two instances, irresolute leader behavior reduced the perceived level of a leader's resolve as participants were significantly less likely to believe the opposing leader was tough and determined ($p < 0.001$). Its impact was strongest when the opposing military was comparable in capability to the participant's military. The effects of relative military power and leader behavior on reputation for resolve reveal further interesting trends.

Once again, I conducted three separate comparisons among those participants assigned to the state power information only groups to determine the baseline effect of relative military capability on a leader's predicted threat response. Leaders from states with a military advantage were more likely to be expected to stand firm or escalate the conflict than leaders from states with a relatively weaker military. This effect was highly

significant for both the original leader ($z=2.896$; $p=0.004$) and the new leader ($z=3.673$; $p=0.000$). Conversely, participants predicted that leaders from a state with a military advantage would respond less resolutely than leaders from a state with comparable military capabilities to the participant's state. While this effect was significant for the original leader ($z=-2.217$; $p=0.027$), it was not significant for the new leader ($z=-0.599$; $p=0.549$). Finally, leaders from a militarily weaker state were significantly less likely to be expected to stand firm when compared to participants from a militarily comparable state. This effect was consistent for both the original leader ($z=-4.625$; $p=0.000$) and the new leader ($z=-3.951$; $p=0.000$). Overall, these results suggest that relative military capability alone can affect leader reputation for resolve.

Like the results of previous tests regarding the effects of leader-based factors on a leader's reputation for resolve once state-based factors are taken into considerations, I find that leader behavior can significantly impact a leader's predicted threat response even when controlling for relative power, as shown in Figures 18, 19, and 20 starting on the next page.




Figure 18: Predicted Threat Response – Opposing State’s Military Stronger Groups




Figure 19: Predicted Threat Response – Opposing State’s Military Weaker Groups




Figure 20: Predicted Threat Response – Militaries Equal Strength Groups

While I find resolute leader behavior has little significant effect on leader reputations from states with a military advantage and has no significant effect when the opposing leader's and participant's militaries are of equal strength ((as shown by comparing dots labeled "R" to those of the same color labeled "MS" in Figure 18 and "ME" in Figure 20), it does have a significant impact when the opposing state is at a military disadvantage (as shown by comparing dots labeled "R" to those of the same color labeled "MW" in Figure 19). In two out of four instances ($p < 0.01$), resolute leader behavior leads participants to believe a leader will be more likely to stand firm or escalate the conflict when the opposing state's military is at a disadvantage. In contrast, irresolute leader behavior has a consistently significant effect on the predicted threat response of leaders (as shown by comparing the dots labeled "I" to those of the same color in the fifth

column of each of the above figures). Leaders who signal irresolute action through either their behavior or statements are perceived as less likely to stand firm or escalate the conflict ($p < 0.001$; $p < 0.01$; $p < 0.05$). This effect was consistent regardless of the relative military capabilities of the opposing state. Once again, these tests indicate that, while resolute leader action affects perceptions of resolve, irresolute action impacts both perceptions of a leader's resolve and that leader's reputation for resolve. These tests further indicate that leader-based factors are highly influential on a leader's reputation for resolve, even when controlling for state-based factors.

3.5.6 Additional Influences on Perceptions of Resolve

These experiments suggest that, while state-based factors can be influential, a leader's perceived level of resolve and predicted threat response are highly dependent on that leader's statements and behavior. For the final analysis, I consider additional factors that may affect participants' assessments of leader resolve. Table 2, on the next page, presents the results of a series of OLS models investigating the effects of key variables derived from the control questions on perceptions of and reputations for resolve. The models in the first and second column of the table show the effects of individual control factors on each leader's perceived level of resolve. These factors include participants' beliefs that leaders are important, views on the acceptability of military force, political leanings, gender, attention to international events, and interest in international politics. The models in the third and fourth column of each table indicate

the effects of these factors on the predicted behavioral response of each leader to the potential threat, measuring each leader's reputation for resolve. These two models also consider the extent to which the perceived level of each leader's resolve affects these behavioral expectations.

Table 2: Influences on Perceptions of Resolve

	(1) Original Leader Resolve Level	(2) New Leader Resolve Level	(3) Original Leader Threat Response	(4) New Leader Threat Response
Views on Leaders	0.020 (0.026)	0.033 (0.028)	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.027 (0.015)
Views on Force	-0.079** (0.028)	-0.049 (0.029)	-0.001 (0.015)	0.041** (0.016)
Political Leanings	0.004 (0.011)	-0.024* (0.011)	0.004 (0.006)	0.007 (0.006)
Gender	0.012 (0.041)	0.049 (0.042)	-0.040 (0.023)	-0.051* (0.023)
Attention	-0.037 (0.020)	0.001 (0.021)	0.013 (0.011)	0.014 (0.011)
Interest	0.045 (0.025)	0.037 (0.027)	0.014 (0.014)	0.017 (0.014)
Resolve			0.508*** (0.011)	0.520*** (0.011)
Constant	3.855*** (0.162)	3.509*** (0.168)	0.307*** (0.100)	0.084 (0.099)
Observations (N)	2455	2453	2455	2453
R ²	0.0061	0.0048	0.4560	0.4813

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

The first and second models reveal that a participant's pre-existing views on the appropriateness of the use of force and their political leanings significantly affect the

extent to which they believe a is tough and determined. Participants who are more opposed to the use of force in general were more likely to view the original leader as tougher and more determined. For perceptions of the new leader's level of resolve, political leanings had a significant negative impact. Conservative participants were more likely to perceive the new leader as more resolute than their liberal counterparts. However, this variable had no effect on the original leader's perceived level of resolve.

The third and fourth models test the effects of these factors on the development of reputations for resolve, as measured by the predicted threat response of each leader. While views on the use of force are only significant for the fourth model regarding the new leader's resolve, the direction of this effect changes. In this instance, participants who oppose the use of force are more likely to view the new leader as more resolute in his response. In addition, the gender of respondents becomes significant for the expected behavioral response of leaders. For the fourth model, women were more likely to believe leaders would back down in the face of a threat. In addition, these models clearly indicate that a leader's reputation is highly influenced by the extent to which that leader is perceived to be resolute. For both the original and new leader, leaders who are perceived as more tough and determined are viewed as more likely to stand firm or escalate the dispute, while less resolute leaders are believed to be more likely to back down. This result provides strong support that perceptions of resolve are directly tied to reputations for resolve.

Finally, I would like to highlight two particularly interesting findings that were not previously discussed. At the end of the survey, participants were asked an open-ended question regarding any additional information they would have liked in order to be more confident in their assessments and predictions. After examining these responses in depth, two patterns emerged. First, the responses to this open-ended question were quite sophisticated overall. Over 98% of respondents took the time to answer the open-ended question, with most answers consisting of full sentences. As mentioned in the discussion of the answers to this question of those participants assigned to the regime type treatment groups, it was clear after examining this additional data that the overwhelming majority of these participants had internalized the survey and thought through the scenario. This level of sophistication, however, was not limited to only those respondents assigned to the regime type group as requests for additional information were conditioned by the group to which participants were assigned. For example, participants receiving the state interest treatment wanted to know more about how the state or leader determined these foreign policy priorities and how the value of the land under dispute affected these priorities. This high level of response quality suggests that participants may be more cognitively sophisticated than previous scholars indicate.

Second, participants overwhelmingly requested either more information regarding the individual leaders (43.4%), including their previous behavior and other personal characteristics, or state capabilities (22.4%). In contrast, few participants (9.9%)

requested information regarding previous state behavior or state history. Examining the responses of the control group in which participants did not receive any information regarding leader or state traits further demonstrates this trend. Participants from this group overwhelmingly requested information regarding leader behavior or other leader-based characteristics (64.3%), while fewer respondents from this group asked for information regarding state conflict history (2.4%) or other state-based characteristics including state interest, capabilities, and regime type (35.7%). While this may be expected as participants were asked directly about leaders, if perceptions of leader resolve are rooted in state-based factors, participants would not have requested more leader-based information in such overwhelming numbers.

Furthermore, while the conclusion cannot be made that policy-makers will seek out the exact same information, this result does suggest that when making assessments of how decision-makers will behave and response to threats, leader behavior and characteristics are the primary sources of information shaping perceptions of and reputations for resolve among survey participants. Furthermore, this provides insight into how participants came to their assessments as it indicates which information they view as most important in making these decisions.

3.6 Conclusions: Can leaders develop reputations for resolve?

The results of these experiments reveal that leaders can develop reputations for resolve independently of the state. Experiment 1 indicates new leaders are viewed as

independent in their resolve from their predecessors. Participants' perceptions of resolve are based on a leader's statements and actions while in office. Even more so, the perceived level of a leader's resolve directly translates into reputations for resolve regarding how leaders will behave during crises. Accordingly, this suggests that leaders can develop reputations for resolve on their own. Further experiments also indicate that such perceptions of resolve can be influenced by other factors. While regime type had little effect on perceptions of resolve or reputation for resolve, other variables considered did have significant effects on both perceived resolve and expected behavior. However, even when controlling for this state-based information, leader-based factors continue to have a significant impact on both the perceived level of a leader's resolve and the predicted threat response of a leader.

Leaders that come from states with a history of standing firm are more likely to be viewed as resolute. Similarly, leaders that come from states with a history of backing down are more likely to be viewed as irresolute. However, even when controlling for state history, leader behavior still has a significant impact on reputations for resolve. Most notably, while resolute leader behavior has little effect on the predicted response of leaders when accounting for state history, irresolute leader behavior has a significantly negative effect on both the perceived level of a leader's resolve and a leader's predicted threat response even when controlling for state reputation. Similarly, while state interest has a significant effect on perceptions of resolve, a leader's behavior still has a significant

impact on a leader's reputation for resolve even when accounting for state interest. Once again, I find that irresolute leader behavior is particularly influential on both perceptions of resolve and reputations for resolve regardless of the state's level of communicated interest in the dispute. Finally, relative military capability also has a significant impact on the perceived level of a leader's resolve and reputations for resolve, but leader behavior continues to be a significant influence on participants' views of leader resolve even when accounting for relative military capability. Once again, I find that a leader signaling he may be irresolute has a significant negative effect on both perceptions of resolve and reputation for resolve. Overall, these results strongly indicate the leader behavior is the driving force behind leader reputations. While these reputations can certainly be influenced by state-based factors, leader behavior is still significant once controlling for these state-based characteristics,

Furthermore, these results also suggest an interesting pattern regarding the effects of resolute and irresolute leader behavior. Resolute leader behavior seems to have little effect on reputations, given the inclusion of state-based factors. While there were significant differences between both the perceived level of resolve and predicted threat response of resolute and irresolute leaders in the leader information only treatment groups, the effect of resolute leader behavior on a leader's predicted threat response is largely diminished once state-based characteristics are included in the analysis. Resolute behavior appears to have the strongest effect on perceived level of resolve, but this

difference often fails to manifest itself once participants are asked to predict how the opposing leader will respond to the threat.

In contrast, irresolute leader behavior has a strongly consistent effect on both perceptions of leader resolve and the leader's reputation based on his predicted threat response. Even when accounting for state reputation, state interest, regime type, and relative military capability, irresolute leader behavior was damaging to both a leader's perceived level of resolve and predicted threat response. Furthermore, irresolute leader behavior magnified the negative effect of a state reputation for irresolute action and low communicated interest in the dispute. In these instances, leaders were perceived to be particularly irresolute and significantly more likely to back down in the face of a potential threat. This may suggest that irresolute leader behavior is a strong conditioning factor on reputations and that it may be even more influential by working in tandem with other factors, such as a previous state history of irresolute action or a low interest in the dispute at hand. Furthermore, this finding suggests that adversaries can develop reputations for irresolute actions, providing a contrary result to that predicted by Mercer's theory of reputation development (H₃).

This result regarding the impact of irresolute leader behavior carries serious implications for policy-makers. Policy-makers cannot rely on a state reputation for resolute action to off-set their own reputation if they make poor decisions while in office. Once policy-makers signal they may be irresolute on an issue, their reputations may be

seriously damaged. This is particularly important if they come from a state with an irresolute history or if the leader communicates that the dispute is not a high priority for his state. In other words, leaders need to be careful to avoid gaining a reputation for irresolute action by firmly asserting their resolve early on. In the next chapter, I examine how leaders may communicate their resolve (or lack of resolve) through their statements and behavior. This result regarding the relative impact of resolute and irresolute leader behavior also calls into question the ability of leaders to develop reputations for resolute action as it appears reputations for irresolute are more prominent than those for resolute action. In the next chapter, I further investigate the ability of leaders to develop reputations for both resolute and irresolute action. In addition, I more fully investigate the process by which these reputations develop over time and further discuss the implications of these findings for policy-makers.

4. Repeated Interactions and Reputations for Resolve: A Process Tracing Experiment

In the second set of experimental surveys, presented in this chapter, I further assess the effects of key variables on perceptions of an individual leader's resolve. The previous set of experiments, presented in the last chapter, indicate that, while state-based factors can affect perceptions of leader resolve, a leader's statements and behavior still significantly impact these perceptions even when controlling for these state-based factors. While the first set of experiments indicate that leaders can develop reputations for resolve independently of their predecessors and the state, these experiments did not address how individual leaders develop these reputations for resolve over time. Furthermore, while the responses to the open-ended questions in the first set of experiments suggest that participants appear to prioritize information regarding leader-based factors in their decision-making, a more thorough analysis is needed to fully understand how participants access and process information regarding leader-based or state-based factors when making assessments of resolve.

In the second set of experiments presented in this chapter, I not only consider whether leaders can develop reputations for resolve independently of the state, but also examine the process by which these reputations develop over time by addressing several empirical questions: 1) What information do participants seek out when making assessment of a leader's resolve? 2) How does this information affect participants'

perceptions of a leader's resolve? 3) How do these perceptions change over time through repeated interactions? While the first set of experiments tested the ability of leaders to develop reputations for resolve by focusing on periods of leadership transitions, this second set of experiments considers how the reputation for resolve of a single leader develops and changes over time through multiple interactions.

In this set of experiments, I manipulate both the type of information participants have access to as well as the content of this information. Rather than presenting participants with a single crisis that is played out across an original leader and a new successive leader in the same state, as is done in the first set of experiments, this second set of experiments presents participants with a three-stage scenario survey in which they repeatedly interact with a single leader through escalating stakes over a single issue and must make assessments about the opposing leader's resolve at each stage of the survey. By doing so, I can gain insight into how a leader's reputation for resolve develops across multiple interactions. More specifically, I am able to directly test several hypotheses presented in Chapter 2 as I randomly assign participants to different treatment groups and manipulate the information they have access to at each stage of the survey based on their assigned group. In doing so, I analyze the effects of state-based and leader-based information on perceived resolve as well as the hypothesis that early interactions should matter more for reputations for resolve and be robust throughout later interactions (H_8).

Furthermore, these experiments complement the previous set of experiments, which strongly indicate that leaders can develop reputations for resolve both separate from the state and from their predecessors. These results suggest that a leader's reputation is based on a leader's statements and behavior while in office. The first set of experiments further indicate that state-based factors, including state reputation, communicated interest in the dispute, and relative military capability, can also be influential on perceptions of resolve, but that leader-based factors are still influential on a leader's reputation even when accounting for these state-based factors. The second set of experiments, presented in this chapter, expand upon these findings. While I further test the effects of state-based variables on leader reputation, I also more clearly differentiate the between the effects of a leader's statements vs. behavior on perceptions of resolve.

In addition, while the first set of experiments is a traditional factorial survey in which participants are given specific treatments within the content of the survey scenario, the second set of experiments utilizes experimental process tracing methods. Rather than simply varying the information put forth in the scenario (as done in the first experiment), the second experiment allows participants to read a scenario and then decide which information they wish to access before making a decision. This structure enables the researcher to track the participant's decision-making process as participants choose which information to access. The combination of both sets of experiments

(presented in this chapter and the last chapter) provides strong insight into how leaders develop reputations for resolve over time and which factors are most salient in the development of these reputations.

4.1 Process Tracing Experiments

Process tracing experiments have been widely used in psychology, neuroscience, and economics to understand how individuals make decisions. In political science, this experimental method has been employed to explore a variety of phenomena ranging from voter choices during campaigns (Redlawsk 2004; Redlawsk, Civettini, and Emmerson 2010; Redlawsk, and Lau 2009) to the dynamics of negotiations (Florea et al 2003) to foreign policy decision-making strategies among both elites and lay populations (Mintz 2004; Mintz et al 1997; Mintz, Redd, and Vedlitz 2006). While traditional survey experiments reveal the effect of treatments on participants' decisions, they are insufficient to provide insight into how those decisions are made. With process tracing experiments, in contrast, researchers can identify the process by which participants make decisions. The main advantage of process tracing experiments lies in their ability to reveal which information is accessed by participants and how this information affects a particular decision or assessment (Ford et al 1989; Jean-Francois et al 2011; Lafond et al 2009; Svenson 1979). By allowing participants to determine which information they access and tracking those decisions, computerized process tracing software provides the best method by which to understand the internal dynamics of decision-making (Huber,

Huber, and Schulte-Mecklenbeck 2011; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Mintz 2004; Mintz, Yand, and McDermott 2011). More specifically, this software allows researchers to look at both the depth and breadth of information search among survey participants, indicating both the style of information search participants use as well as which information was considered most important by participants (Redlawsk 2004).

While there are several types of process tracing software available, my analysis employs the Dynamic Process Tracing Environment (DPTE).¹ The DPTE is particularly useful for studying decision making over time as it “can be used to study multi-stage, multi-alternative evaluation and choice environments” (Redlawsk 2013). The DPTE provides greater flexibility as it allows for multi-stage surveys in which different information can be accessed by the participant at each stage according to the treatment group and condition to which each participant is randomly assigned (Redlawsk, Civettini, and Emerson 2010). Furthermore, I find the interface of the DPTE to be more sophisticated than other platforms and easier for participants to navigate. The DPTE is particularly advantageous as it provides the researcher with complete control over pre- and post-stage questions, which alternatives are presented at each stage, and how each stage of the experiment is set up and presented to participants.

¹ I also considered using Mintz’s Decision Board Platform but found the software did not readily provide the flexibility needed to conduct a multi-stage analysis.

4.2 Experimental Procedure

Like the previous set of experiments, all participants who take the survey are given a consent form explaining the survey procedure and any potential risks or benefits of participating in the study. All subjects are randomly assigned to a treatment group in which I manipulate the type of information they can access as well as the content of that information. Participants are asked to read multiple scenarios and make assessments based on what they read. Unlike the previous set of experiments which focused on periods of leadership change, this set of experiments follows the development of the reputation for resolve of a single leader across multiple interactions through an iterative survey design. The survey provides participants with three separate scenarios addressing a consistent issue under dispute: a summit meeting, extended negotiations, and a potential crisis. This survey structure and its accompanying scenarios is based on the pattern of interactions observed in the case study presented in Chapter 6 in which leaders discuss an issue under dispute with increasingly high stakes negotiations, beginning by establishing their positions through a formal summit meeting, continuing direct negotiations after the summit, and culminating in a potential crisis when a negotiated settlement has not been met. Through this iterative design, I am able to track the development of reputation for resolve over time and examine the impact of independent variables across various stages of the experiment (Ludwick and Zeller 2001; Kuperman and Ozkececi-Taner 2006).

Prior to reading the first scenario, subjects are given a series of control and demographic questions. These questions are the same as those presented in the previous set of experiments and are meant to capture any preexisting beliefs regarding the participant's view of the importance of world leaders and the appropriate use of military force. After reading each scenario, participants answer questions regarding their assessments of the leader's resolve. These questions are identical across each stage of the survey. For the final stage of the survey, in which participants read a scenario about a crisis with a potential threat, participants are also asked to predict how the opposing leader would respond to a potential threat. By comparing the responses across each stage of the survey of participants who are assigned to different treatments, I am able to determine the extent to which each participant's perception of a leader's resolve changes over time as well as the extent to which assessments of resolve are affected by the information participants choose to access. In between each stage, participants are asked a factual question based on the previous scenario to check for both reading comprehension and attention (Chandler, Mueller, and Paolucci 2013). Those participants who failed to answer both these questions correctly are excluded from the analysis. The survey concludes with basic demographic questions regarding gender, age, and education as well as a debriefing. The full text of the experiment can be found in Appendix A.

4.2.1 Deception

This experiment involves two related forms of deception. Like the first set of experiments presented in the last chapter, I use a monetary incentive to encourage participants to carefully read the survey and to be more invested in the study (Dickson 2011; Druckman and Kam 2011; Chandler, Mueller, and Paolucci 2013). Accordingly, participants are informed that making correct assessments about each leader's resolve throughout the survey can earn them a bonus payment. As part of the deception, however, all participants receive this bonus regardless of their answer choices. In addition, as participants in this study are asked to select which pieces of information they would like to read at each stage of the survey before making assessments of resolve, participants are told that each piece of information they access will cost them \$0.01. In reality, however, participants are not penalized for accessing information. This deception is meant to mimic the real world trade-offs between the desire to make a good/correct assessment and the cost, in terms of time and resources, it takes to make these decisions. Both deceptions are explained to participants in the debriefing and were approved by the Institutional Review Board at Duke University.

4.3 Survey Design

4.3.1 Scenario Design

In the three-stage survey, participants are asked to read three successive yet distinct scenarios in which they take the role of a leader of an unnamed state.² Each of the three scenarios involves an ongoing foreign policy dispute with the same leader from a neighboring state over who should control an area of resource rich land along the participant's and neighboring state's shared border. Throughout each scenario, this issue under dispute remains consistent. During the first scenario, participants are told they are about to enter into negotiations with the neighboring state's leader at an international summit. In the second scenario, participants are informed that they were unable to reach an agreement with the leader of the neighboring state during the summit and are now entering into ongoing negotiations over who should control the area of land. Finally, in the third scenario, participants are informed that a compromise has yet to be reached and that they have the option to issue a threat to try to force a settlement. The scenario text as presented to participants for each of the stages is as follows:

International Summit: You are the leader of a state that shares a disputed border with a neighboring state. You are about to enter into negotiations at an international summit with the leader of the neighboring state over who should control this disputed area of land along your shared border. This area of land is rich in mineral resources and whoever controls this land will get both more power and resources. Before you go to this important conference to negotiate with the opposing leader, you need to gather information as to how you think

² As in the previous set of experiments, I chose not to use real states as to avoid any confounding issues due to pre-existing beliefs about a particular state.

this leader will act during the summit meeting. You have never negotiated with this leader before.

Extended Negotiations: Since the summit ended a few months ago, you have decided to enter into on-going negotiations to try to find a solution to the dispute over who should control the disputed area of land. Before you enter into these negotiations you need to predict how the opposing leader will act during these negotiations.

Potential Crisis: Despite the continued negotiations over the disputed piece of land, a compromise has not been reached. You are getting impatient to end the dispute. You can issue a threat to send military forces to the border if a settlement is not reached within the next few months. Before you issue a threat, however, you must predict how the opposing leader would respond to the threat.

At each stage, participants are presented with the appropriate scenario and are then informed that, on the next screen, they will find pieces of information that their advisors have gathered to help the participant predict how the leader in the neighboring (opposing) state may act. Participants are then presented with a screen in which they can choose which types of information they wish to obtain. Figure 21, on the next page, shows a sample screenshot of this part of the survey. At each stage of the scenario, participants are presented with randomly ordered relevant information based on their assigned group that can help them determine how the opposing leader may act during the summit, negotiations, and in the face of a potential threat to send military forces to the border. Participants are free to access as much or as little information as they see fit. Finally, participants are not made aware of which information they will have access to prior before seeing this screen. Accordingly, participants are not informed of the group

to which they are randomly assigned, nor are they told the type of information participants assigned to other groups may access.



Figure 21: Sample Screenshot of Information Available to Participants

After participants finish accessing the information they wish to see, each participant is asked to make assessments about the opposing leader's resolve. Upon answering these questions, participants are then told how the opposing leader acted during that stage of interactions. Participants are then asked to make predictions regarding they believe how the opposing leader would behave in a similar situation in the future. For example, after reading the scenario about the upcoming summit meeting, accessing information about the opposing leader or state, and answering questions about how they believe the opposing leader will behave during the summit, participants are told how the opposing leader actual behaved at the summit (i.e. whether the

opposing leader was resolute or irresolute during the summit). Participants are then asked how they believe the opposing leader would behave in future summit meetings. After answering the final set of questions at each stage, participants move onto the next stage of the survey. After the final scenario and accompanying questions are presented, subjects are asked basic demographic questions and are then debriefed.

4.3.2 Groups and Conditions

Participants in this experiment were randomly assigned to groups in which they could only access information regarding the opposing leader's statements and behavior (leader information only groups) or in which they could access this leader-based information as well as state-based information. A full list of treatment and control groups is listed in Table 3 on the next page. In the first set of treatment groups listed in Table 3, participants were only able to access information about the leader's statements and behavior at each stage of the scenario. At each stage of the scenario, the leader was either resolute or irresolute in his statements and behavior (H_1). In the second set of treatment groups, participants could access information regarding the leader's statements and behavior as well as information regarding the past behavior of the state. For these treatment groups, the state either acted resolutely or irresolutely in the past (H_2). For the third set of treatment groups, participants could access information regarding the leader's statements and behavior in addition to information regarding the state's interest in the dispute, which was either high or low (H_3). For the fourth set of

treatment groups, participants could access information regarding the regime type of the target state, which as either a democracy or a non-democracy, as well as the leader's statements and behavior (H₇). Finally, for the fifth set of treatment groups, participants could access information regarding the leader's statements and behavior as well as the target's military capability relative to the participant's. In these treatment groups, participants could access information that the opposing state's military was either stronger, weaker, or of equal strength to the participants' military (H₆).

Table 3: Treatment Groups

Leader-Information Groups (Stage 1/Stage 2/ Stage 3)		
Resolute/Resolute/Resolute		Resolute/Resolute/Irresolute
Resolute/Irresolute/Resolute		Resolute/Irresolute/Irresolute
Irresolute/Resolute/Resolute		Irresolute/Resolute/Resolute
Irresolute/Irresolute/Resolute		Irresolute/Irresolute/Irresolute
Past State Behavior		
Leader Info+ State Resolute		Leader Info + State Irresolute
State Interest		
Leader Info + High Interest		Leader Info + Low Interest
Regime Type		
Leader Info + Democracy		Leader Info + Non-Democracy
Relative Military Capability		
Leader Info + Opposing Military Stronger	Leader Info + Opposing Military Weaker	Leader Info + Equal Military Strength

It is important to note that participants assigned to the state-based information treatment groups could only access one type of state-based information. For example, participants could be assigned to a group in which they could access information about

state interest in the dispute or in which they could access information about the opposing state's regime type, but not both.³ While the leader's signaled resolve could change at each stage of the survey, the value of the state-based variables remains consistent throughout the survey. For example, a participant could access information that the leader was resolute in the first stage, irresolute in the second stage, and resolute in the third stage. However, if a participant was assigned to the resolute state behavior group, the participant could be able to access information that the state was resolute at each stage of the survey. Despite this static information, participants were not told that the content of the state-based information would change.

4.3.2.1 Stage Information Options

The type of information participants could access at each scenario varied by the stage of the survey and the group to which participants were assigned. For the summit meeting stage of the survey (Stage 1), all participants could access information regarding the opposing leader's statements prior to the summit and intelligence reports indicating how the opposing leader may behave during the summit. At the extended negotiations stage (Stage 2), all participants could access information about the opposing leader's interactions with other leaders during previous negotiations, more information about how the opposing leader acted during the recent summit, and information about the opposing leader's press statements leading into negotiations. At the crisis stage (Stage

³ This set up is comparable to that utilized in the previous set of experiments.

3), all participants could access information regarding the opposing leader's press statements prior to the crisis, the opposing leader's behavior in past crisis situations, and the opposing leader's behavior during the previous rounds of negotiations in the second stage of the survey. At each of these stages, subjects who were assigned to state-based information groups could also access relevant state-based information depending on the group and condition to which they were assigned. It is important to note that while the content of this information is consistent, the way in which the information is phrased varies by the scenario. In other words, participants could reinforce the treatment by gathering additional information for the state-based treatment to which they were assigned. For example, a participant who was assigned to the high state interest condition and accessed the state interest information at each stage would be told during the summit stage: "In press statements, the opposing leader has stated that the disputed border is a high priority for his state." During the negotiation stage, the participant would read: "The opposing leader has repeatedly stated that the disputed border is the top priority for his state right now." Finally during the crisis stage, the participant would be informed: "The disputed area remains a high priority for the opposing state." The full wording for each condition at each stage of the experiment can be found in Appendix C.

4.3.3 Dependent Variables

Like the previous set of experiments, the main dependent variable in my analysis is the extent to which each leader is viewed by participants to be resolute. To measure resolve, I once again utilized two common synonyms for resolve used in the literature: toughness and determination. After reading the scenario at each stage of the survey, participants are asked to rank the leader on a scale in terms of their toughness and determination. I average these two measures to create a composite measure of resolve. In addition, participants are asked how likely they believe a compromise will be reached in the upcoming summit or negotiations. Finally, during the crisis stage, participants were also asked how they believed the opposing leader would respond to the potential threat as well as how confident they were in this belief and whether or not they would actually issue the threat. As with the previous set of experimental surveys, responses were clearly labeled along a five-point ordinal scale (Krosnick 1999; Pelham and Blanton 2007; Sue and Ritter 2012).

During the summit and negotiation stages, participants are asked how likely they believe the leader is to be tough and determined during the upcoming negotiations as well as how likely they believe a compromise will be reached during the summit or negotiations. During the crisis stage, participants are asked how tough and determined they believe the opposing leader will be in response to the threat as well as how they believe the leader would respond to the potential threat, how confident they are in their

beliefs, and whether or not they would issue the threat. Finally, after being told how the leader acted at each stage of the survey, participants were then asked how tough and determined they believed the leader would act in future similar situations.

4.3.4 Control Questions

Before reading the first scenario, participants answer a series of demographic and control questions that are identical to those used in the first set of experiments presented in the previous chapter. Demographic questions include participants' political leanings, party affiliation, interest in and attention to international events, and their primary news source. As the survey asks participants to make assessments and predictions about international leaders and their responses to military threats, the control questions measure the extent to which subjects believe international leaders are efficacious actors in international politics as well as participants' views regarding the acceptability of the use of military force. To measure participants' views on the importance of leaders to international politics, participants are asked, on a five-point scale, how strongly they agree or disagree with the following statements:

International leaders are important and have a large impact on international events.

It doesn't really matter who is in office. A country would end up with the same policies regardless of the person in office.

To account for participants' views on the acceptability of the use of militarized force, subjects are asked how strongly they agree or disagree with the following statements:

Sometimes the only way to solve a problem between states is through military force.

The use of military force only makes problems worse.

States should be able to talk things out and reach a peaceful solution to their problems.

To help avoid any potential issues with priming effects by asking participants about leaders prior to taking the survey, these control questions were randomly ordered and interspersed with the initial demographic questions. I also ensured that participants would not receive a question regarding their views of leaders as the last question before reading the first scenario. Finally, at the end of the survey, participants were asked additional demographic data including their age, gender, and education level.

4.3.5 Participant Selection

This set of experiments was administered through the Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) subject recruitment platform. Experimental participants received a total of \$0.75 for participating in the 10-15 minute survey. Participants from the subject pool self-selected into the survey and were randomly assigned to a treatment group and condition. Like the previous set of experiments, the sample was limited to U.S. residents and AMT workers with a 95% or higher approval rating (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012; Chandler, Mueller, and Paolucci 2013; Rand 2012). As this set of surveys was completed after those presented in the previous chapter, subjects who participated in the first set of experiments were not eligible for this study. This exclusion was due to the similar content and set-up of the two surveys and the concern that participating in the

first set of experiments could both bias subjects' thinking and answers in the second set of experiments, particularly as both surveys use the same measurements for resolve and involve the same deception.

The final sample (N=3,198)⁴ was 49.09% female and 50.91% male. Participants were well educated as 48.35% of the sample held a bachelor's degree or higher and an additional 41.26% had completed some college. As such, almost 90% of the sample had at least some college education. Participant ages ranged from 18 to 75 (median = 30.89). These demographics are comparable to those of the previous set of experiments. The sample for the second set of experiments was slightly less conservative than the previous sample with 55.44% of participants identifying as some form of liberal in political leaning and 39.21% identifying as Democrats. In contrast, only 19.95% of the sample considered themselves some form of conservative and 14.48% identified as members of the Republican Party. Finally, the sample for this set of experiments was quite interested in international affairs with 53.61% indicating they were either somewhat or extremely interested in international politics and 42.00% indicating they either somewhat or very closely follow international events.⁵ In comparison to the

⁴ Over the course of the survey, participants answered two factual questions based on the information in the various scenarios. Participants who failed to correctly both these questions correctly were dropped from the analysis and are not included in this total.

⁵ In recruiting participants from the AMT sample, the survey was advertised as being about political events to purposely try to gain a sample which would be both more interested and attentive to international politics.

sample from the first set of experiments, this sample is less conservative, composed of more moderates and independents, and slightly less interested in international politics.

4.4 Information Selection

For the first step in the analysis, I examine which information participants seek out at each stage of the survey. In doing so, I determine whether participants were more likely to access multiple pieces of information at different stages of the survey, the extent to which participants relied on a leader's actions vs. previous behavior in making decisions, how strongly participants focused on leader-based vs. state-based information in their assessments, and which information participants selected first during each stage. These analyses provide insight into the thoroughness of each participant's information search and their reliance on a particular heuristic when accessing this information.

4.4.1 Thoroughness of Information Search

Table 4, on the next page, shows the percentage of participants accessing one, two, three, or four or more pieces of information at each stage of the survey. The results indicate that, in general, participants seek out quite a bit of information when making their decisions. This suggests that participants are both taking the survey seriously and may be conducting a deliberate and thorough information search.⁶

⁶ This could be due to the fact that participants used a more rational decision-making style than predicted or it could be related to the amount of time participants had to access this information. Due to limitations in the program, participants could not simply proceed to the next screen when they were done with their information search. Rather they were required to spend a full minute on this screen before proceeding to the next screen.

Table 4: Amount of Information Accessed by Participants

	Summit Stage (Stage 1)			Negotiation Stage (Stage 2)			Crisis Stage (Stage 3)		
	All Groups	Leader Info Only	State Info Also	All Groups	Leader Info Only	State Info Also	All Groups	Leader Info Only	State Info Also
None	4.32%	3.48%	4.46%	12.60%	14.78%	12.24%	13.48%	13.04%	13.55%
One	15.51%	12.83%	5.96%	26.02%	28.91%	25.53%	29.24%	34.78%	28.31%
Two	24.80%	52.39%	20.16%	26.92%	18.04%	24.91%	21.73%	17.39%	22.46%
Three	37.77%	16.74%	41.31%	15.13%	30.87%	12.49%	13.13%	29.13%	10.45%
Four or More	17.61%	14.56%	18.12%	22.33%	7.39%	24.48%	22.41%	5.65%	25.23%
Mean # info chosen	2.55	2.31	2.59	2.09	1.87	2.13	2.13	1.87	2.17

Participants assigned to the leader information only groups were presented two pieces of accessible information at the summit stage and three pieces of accessible information at the negotiation and crisis stages. Participants assigned to the state-based information groups were presented with three pieces of accessible information at the summit stage and four at the negotiation and crisis stages. Accordingly, the number of pieces of information accessed at each stage according to the assigned group indicates that most participants chose to access as much or almost as much information as was available to them. Furthermore, a fair number of participants in each group chose to access the same piece of information more than once, such as leader-information only group assigned participants who accessed three or more pieces of information at the summit stage and four or more pieces of information at the negotiation and crisis stages. In contrast, relatively few participants chose to access no information at each stage. Only

96 participants (0.03% of the total sample) chose not to access any information at all throughout the survey.

The results presented in Table 4 also reveal insight into participants' information gathering processes. According to my hypothesis that early interactions should matter most for reputations for resolve (H_8), I would expect participants to gather the most information during the first stage of interactions (the summit stage) and less information as the survey progresses. The results provide general support for this hypothesis. Overall, participants did gather the most information during the summit stage (total sample mean = 2.55). Furthermore, this stage saw the fewest participants failing to collect any information with less than 5% of the total sample selecting no information. In contrast, participants selected fewer pieces of information during the negotiation stage, regardless of the type of information they could access (total sample mean = 2.09), and a greater number of participants in the sample failed to access any information (12.6% of the total sample). The final stage of the survey, the crisis stage, saw a comparable amount of information being accessed as in the negotiation stage (total sample mean = 2.13), with a similar percentage of participants failing to access any information (13.48% of the total sample). These results indicate that participants seek out more information during their first interaction with a new leader and then access less information for their second and third interactions. Furthermore, these results become even more meaningful when we consider that participants in both the leader-based and state-based information

groups had more information options during the negotiation and crisis stages than they had during the summit stage.

4.4.2 Which Information Do Participants Seek Out

Next, I examine which specific information participants seek out at each stage of the survey. For the purpose of comparability, I divide this analysis into an examination of the leader-based information all participants had access to and the information participants assigned to state-based information groups seek out. Table 5, below, shows the percentage of participants from leader-based information and state-based information groups accessing particular leader-based information at each stage.

Table 5: Percentage of Participants Accessing Leader-Based Information

	Summit Stage (Stage 1)			Negotiation Stage (Stage 2)			Crisis Stage (Stage 3)		
	All Groups	Leader- Info Only	State- Info Also	All Groups	Leader- Info Only	State- Info Also	All Groups	Leader- Info Only	State- Info Also
Intelligence Reports	85.33%	92.61%	84.11%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Leader Statements	77.30%	86.96%	75.68%	52.19%	52.96%	52.23%	47.50%	48.91%	47.26%
Past Leader Behavior	N/A	N/A	N/A	62.54%	66.30%	61.91%	73.70%	79.13%	72.79%
Leader Behavior in Last Stage	N/A	N/A	N/A	54.50%	59.57%	53.65%	39.93%	45.00%	39.08%

The results of this table indicate key trends in the selection of leader-based data across all groups. First, it is important to note the large number of participants assigned to the state-based information groups that chose seek out leader-based information. In

these instances, participants had access to both state-based and leader-based information when making assessments of resolve. If reputations are based primarily on state-based factors, as current theories of reputation for resolve predict, one would expect participants in the state-based information groups to heavily view state-based information and access little leader-based information. The high percentages of participants assigned to these groups that access leader-based information at each stage, particularly intelligence reports on the new leader (84.11%) and statements by the leader prior to summit negotiations (75.68%) as well as the leader's behavior in past crises (72.79%), indicates that these participants do view leader-based information even when they have access to state-based information. Furthermore, in many instances, participants assigned to state-based information groups accessed leader-based information at percentages comparable to those participants assigned to the leader-information only group. This is particularly prevalent across all leader-based information options at the negotiation stage as well as for a leader's statements and past behavior during the crisis stage of the survey.

Second, these results indicate that, when available, subjects are more likely to access information regarding a leader's past behavior in similar situations than the leader's statements. This is evident at both the negotiation and crisis stages. For subjects assigned to leader-only information groups and subjects assigned to state-based information groups, participants accessed information regarding a leader's past

behavior at much higher rates than a leader's statements to the press. At the negotiation stage, 62.54% of the total sample accessed information about a leader's past behavior while only 52.19% of the total sample sought out information about the leader's statements going into negotiations. The difference at the crisis stage is even more notable as only 47.50% of the total sample accessed information about a leader's statements going into the crisis but 73.70% of the total sample sought out information about the leader's behavior in past crises. Furthermore, it appears that what is most important to participants regarding a leader's behavior is how that leader acted in similar situations. While 54.50% of the total sample sought out more information at the negotiation stage about how the leader had handled negotiations during the summit, only 39.93% of the total sample at the crisis stage wanted more information about how the leader had handled negotiations during the previous stage. These rates are also much lower than the rates of participants seeking out information as to how the leader had handled similar situations in the past. Thus, it appears that a leader's past behavior weighs heavily on participants' information search decisions.

For the second part of this analysis, I consider the extent to which participants assigned to the state-based information conditions seek out state-based information at each stage of the survey. The percentages of participants assigned to these groups accessing their respective state-based information at each stage of the survey are presented in Table 6 on the next page.

Table 6: Percentage of Eligible Participants Accessing State-Based Information

	Summit Stage (Stage 1)	Negotiation Stage (Stage 2)	Crisis Stage (Stage 3)
Past State Behavior in Similar Situations	76.69%	38.84%	59.18%
State Interest	72.50%	50.97%	35.63%
State Regime Type	73.10%	36.73%	30.06%
Relative Military Capability	72.42%	27.83%	34.51%

These results indicate that participants are most likely to access state-based information during the summit stage, the stage in which participants sought out the most information in general. Interestingly, participants from the state-based information groups seek out state-based information during this first stage at comparable rates to the leader's statements regarding the upcoming summit but at lower rates than intelligence reports about the leader's potential behavior at the summit. The number of participants accessing state-based information during the negotiation stage then sharply drops-off. While this could be due to the fact that there is little change in the content of information presented in the state-based information groups at the various stages (although participants are unaware of this), it may be particularly telling that participants assigned to these state-based information groups continue to access leader-based information at higher rates than they access state-based information.

The table above also reveals interesting trends in the information participants seek out, which appears to be highly dependent on the type of state-based information

they could receive. While participants in the regime type and state interest group accessed less state-based information as the survey progressed, participants in the military capability and state behavior groups sought out more state-based information in the crisis stage than during the negotiation stage. This may suggest that these participants viewed the state's previous crisis behavior or the relative military capability of the opposing state as more salient during the crisis stage than during negotiations. It is important to note that across both the negotiation and crisis stages participants accessed their respective state-based information at much lower rates than they accessed information regarding the opposing leader's past behavior in similar situations.

4.4.3 Priority of Information

Finally, I also consider which information participants access first at each stage of the survey. Examining which information participants sought out first provides clues as to which heuristic participants rely on (i.e. leader-based vs. state-based information) and is also critical to understanding which information participants consider to be most important in the decision task as this information should be sought out the earliest (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). Below I present three distinct tables – one for each stage of the survey – showing the number of participants (in percentages) accessing different types of information first during each stage. I begin by examining the priority of information search among participants in the summit stage as presented in Table 7 on the next page.

Table 7: First Piece of Information Accessed During Summit Stage

	Summit Stage (Stage 1)				
	Leader- Info Only Group	Past State Behavior Group	State Interest Group	Regime Type Group	Military Strength Group
Intelligence Reports on Leader's Potential Actions	66.45%	43.38%	51.18%	47.48%	51.58%
Leader Statements	33.56%	24.41%	24.73%	30.82%	27.57%
Relevant State-Based Information	N/A	32.20%	24.10%	21.70%	20.85%

The table above indicates a clear pattern regarding which information participants chose to access first. It is important to keep in mind when analyzing this data that the order in which information was presented to participants was randomized at each stage. Across all groups, including each state-based information group, participants overwhelmingly choose to first access intelligence reports regarding the opposing leader's potential actions during the upcoming summit. The importance of other state-based and leader-based information then varies based upon the type of state-based information participants could access. Participants in the past state behavior group are more likely to access information about the opposing state's actions in previous summits first than they were to seek out the opposing leader's statements first. In contrast, participants in the regime type and military strength group are more likely to first access the opposing leader's statements than their state-based information. Finally, participants in the state interest group are equally likely to seek out information about the state's interest in the dispute first as they were to access information about the

leader's statements to the press regarding the upcoming summit. Table 8 below reveals further interesting patterns in participants' information choices during the negotiation stage of the survey.

Table 8: First Piece of Information Accessed During Negotiation Stage

	Negotiation Stage (Stage 2)				
	Leader-Info Only Group	Past State Behavior Group	State Interest Group	Regime Type Group	Military Strength Group
Leader Statements	27.30%	25.64%	23.09%	28.14%	27.00%
Past Leader Behavior in Similar Situations	38.01%	32.26%	32.60%	35.19%	35.39%
More Info on Leader Behavior in Previous Stage	34.70%	24.82%	21.22%	23.88%	21.86%
Relevant State-Based Information	N/A	17.26%	23.09%	12.79%	15.85%

The table above indicates that participants, regardless of the group to which they are assigned, are most likely to access information regarding the opposing leader's behavior during previous negotiations. Participants, regardless of whether they could access state-based information, are also more likely to seek out the opposing leader's statements about the upcoming summit. Finally, with the exception of subjects in the state interest group, participants were more likely to seek out information regarding how the opposing leader behaved during the previous stage than they are to seek out state-based information. While this could be due to the fact that the content of the state-based information does not change over time, participants are also unaware of the static

nature of this state-based information. Accordingly, these findings suggest that during the negotiation stage, participants view leader-based information as highly salient, with the leader's past behavior in similar situations being the paramount concern. Table 9 below indicates additional interesting patterns of information processing during the final stage of the survey.

Table 9: First Piece of Information Accessed During Crisis Stage

	Crisis Stage (Stage 3)				
	Leader-Info Only Group	Past State Behavior Group	State Interest Group	Regime Type Group	Military Strength Group
Leader Statements	23.75%	16.46%	21.08%	23.81%	15.49%
Past Leader Behavior in Similar Situations	63.50%	41.37%	56.62%	57.80%	48.53%
More Info on Leader Behavior in Last Stage	12.75%	7.50%	12.02%	9.09%	9.14%
Relevant State-Based Information	N/A	34.66%	10.27%	9.30%	26.84%

These results echo the primary results from the analysis of participants' priority of information search during the negotiation stage as participants during the crisis stage of the survey, regardless of the group to which they are assigned, are most likely to first access information regarding the opposing leader's behavior during previous crises. While participants in the leader information only group are then most likely to seek out information regarding the opposing leader's press statements first, the second most prevalent type of information sought out first by participants who could access state-

based information varies by group. While participants in the state interest and regime type groups are also then most likely to seek out information reading the opposing leader's press statements, participants assigned to the past state behavior and relative military strength groups access their relevant state-based information as the second most prevalent type of information processed. This confirms the results from the previous information choice analysis that a state's past behavior and relative military strength are viewed as more salient by participants during crisis with the potential for military action than during negotiations. However, the primary result from this analysis indicates that participants are most likely to access information regarding a leader's past actions regardless of the type of interaction. Even during crisis situations, participants remain most likely to access information about the opposing leader's previous behavior.

4.5 Results and Discussion

The frequency tables above indicate the majority of participants, regardless of the group to which they are assigned, chose to seek out information about a leader's statements and behavior at each stage of the survey. Even those participants who could access information about state-based factors still heavily relied on leader-based information when making assessments of resolve. Furthermore, participants overwhelmingly prioritized information about a leader's past actions in their information search, regardless of the group to which they were assigned. Even participants assigned to state-based information groups were more likely to first choose

to access leader-based information over state-based information at each stage of the survey. This suggests that leader-based factors are important in participants' decision-making processes. During the second and third stages of the survey, participants were most likely to choose to access information regarding a leader's previous behavior in similar situations and were more likely to access this information first. This indicates that participants consider a leader's past actions to be very important. In other words, a leader's reputation is important in the decision-making calculus of the participants in the sample.

The next step of the analysis considers the effect of this information on participants' perceptions of the opposing leader's resolve. I first begin by examining the effect of specific pieces of information on perceptions of resolve at each stage of the survey. I then consider how the order of information choice affects perceptions of resolve and the extent to which information accessed during earlier stages of the survey and early perceptions of resolve affect participants' later perceptions. Finally, I test for additional influences on perceptions of resolve among participants.

4.5.1 Information Choice and Perceptions of Resolve

For the first step in the analysis, I focus on the effect of information choice on participants' perceptions of resolve. In doing so, I examine the extent to which participants receiving divergent information about a leader's statements and behavior, state interest, state history, regime type, or relative military capability affect perceptions

of resolve. Participants only receive a given treatment if they choose to access that treatment's relevant information at each stage. For example, a participant could be assigned to a group in which the state has a history of resolute behavior, but if that participant never accesses information pertaining to previous state behavior, she will never receive the treatment. Accordingly, I only compare the responses across treatment groups and conditions of those individuals who accessed a particular piece of information. In doing so, I am able to determine the treatment effect of each piece of accessed information on participants' perceptions of resolve at each stage of the survey, independent of other information participants may have accessed.

4.5.1.1 Leader-Based Information

To begin, I first examine the effect of leader-based information on perceptions of leader resolve, including intelligence reports about the leader, the leader's statements to the press, and the leader's previous behavior in similar situations. Every participant in the survey could access leader-based information at each stage, and each piece of leader-based information indicated the leader was either resolute or irresolute in his statements or actions. I first test for the effect of different leader-based information on perceptions of resolve among those participants who only accessed leader-based information at each stage of the survey. Using ANOVA tests, I find consistent evidence that both a leader's statements and behavior significantly impact participants' perceived level of leader resolve as indicated in Table 10 on the next page.

Table 10: Differences in Perceived Resolve among Participants Only Accessing Leader-Based Information

	Resolute	Irresolute		
Information Choice	Mean (sd)	Mean (sd)	F	n
<i>Summit Stage</i>				
Intelligence Reports	4.744 (0.412)	2.152 (0.692)	4532.72***	895
Leader Statements	4.700 (0.449)	2.241 (0.803)	2739.57***	778
<i>Negotiation Stage</i>				
Leader Statements	4.072 (0.866)	2.347 (0.921)	876.65***	945
Past Leader Behavior in Similar Situations	4.101 (0.953)	2.348 (1.010)	941.67***	1201
<i>Crisis Stage</i>				
Leader Statements	4.286 (0.645)	2.365 (0.881)	1077.63***	707
Past Leader Behavior in Similar Situations	4.310 (0.639)	2.202 (0.790)	2843.60***	1353

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; Mean values are ranked on a scale from 5 (very resolute) to 1 (very irresolute)

The above table compares the mean value of the perceived level of resolve across participants who accessed specific pieces of leader-based information regarding the leader's statements and behavior. According to my primary hypothesis, at each stage of the survey participants who accessed leader-based information indicating the leader may be resolute should perceive the leader as significantly more resolute than participants who accessed leader-based information that indicated the leader may be irresolute. As the above table shows, leader-based information does have a significant effect on perceptions of resolve. Across all three stages, a leader's statements regarding

his future behavior had a significant impact on participants' perceptions of resolve. Participants who accessed information that the leader had put forth statements indicating he would stand firm during the summit, negotiations, and/or crisis were more likely to view that leader as tough and determined at each stage than were participants who received information that the leader had put forth statements indicating his desire for a settlement. A leader's past behavior in similar situations also had a significant effect on perceptions of resolve. Those leaders who had stood firm in past negotiations or crises were more likely to be perceived as resolute during the current negotiations and crisis in the survey. Finally, participants who accessed intelligence reports that the leader was committed to firmly presenting his position at the summit were more likely to perceive the leader as more tough and determined than participants who accessed intelligence reports that the leader may be indecisive.

I next conducted an additional test of the effect of leader-based information on perceptions of resolve by examining the responses of those participants who were assigned to a state-based information group and accessed both state-based and leader-based information at each stage. In doing so, I test for the effect of leader-based information even when controlling for state-based information. As the results of Table 11 on the next page indicate, I find that leader-based information has a significant effect on perceptions of resolve even when directly controlling for the effect of participants accessing state-based information during the survey.

Table 11: Differences in Perceived Resolve among Participants Accessing Leader-Based and State-Based Information

	Resolute	Irresolute		
Information Choice	Mean (sd)	Mean (sd)	<i>F</i>	<i>n</i>
<i>Summit Stage</i>				
Intelligence Reports	4.538 (0.640)	2.363 (0.864)	3765.26***	1834
Leader Statements	4.535 (0.650)	2.364 (0.862)	3425.79***	1694
<i>Negotiation Stage</i>				
Leader Statements	3.819 (1.051)	2.628 (1.071)	228.09***	724
Past Leader Behavior in Similar Situations	3.869 (1.020)	2.590 (1.011)	289.65***	799
<i>Crisis Stage</i>				
Leader Statements	4.088 (0.844)	2.573 (0.994)	546.26***	812
Past Leader Behavior in Similar Situations	4.111 (0.794)	2.528 (0.952)	820.80***	1004

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

As the table above shows, accessing leader-based information continued to have a significant effect on participants' perceptions of leader resolve even when directly controlling for state-based information. For example, among this subset of the survey sample, participants who accessed information that the leader made statements indicating he would stand firm at each stage were significantly more likely to perceive the leader as resolute than subjects who received information that the leader had made statements indicating he wanted a settlement, regardless of the state-based information which these participants also accessed. The same pattern holds true for participants who accessed information regarding either a leader's past behavior or intelligence reports

about the leader. Across all leader-based information, participants who received cues that the leader would stand firm, based on either the leader's statements or behavior, were significantly more likely to perceive the leader as more tough and determined than participants who received information that the leader was indecisive or would prefer a settlement, regardless of the state-based information which they also accessed.

As a further robustness check, I tested for the effect of leader-based information at each stage of the survey by comparing the responses of those who chose to access a particular piece of information to those who chose not to access this information. The results indicate that accessing leader-based information has a significant impact in the hypothesized direction on participants' perceptions of leader resolve. Participants accessing information that the leader had made resolute statements at the summit stage ($F=122.41$; $p=0.000$), negotiation stage ($F=12.06$; $p=0.0005$), and crisis stage ($F=16.15$; $p=0.0001$) were significantly more likely to perceive the leader as resolute, regardless of the other information which they accessed. Conversely, participants accessing information that the leader had made irresolute statements at the summit stage ($F=75.25$; $p=0.000$), negotiation stage ($F=76.82$; $p=0.000$), and crisis stage ($F=23.03$; $p=0.000$) were significantly less likely to perceive the leader as resolute. Participants accessing intelligence reports that the leader may respond firmly were more likely to perceive the leader as resolute ($F=122.41$; $p=0.000$), while participants receiving intelligence information that the leader may back down were more likely to perceive the leader as

irresolute ($F=242.44$; $p=0.000$). Finally, accessing information regarding the leader's past behavior in similar situations also had a significant effect on perceptions of resolve. When comparing the responses of participants who accessed this information at the negotiation and crisis stages to those who did not, participants who received information that the leader stood firm in the past were more likely to view the opposing leader as resolute at both the negotiation ($F=41.37$; $p=0.000$) and crisis ($F=107.62$; $p=0.000$) stages, regardless of the other information they accessed. Conversely, participants accessing information that the leader backed down in the past were more likely to view the opposing leader as irresolute at both the negotiation ($F=152.25$; $p=0.000$) and crisis ($F=391.98$; $p=0.000$) stages. The results of these and the previous tests provide strong support that perceptions of a leader's resolve are based on that leader's statements and behavior, even when controlling for state-based information participants may have accessed. This further indicates that leaders can develop reputations for resolve separate from the state.

4.5.1.2 State-Based Information

While these results show that a leader's statements and behavior have a significant impact on perceptions of resolve, state-based variables may also affect these perceptions. To test for the effects of state-based variables on perceptions of resolve, I performed additional ANOVA tests comparing the responses of participants who accessed state-based information. For each state-based information group, I first

examine the responses of those who only accessed relevant state-based information at each stage to establish the effect of this information on perceptions of resolve. I then test for the effects of state-based information on perceptions of resolve among those participants who also chose to access leader-based information. In doing so, I observe the conditioning effect of leader-based information on perceptions of resolve in this context.⁷ The results of these tests indicate that while some state-based characteristics have a significant impact on perceptions of resolve, others do not. Furthermore, even when controlling for state-based information, I find that a leader's statements and behavior still have a significant impact on perceptions of resolve. I present the results for participants assigned to different types of state-based information separately based upon the type of state-based information participants accessed, beginning with participants who only accessed information regarding state history in Table 12 below.

Table 12: Differences in Perceived Resolve among Participants Only Accessing State History Information

State History	Resolute	Irresolute		
	Mean (sd)	Mean (sd)	<i>F</i>	<i>n</i>
Summit Stage	4.417 (0.862)	2.034 (0.731)	102.80***	47
Negotiation Stage	4.000 (1.144)	2.432 (0.877)	26.03***	44
Crisis Stage	4.442 (0.647)	2.026 (0.896)	198.67***	82

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

⁷ This is the same method of comparison that was utilized in the previous chapter.

As Table 12 indicates, previous state history has a significant impact on perceptions of resolve. At each stage in the survey, participants who only accessed information that the state had previously stood firm in a similar situation were more likely to view the leader as more tough and determined than participants who accessed information that the state had backed down in the past. These results indicate that a state's past behavior can affect perceptions of leader resolve.

I next test for the effects of state history on perceptions of resolve when controlling for the effect of accessing leader-based information at each stage of the survey, as presented in Table 13 below.

Table 13: Differences in Perceived Resolve among Participants Accessing State History and Leader-Based Information

State History	Resolute	Irresolute		
	Mean (sd)	Mean (sd)	F	n
Summit Stage	3.782 (1.212)	2.743 (1.224)	90.11***	496
Negotiation Stage	3.252 (1.254)	2.758 (1.253)	8.85**	231
Crisis Stage	3.639 (1.131)	3.021 (1.155)	24.55***	337

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

As the table above indicates, information regarding state history remains statistically significant even when controlling for leader-based information. Once again, participants who accessed information that the state had acted firmly in a similar situation in the past viewed the opposing leader as more resolute than participants who accessed information that the state had backed down in the past, regardless of the content of the

leader-based information they accessed. As an additional robustness check, I tested for the effects of previous state behavior at each stage by comparing the responses of those who chose to access this state-based information versus those who could access this information but chose not to. In doing so, I more clearly isolate the effects of accessing this information on perceptions of resolve. The results of these tests largely confirm the findings presented above. Most notably, participants who accessed information that the state stood firm in past summits ($F=7.59$; $p=0.006$) and crisis ($F=7.08$; $p=0.008$) were more likely to view the leader as more tough and determined. However, there was no significant effect of a state standing firm during past negotiations on the leader's perceived resolve during negotiations ($F=0.55$; $p=0.458$) compared to those participants who were eligible but did not access this information. Conversely, participants who accessed information that the state backed down in past summits ($F=8.52$; $p=0.004$), negotiations ($F=10.10$; $p=0.002$), and crises ($F=8.47$; $p=0.004$) were more likely to view the opposing leader as irresolute. All together, the results of these tests indicate that state history can be a significant factor on perceptions of a leader's resolve.

I next test for the effect of state interest on perceptions of leader resolve. Like the state history group comparisons, I first examine the effect of this information on participants who only chose to examine information pertaining to state history (as presented in Table 14) and then test for the effect of this state-based information on those participants who also accessed leader-based information (as presented in Table 15).

Table 14: Differences in Perceived Resolve among Participants Only Accessing State Interest Information

State Interest	High	Low		
	Mean (sd)	Mean (sd)	F	n
Summit Stage	4.500 (0.500)	3.214 (0.848)	10.00**	19
Negotiation Stage	4.250 (0.950)	2.692 (1.258)	28.86***	58
Crisis Stage	4.083 (0.585)	2.700 (0.837)	10.42*	11

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

The results from the table above indicate that, among those participants who only accessed information pertaining to state interest at each stage, state interest does have a significant effect on perceptions of resolve. Those participants who accessed information indicating the dispute was a higher priority viewed the opposing leader as more tough and determined than those participants who accessed information indicating the dispute was a low priority for the opposing state. It is interesting to note, however, that for the summit stage and crisis stage very few participants chose to only access information pertaining to state interest, confirming that information pertaining to state interest may not have been a high priority for most participants.

Next, I tested for the effects of state interest on perceptions of resolve when controlling for the effect of accessing leader-based information at each stage of the survey, as presented in Table 15 on the next page.

Table 15: Differences in Perceived Resolve among Participants Accessing State Interest and Leader-Based Information

State Interest	High	Low		
	Mean (sd)	Mean (sd)	<i>F</i>	<i>n</i>
Summit Stage	3.624 (1.222)	3.144 (1.314)	16.66**	465
Negotiation Stage	3.460 (1.161)	3.087 (1.208)	6.97**	282
Crisis Stage	3.500 (1.182)	3.171 (1.156)	4.47*	227

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Participants included in this test chose to access information pertaining to state interest as well as some type of leader-based information at each stage. The results indicate that state interest remains a significant factor on perceptions of leader resolve even when controlling for leader-based information. Once again participants who accessed information indicating the dispute was a high priority for the opposing state perceived the opposing leader as more tough and determined than those participants who were informed that the dispute was a low priority for the opposing state. Finally, I once again tested for the effects of accessing state interest by comparing the responses of those participants who accessed this information to those who were eligible to access this information but chose not to. In this way, the perceptions of those who chose not to access the information acts as a control group to test the baseline effects of state interest. When comparing the perceived resolve of those participants who accessed information that the state was highly interested in the dispute to those who could access this information but chose not to, I find that high state interest only has a significant effect in

the predicted direction on perceptions of resolve at the negotiation stage ($F=6.01$; $p=0.015$) and has no significant effect at either the summit stage ($F=0.07$; $p=0.789$) or crisis stage ($F=0.30$; $p=0.581$). Conversely, using the same method, I find that low state interest has a significantly negative effect on perceptions of resolve at the summit ($F=3.86$; $p=0.051$) and negotiation ($F=3.08$; $p=0.080$) stages, but not at the crisis stage ($F=0.00$; $p=0.952$). Accordingly, these results suggest that state interest does affect perceptions of resolve, but that low state interest has a more consistent effect on these perceptions.

The results from these first two sets of tests indicate that state-based information can affect perceptions of leader resolve. I next examine the effect of the opposing state's regime type on these perceptions, both among participants who only accessed information regarding regime type at each individual stage (presented in Table 16 below) and for participants who access regime type information and leader-based information (presented in Table 17). The results of these two tests, however, indicate that not all state-based information has a significant impact on perceptions of leader resolve.

Table 16: Differences in Perceived Resolve among Participants Only Accessing Regime Type Information

Regime Type	Democracy	Non-Democracy		
	Mean (sd)	Mean (sd)	<i>F</i>	<i>n</i>
Summit Stage	4.275 (0.629)	3.667 (0.983)	1.60	10
Negotiation Stage	3.083 (1.211)	4.250 (1.252)	3.60	20
Crisis Stage	4.333 (0.577)	4.400 (0.822)	0.01	8

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

The results of the above analysis indicate that regime type does not have a significant effect on perceptions of resolve. It is further interesting to note that few participants chose to only access regime type information at an individual stage. This suggests that regime type is not a high priority in participant's decision-making during the survey. These results are further confirmed when testing for the effects of regime type on perceptions of resolve and controlling for participants who also accessed leader-based information, as presented in Table 17 below.

Table 17: Differences in Perceived Resolve among Participants Accessing Regime Type and Leader-Based Information

Regime Type	Democracy	Non-Democracy		
	Mean (sd)	Mean (sd)	<i>F</i>	<i>n</i>
Summit Stage	3.517 (1.349)	3.756 (1.309)	3.10	384
Negotiation Stage	3.451 (1.211)	3.243 (1.309)	1.14	178
Crisis Stage	3.373 (1.199)	3.171 (1.179)	1.11	154

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Participants included in this test chose to access both information pertaining to state regime type and some type of leader-based information at each stage. Once again, regime type does not have a statistically significant effect on perceptions of resolve. It is interesting to note that, like the results from the last set of experiments presented in the previous chapter, there is no clear result as to whether democratic leaders are perceived as more resolute than their non-democratic counterparts. In both this test and the previous test, democratic leaders are viewed as more resolute than non-democratic

leaders in some instances, but less resolute in others. Furthermore, there is no consistency regarding during which stage of the survey democratic leaders are viewed as more or less resolute. Using the same robustness test as with the previous state-based and leader-based information groups, I compare the responses of those participants who accessed regime type information to those who were eligible to do so but chose not to. In doing so, I continue to find that regime type has little effect on perceptions of resolve. Participants accessing information that the opposing state is a democracy has no significant effect at the summit ($F=0.12$; $p=0.732$), negotiations ($F=0.03$; $p=0.872$), or crisis ($F=0.63$; $p=0.428$) stages. Similarly, participants accessing information that the opposing state is not a democracy has no significant effect at the summit ($F=0.02$; $p=0.895$), negotiations ($F=0.13$; $p=0.722$), or crisis ($F=0.01$; $p=0.937$) stages. Overall, the results of these tests indicate state regime type does not significantly affect perceptions of resolve.

For the final analysis, I test for the effects of relative military capability on perceptions of resolve. Like the previous analyses, I first analyze the responses of participants who only selected information regarding relative military capability (as presented in Table 18 on the next page) and then examine the responses of participants who accessed information pertaining to both relative military capability and a leader's statements or behavior (as presented in Table 19).

Table 18: Differences in Perceived Resolve among Participants Only Accessing Military Strength Information

Opposing State's Military Strength	Weaker	Equal	Stronger		
	Mean (sd)	Mean (sd)	Mean (sd)	<i>F</i>	<i>n</i>
Summit Stage	3.367 (0.901)	3.375 (0.854)	4.357 (0.476)	4.99*	20
Negotiation Stage	3.625 (1.575)	3.667 (1.414)	3.964 (1.407)	0.18	31
Crisis Stage	-----	3.618 (1.024)	4.231 (0.927)	2.86	30

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

As the results in the table above indicate, relative military capability does not have a consistently significant effect on perceptions of resolve. In general, participants who received information that the opposing state's military was weaker than theirs were more likely to view the opposing leader as less resolute. Conversely, participants who received information that the opposing leader's military was stronger than theirs were more likely to view the opposing leader as resolute. However, these differences were only statistically significant during the summit stage of the survey. It is also interesting to note that for the crisis stage of the survey, not a single participant assigned to the opposing military weaker condition chose to only access information pertaining to military strength. Of further interest is the finding that leaders which come from states that have a weaker military or are of comparable military strength are viewed as similar in their resolve. Based on the results of the last set of experiments presented in the previous chapter, one would expect that leaders from states with comparable military

power to the participant's military would be viewed as more resolute than leader's from states with a weaker military.

Interestingly, the impact of relative military strength on perceptions of resolve changes once participants who also chose to access leader-based information are included in the analysis, as presented in Table 19 below.

Table 19: Differences in Perceived Resolve among Participants Accessing Military Strength and Leader-Based Information

Opposing State's Military Strength	Weaker	Equal	Stronger		
	Mean (sd)	Mean (sd)	Mean (sd)	<i>F</i>	<i>n</i>
Summit Stage	3.313 (1.353)	3.495 (1.299)	3.839 (1.242)	7.94***	576
Negotiation Stage	3.286 (1.250)	3.335 (1.272)	3.374 (1.135)	0.13	298
Crisis Stage	3.077 (1.128)	3.419 (1.182)	3.519 (1.159)	3.67*	338

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

As the above table indicates, military strength does not have a consistently significant effect on perceptions of resolve. While relative military capability has a significant effect on perceptions of resolve during the summit stage and crisis stage, it is not statistically significant during the negotiation stage. This change in the significance of relative military capability once leader-based information is included in the analysis may suggest that there is an interaction effect between a leader's statements or behavior and the relative military capability of the leader's state.

In addition, I conducted robustness tests to determine the baseline effect of accessing information pertaining to military capability at each stage of the survey by

comparing the responses of those who accessed military capability information to those who chose not to. In doing so, I explore the effect of each level of relative military capability on perceptions of resolve. The results indicate that military strength has differing effects on perceptions of resolve depending on the opposing state's relative military capability. To begin, accessing information that the opposing state's military is weaker appears to have no significant effect at the summit ($F=2.11$; $p=0.148$), negotiation ($F=0.55$; $p=0.459$), or crisis ($F=0.15$; $p=0.693$) stage. In contrast, accessing information that the opposing state's military is of equal strength to the participant's military does not have a significant effect at the summit ($F=0.02$; $p=0.878$) or negotiation ($F=1.42$; $p=0.234$) stages, but does significantly and positively impact perceptions of resolve at the crisis stage ($F=3.93$; $p=0.049$).

Finally, accessing information that the opposing state's military is stronger than the participant's does not have a significant effect on perceptions of resolve at the summit stage ($F=3.21$; $p=0.074$), negotiation stage ($F=0.96$; $p=0.328$), or crisis stage ($F=1.49$; $p=0.223$), although it does approach significance at the first stage. As such, the findings on relative state capability are unclear. While there are significant differences in perceptions of resolve when comparing the different levels of military strength, this effect largely dissipates when the responses of participants accessing this information are compared to those who chose not to access this information. Overall, however, it is

clear that relative military capability has a less significant and consistent effect than other state-based variables.

4.5.2 Information Order Choice and Perceptions of Resolve

In Chapter 2, I hypothesize that due to cognitive limitations in the way in which people seek out and process information, early assessments of resolve should impact later perceptions of resolve (H_8). This effect is driven by early perceptions being difficult to change, allowing them to carry into future interactions and shape both how information is accessed and processed by individuals. By applying this same logic to the decision-making process of participants throughout the survey, it is possible that the order of information choice at each stage of the survey can have a significant impact on perceptions of resolve at each stage. One of the primary benefits of using process tracing methods is that it allows the researcher to track the decision-making process of the participant. Earlier in this chapter I presented frequency distributions indicating which pieces of information participants accessed first at each stage of the survey. Analyzing these statistics, I inferred that leader-based information is critical to participants' decision-making as information order choice is both an important signal of the heuristic decision-making style of participants and an indication of which information is viewed as most important (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). While prior tests indicate that the content of information can affect perceptions of resolve, the results of the ANOVA tests analyzing the impact of information order choice indicate that the order in which

information is accessed has little effect on perceptions of resolve. Table 20 below presents the F-scores and significance of accessing a particular piece of information first.

Table 20: The Effect of Accessing Each Piece of Information First on Perceptions of Resolve

	Summit Stage	Negotiation Stage	Crisis Stage
Leader Statements	0.97	1.36	0.21
Intelligence Reports	0.03	-----	-----
Leader Behavior in Previous Stage	-----	5.89*	0.02
Past Leader Behavior in Similar Situations	-----	0.00	20.20***
State History	0.49	0.00	3.01
State Interest	0.35	0.00	0.18
Regime Type	2.83	0.31	0.31
Opposing State's Military Strength	1.06	5.98*	0.02

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; F-scores reported

As the above table indicates, choosing to access a piece of information first during each stage has little effect on participants' perceptions of resolve at that stage. This may be due to the fact that participants conducted a fairly thorough information search. As previously discussed, participants were highly likely to choose as much or almost as much information as was available to them at the summit stage, and were then as likely to choose one piece of information, two pieces of information, or all available pieces of information at later stages. While it appears that information order choice has little effect on perceptions of resolve at each stage, I next test for the impact of information accessed at early stages on later perceptions of resolve.

4.5.3 The Effect of Early Information and Perceptions on Later Assessments of Resolve

In Chapter 2, I hypothesize that early perceptions of resolve should impact future perceptions as they will be most influential in leaders' assessments of resolve (H₈).

Applying this hypothesis to the experimental data predicts that information accessed during early stages of the survey will have a substantial impact on participants' perceptions of resolve at later stages. This is particularly true of information accessed during the summit stage as participants have no prior information regarding the characteristics of either the leader or the state. Furthermore, this potential effect of early information affecting later perceptions may impact the information participants choose to access during later stages of the survey. More specifically, as state-based information is static (although participants are unaware of this), participants may access state-based information during the early stages of the survey and maintain this information in their decision-making process throughout the survey without accessing additional state-based information at later stages. For example, participants may reason that it is unlikely that the military capabilities of a state would change dramatically during the few months that are said to elapse between the summit and negotiation stages, and they may therefore choose not to access this information at the negotiation stage. This may also explain why there is such a dramatic decline in the number of participants accessing state-based information after the summit stage.

To determine the effect of early information on later perceptions of resolve, I first examine the impact of accessing information during the summit stage on participants' perceptions of the opposing leader's resolve at the negotiation and crisis stages as well as the effects of accessing information during the negotiation stage on participants' perceptions of the leader's resolve during the crisis stage. In Table 21 below, I present the F-Score results of the ANOVA tests assessing the effects of early information on later perceptions of resolve. The results indicate that information accessed early during the survey can affect participants' perceptions of leader resolve at later stages.

Table 21: The Effect of Accessing Information at an Earlier Stage on Perceptions of Resolve at a Later Stage

	Summit Stage Access		Negotiation Stage Access
	Negotiation Resolve	Crisis Resolve	Crisis Resolve
Leader Statements	740.41***	28.49***	99.55***
Intelligence Reports	964.89***	39.42***	-----
State History	6.92**	45.16***	23.72***
State Interest	6.98**	11.17***	11.79***
Regime Type	0.22	0.03	4.39*
Opposing State's Military Strength	0.69	12.14***	3.60*

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; F-scores reported

In this test, I compared the perceptions of resolve at later stages of the survey across participants who chose to access a specific piece of information (as indicated in the far left column) earlier during the survey to those who could access this information but chose not to. The results above show that both leader-based and state-based information gathered early during the survey can affect perceptions of resolve during later decision-making. Most notably, a leader's statements during the summit and

negotiation stages have a significant impact on perceptions of that leader's resolve during later stages. Similarly, gathering information from intelligence reports as to how the opposing leader may act during the summit had a significant effect on perceptions of leader resolve during both the negotiation and crisis stages. Participants who accessed information that the leader had made resolute statements or that the participant's advisors believed the opposing leader would be resolute during the summit were more likely to perceive the leader as tough and determined during future stages. Similarly, for both state history and state interest information groups, I find that previously accessing this information at an earlier stage has a statistically significant effect on later perceptions of resolve. Participants who access information that the state has stood firm during past summits and negotiations are more likely to view the opposing leader as resolute during the negotiation and crisis stages. Similarly, participants who access information during the summit and negotiation stages that the dispute is a high priority for the opposing state are more likely to view the opposing leader as resolute during subsequent stages. Of particular interest is the prolonged effect of accessing state-based information during the summit stage. For three of the four state-based variables (state history, state interest, and military strength), the content of the information accessed during the first stage has a significant impact on perceptions of resolve during the final stage of the survey. These results indicate that early information can significantly affect perceptions of resolve during later interactions.

In addition, I also examine the perceptions of participants who, during the negotiation and/or crisis stages, chose to access additional information regarding how the leader behaved in the previous stage in order to determine the extent to which a leader's previous behavior affects perceptions of resolve. The decision to access this information may, in and of itself, be interpreted as an indication that leaders can develop reputations for resolve as these participants access information about the leader's past to make predictions about the leader's current and future behavior. I find that additional information regarding the leader's behavior in the previous stage has a significant effect on perceptions of the leader's resolve at the current stage. Participants who accessed information during the negotiation stage that the leader had behaved resolutely during the summit stage were significantly more likely to perceive the leader as tough and determined during negotiations than those who accessed information that the leader had behaved irresolutely during the summit stage ($F=974.49$; $p=0.000$). Similarly, participants who accessed information during the crisis stage that the leader had behaved resolutely during extended negotiations were significantly more likely than those who accessed information that the leader had behaved irresolutely to believe the leader would be tough and determined during the upcoming crisis ($F=78.72$; $p=0.000$). These participants were also more likely to believe the leader would stand firm in the face of the potential threat ($F=26.27$; $p=0.000$). This indicates that information regarding a leader's behavior in prior interactions matters for assessments of resolve.

Finally, I directly test one of the primary hypotheses of my thesis by examining whether early perceptions of resolve have an impact on later assessments. I find that early perceptions of resolve have a significant impact on participants' assessments of leader resolve at later stages. Most notably, participants who perceived the opposing leader to be more resolute during the summit stage are significantly more likely to perceive the leader to be tough and determined during both the negotiation stage ($F=2.21$; $p=0.0197$) and crisis stage ($F=12.51$; $p=0.000$) than participants who perceived the opposing leader as less resolute during the summit stage. Furthermore, I find a similar statistically significant effect regarding perceptions of leader resolve at the negotiation stage on perceptions of resolve at the crisis stage ($F=34.74$; $p=0.000$).

4.5.4 Additional Influences on Perceptions of Resolve

The results of this chapter overwhelmingly indicate that participants' perceptions of a leader's resolve are based, in large part, on that leader's statements and behavior as well as key state-based variables, namely state past behavior and communicated interest in the dispute. Furthermore, information accessed during earlier stages can have significant effects on perceptions of resolve, as can prior perceptions of a leader's resolve. In the previous set of experiments presented in the last chapter, I found that additional factors can also influence perceptions of resolve, including participants' views on the use of force, their gender, and their political leanings. For the final analysis, I conducted a series of OLS models investigating the effects of additional variables

drawn from the control and demographic questions on perceptions of resolve at each stage. The results of these tests are presented in Table 22 below.

Table 22: Additional Influences on Perceptions of Resolve

	(1) Resolve During Summit	(2) Resolve During Negotiations	(3) Resolve During Crisis
Views on Leaders	0.030 (0.031)	-0.022 (0.026)	-0.017 (0.027)
Views on Force	-0.041 (0.035)	0.023 (0.030)	-0.032 (0.031)
Political Leanings	0.0002 (0.017)	0.024 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.015)
Gender	0.076 (0.049)	-0.052 (0.042)	0.048 (0.044)
Attention	-0.021 (0.029)	0.010 (0.025)	0.008 (0.026)
Interest	0.0006 (0.0277)	-0.024 (0.024)	-0.016 (0.024)
Summit Resolve		0.469*** (0.15)	0.039* (0.018)
Negotiation Resolve			0.251*** (0.019)
Constant	3.266*** (0.198)	1.681*** (0.175)	2.504*** (0.185)
Observations (N)	3060	3060	3060
R ²	0.0019	0.2346	0.0832

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Each model assesses the impact of these variables on participants' perceptions of leader resolve at the summit, negotiation, and crisis stages respectively. The results of these models clearly indicate that the demographics of participants do not have a

significant effect on perceptions of resolve at each stage. Regarding the control questions, neither views on the use of force nor the importance of leaders have a significant effect on perceptions of resolve. In contrast, the perceived resolve of the leader during previous stages does have an impact on perceptions of resolve at the current stage. Perceived resolve during the summit is positively and significantly related to perceptions of resolve at both the negotiation and crisis stages, as are perceptions of resolve during the negotiation stage on perceptions of resolve at the crisis stage. These results confirm the findings from previous tests presented in the last section indicating that early perceptions of resolve can carry far into the future.

4.6 Conclusions: The Development of Leader Resolve

The results of this second set of experiments provide strong support for my primary hypotheses regarding both the ability of leaders to develop reputations for resolve as well as the way in which these reputations change over time. To begin, it is clear from the experiments that leader-based information is highly important to participants' decision-making processes. Frequency statistics reveal that participants seek out leader-based information at higher rates than state-based information and are more likely to seek out leader-based information first. In this regard, it appears that participants more highly value a leader's past behavior, either in similar situations or in previous stages, than a leader's statements or state-based characteristics.

Further tests confirm the significance of a leader's past actions on perceptions of resolve. Information regarding a leader's past actions in similar situations is not only highly valued by participants, but also has a significant effect on perceptions of resolve. So too does additional information regarding how the leader acted in the previous stage of the survey. Interestingly, while a leader's statements are less highly valued by participants when compared to that leader's actions, a leader's statements also have a statistically significant effect on perceptions of resolve. Accordingly, this suggests that reputation is not just built upon a leader's actions. Rather, a leader's statements can also help to communicate his resolve. This result carries interesting implications for policy-makers that will be addressed more fully in the concluding chapter. It certainly suggests that resolute or irresolute statements can be meaningful and that leaders must realize that both their statements and behavior contribute to their reputations for resolve.

In addition to a leader's statements and behavior, state-based variables can also have a significant impact on perceptions of resolve. Like the previous set of experiments, I find that state history and communicated interest in the dispute are particularly important for perceptions of resolve. While a state history of irresolute action can harm perceptions of a leader's resolve, a state history of resolute action can bolster that leader's reputation. Conversely, communicating that an issue is not a top priority for the state can be particularly harmful to a leader's reputation for resolve. There was mixed evidence regarding the impact of relative military capability on perceptions of resolve.

Overall, it clearly has a less significant effect on reputations than either state history or state interest in the dispute. Finally, regime type had no significant effect on perceptions of resolve, and it remains unclear as to whether democratic or non-democratic leaders were perceived as more resolute in principle.

The results of this set of experiments also provide critical insight into the ways in which reputation for resolve develops over time for a single leader. The order in which information was accessed by participants had little significant effect on perceptions of resolve. This may be due to the rather thorough information search participants conducted, particularly during the initial stage of the survey. That being said, participants did conduct a more thorough information search during the initial scenario and accessed less information as the survey progressed.

Other results provide strong support for my primary hypotheses regarding the development of reputations for resolve. I theorized in Chapter 2 that reputations for resolve will develop early on and that these initial perceptions of resolve will be difficult to change. Indeed, I found that early perceptions of resolve were highly influential at later stages of the survey. Furthermore, information accessed during earlier stages of the survey remained a significant influence on perceptions of resolve at later stages. This is particularly true of a leader's statements and actions as well as the state's history and communicated interest in the dispute. This hypothesis will be further tested in Chapter 6 where I follow the development of American Presidents Eisenhower's and Kennedy's

reputations for resolve over time vis-à-vis Soviet Premier Khrushchev. In addition, this case study further delineates the effects of a leader's statements versus behavior on reputations for resolve.

Overall the results of the two sets of experiments presented in both this chapter and the previous chapter clearly indicate that individual leaders can develop reputations for resolve independently of both their predecessors and the state. Furthermore, a leader's statements and behavior have a strong statistically significant impact on that leader's reputation. While state history, state interest, and relative military capability can also influence reputations for resolve, leader behavior has an impact on reputations independent of these state-based variables. In the next chapter, I further examine the effect of these leader-based versus state-based factors on reputations for resolve through a large-N statistical study. More specifically, I address the impact of a leader's behavior on the onset of future crises and delve more fully into the extent to which state-based factors are influential in this regard. I particularly focus on the potential dichotomy between leader behavior and state behavior and the effect these two factors have on reputations for resolve.

5. Reputation for Resolve: A Statistical Analysis

The results of the experimental surveys, presented in the previous two chapters, support my hypothesis that leaders can develop reputations for resolve independently of the state. Furthermore, the evidence from these experiments indicates that these reputations are based upon a leader's statements and actions while in office. In addition, the experimental results suggest that a state's past behavior as well as the state's interest in the issue under dispute can also influence these leader-based reputations for resolve. While the experiments provide robust support for my primary hypotheses, one of the main concerns regarding experiments in general is their applicability to larger populations. Although I argue in Chapter 3 that sample populations should be comparable to leaders in the ways in which they access and process information, it is prudent to further test my hypotheses against a larger population of cases that directly deal with international leaders in an effort to address potential issues with the external validity of my experimental findings.

5.1 Research Design

In this chapter, I further examine the extent to which international leaders can develop their own reputations for resolve through a statistical duration analysis of a large sample of international crises. More specifically, I examine the extent to which a leader's actions in one crisis affect the duration of time that elapses before that leader is the target of another international crisis. In accordance with my primary hypothesis, I

predict that leaders who demonstrate their resolve during a crisis will be less likely to be targeted in the future. According to the logic of reputation for resolve, if leaders develop reputations for resolve based on their behavior while in office, leaders who respond resolutely to a crisis should either avoid being future targets of aggression or will enjoy longer periods of time between the ending of one crisis and start of a new crisis when compared to leaders who failed to demonstrate their resolve initially. In addition to examining the impact of a leader's behavior on these patterns of crisis initiation, I also consider the effects of other key variables identified in earlier chapters. These include the relative military capability of the target and challenger state, the level of democracy in the target state, and the importance of the issue at stake during the crisis.

Furthermore, and as I will explain in greater detail later in the chapter, I conduct two separate analyses: one which isolates the effect of leader behavior on crisis initiation and the other of which considers the effect of state behavior. The first set of analyses focuses on the extent to which leaders are able to develop reputations for resolve based on their behavior, while the second set of analyses considers the extent to which states are able to develop these reputations. Accordingly, I examine whether leaders and/or states are able to develop reputations for resolute action.

Unlike other scholars who have studied reputation for resolve, I do not test for the effect of resolve on crisis outcome. Rather, I focus on the extent to which leaders (or states alternatively) are able to develop a reputation for resolve by acting resolutely in a

crisis. By focusing on the future targeting of leaders (and states), I examine the downstream effects of resolute behavior on conflict processes. Accordingly, I consider whether a leader responding to a crisis trigger resolutely makes that leader less vulnerable to future challenges, suggesting that leader may have developed a reputation for resolute action.

As discussed in Chapter 1, I take a perception-based approach to the study of reputations for resolve, focusing on how resolutely a leader is perceived by others based upon that leader's behavior while in office. Accordingly, I concentrate on capturing perceptions of resolve by focusing on the onset and timing of international crises. To do so, I employ measurements of key concepts that are operationalized in terms of the perceptions of the target (the defender) and challenger (the actor who initiates the crisis) whenever possible. For example, the variable measuring the target's interest in the dispute is based on the target's perception of the severity of the issue under dispute.¹ As such, my analysis focuses, as much as possible, on perceptions of resolve to observe whether leaders are able to develop reputations based on their behavior. In this regard, this analysis complements the experimental and case study work by examining whether a leader's actions can signal resolve and help stave-off future crises.²

¹ As coded in the ICB dataset.

² Through this method, I do also indirectly test the impact of resolute behavior on crisis initiation by examining the downstream effects of a reputation for resolve, but this is not the focus of my analysis.

5.1.1 Limitations

This analysis is not without its limitations. To begin, the dataset I use is comprised of international crisis events. While this focus on international crises is preferable to an analysis that solely considers militarized disputes, the data only captures those disagreements which were severe enough to be classified as international crises. It may be possible that some resolute leaders are omitted from the analysis as they were never the target of an international crisis. These leaders, for example, may have communicated their resolve through negotiations of an issue under dispute and avoided being targets of aggression due to the fact that they demonstrated their resolve in interactions short of international crises. However, this focus on international crises is a strong improvement over the scholarly reliance on militarized interstate dispute data in which leaders that were resolute in crises short of militarized action are omitted from the analysis. Furthermore, I believe that focusing on international crises is appropriate as the data encompasses a wide variety of issues under dispute as well as varying levels of intensity and severity. As such, focusing on the extent to which leaders are able to demonstrate their resolve through international crises provides strong analytical leverage over both the types of behavior that leads to a reputation for resolve as well as the types of issues upon which leaders may demonstrate this resolve. This limitation is addressed more fully in my discussion of the dependent variable in the analysis.

An additional limitation of my analysis lies in my ability to directly measure reputation for resolve using the available data. The experiments indicate that leaders most prominently demonstrate their resolve through their behavior while in office. That being said, the second set of experiments, in particular, finds that a leader's statements can also affect perceptions of resolve. Accordingly, I would ideally measure reputation for resolve in this analysis in terms of both statements and behavior. However, the available data only allows for an examination of a leader's resolve based upon that leader's actions. As such, the analysis presented here encompasses a more narrow definition of demonstrated resolve. Furthermore, my work is limited in the extent to which I am able to measure the challenger's perceptions of the target's resolve. While I would prefer to directly measure how resolutely the challenger perceived the target to be in a crisis, as I argue that resolve is about how an actor's statements and behavior are interpreted by others, the dataset does not fully allow for resolve to be measured this way. Rather, the data relies on more objective measures of resolve, such as categorizing the response of the target. It may be possible, for example, for a target to be perceived as resolute by a challenger, but for this to not significantly affect future crisis onset as other factors may affect the extent to which a challenger relies on this perception of resolve when making decisions regarding crisis initiation. Accordingly, this analysis considers the more downstream effects of reputation for resolve by examining the extent to which resolute action can affect future crisis interactions. These limitations regarding the data's

focus on international crises as well as the slippage between resolve as a concept and the measurements of resolve used in this analysis are also discussed later in the chapter.

Despite these limitations, this analysis can also provide insight into how reputations for resolve develop. It provides a direct comparison as to the effect of leader (or state) behavior, state power, state interest, and regime type on crisis onset.

Furthermore, the inclusion of other variables that were not addressed in the experiments allows for a further examination of the varying contexts under which reputations for resolve may develop, such as during an ongoing war or between states that are far apart geographically. While the experimental work and case study (presented in the next chapter) focus on the causal mechanisms by which leaders may develop reputations for resolve, the statistical analysis presented in this chapter benefits from greater generalizability. In addition, this analysis allows for the examination of resolve across a wider variety of crises. While the experimental work only focuses on high stakes threats, this analysis contains crises that vary in both their intensity and their issue at stake. Accordingly, the statistical work presented in this chapter encompasses a wide range of crises and roots my overall analysis in a large number of real world cases.

5.1.2 The Dataset

To determine the effect of a leader's behavior on his reputation for resolve, I combine two prominent datasets: the International Crisis Behavior actor-level dataset

and the *Archigos* leadership dataset.³ In Chapter 2, I argue that the discipline's framing of reputation for resolve in terms of war fighting is problematic as it leads scholars to focus only on militarized interstate disputes. Accordingly, scholars studying reputation for resolve may fail to consider the development of these reputations during lower-stakes crises, such as economic disputes, verbal threats, or other non-militarized crisis interactions. It is during these lower-level disputes that reputations for resolve may develop, especially if one considers that many militarized disputes escalate through multiple rounds of interactions. By focusing only on disputes that have escalated to militarized conflict, scholars may be only measuring situations in which states (or leaders) failed to successfully communicate their resolve early in their tenure.

Rather than relying on the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) data, which many scholars of reputation for resolve use (e.g. Wiegand 2011), I employ the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset to examine the development of leader-based reputations for resolve. In contrast to MIDs data, which only contains disputes regarding the threat or use of militarized force, the ICB dataset contains information for 1000 crisis events on a variety of issues spanning from the years 1918 to 2007. As Downes and Sechser (2012) point out, a large number of these events do not include the use or threat of militarized force. Rather, the dataset consists of a wide

³ The ICB dataset is available at: <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/>. The *Archigos* dataset is available at: <http://www.rochester.edu/college/faculty/hgoemans/data.htm>.

range of acts including economic embargos, political threats or demands, non-violent military action, and the use of violence. Glaser (2010) asserts that during international crises, states should be able to communicate their resolve through a variety of actions short of a full out war, so long as the action is sufficiently costly (96). As the data I use encompasses a large variety of issues over which leaders and states can demonstrate their resolve, employing this ICB data allows for a more complete understanding of how reputations for resolve develop.

While the ICB dataset is organized in terms of states, the *Archigos* dataset provides information about the leaders of those states. This dataset contains information regarding international leaders' entry into and exit out of power, including dates specifying the beginning and end of each leader's tenure. The coding scheme used for the *Archigos* data defines a country's leader as "the person that *de facto* exercised power in a country" (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009) and contains information for leaders from the years 1875 to 2004. By combining the *Archigos* data with the ICB actor-level data, I created a dataset that consists of directed-leader-dyads for each crisis event. Accordingly, the dataset contains information regarding which leader was the target (the defender) and challenger (the crisis initiator), as well as the target leader's entry into and exit out of power dates. As the *Archigos* dataset only records information for leaders through 2004, the original combined dataset did not have leader information for events occurring between 2005 and 2007. Accordingly, I conducted qualitative research to

determine the leader of record for the remaining 20 events that occurred from 2005-2007 using the same coding rules detailed by Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009).⁴ After excluding events for which there was no clear challenger state or entity, the final dataset consisted of 984 crisis events.

5.1.3 Statistical Method

Using this data, I conduct a large-N duration analysis employing a Cox-proportional hazards model (Cox 1972). The primary benefit of duration analysis models⁵ in general is their ability to inform the researcher about when an event takes place, not just if an event occurred (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 1). More specifically, these models allow researchers to test for the effects of an independent variable on the timing at which that event takes place. In my analysis, for example, I test for the effects of a leader's crisis response on the length of time between the end of a crisis and the onset of a future crisis. Of the duration models available, one of the most widely used throughout the political science literature (and in social science more broadly) is the Cox proportional hazards model. Within international relations, this form of duration analysis has been used to study both leader-based models and general models of crisis initiation (see Beinen and Van de Walle 1992, Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010, and Cresenzi 2007). One of the main

⁴ The coding of the leaders for these events can be found in Appendix D.

⁵ Also referred to as survival analyses or event history models

advantages of the Cox model is its general flexibility as it does not specify the form of the hazard rate. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) clearly articulate this benefit: “The primary advantage of the Cox model is simple: the relationship between covariates and the hazard rate can be estimated without having to make assumptions whatsoever about the nature and shape of the baseline hazard rate” (89). As such, the Cox model is useful in situations where the time dependency of the covariates is of less interest than the effect of the covariates on the dependent variable (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). In addition, the Cox model is advantageous in its ability to handle right censored data – an event that either has not happened at the end of the time recorded in the dataset or an event that does not occur within the specific time recorded for a subject in the dataset (Despa 2010; Therneau 2000). For example, within my data, leaders who are targeted once and then not targeted again are right censored by their exit out of power date and leaders or states which are still in the dataset at the end of the recorded time are censored by the end of the data.

The primary concern regarding the use of the Cox model is the violation of the assumption that each of the covariates has a similar hazard rate (Therneau 2000; Tian, Zucker, and Wei 2005). This model can prove problematic for scholars who are interested in the form of the baseline hazard (Royston and Parmar 2002). Instead, scholars may choose to model the effects of time-dependent hazard ratios (Lambert and Royston 2009). I assert, however, that the concern over time-dependent hazard ratios is

less problematic for my study as the primary variables of interest are not directly related to time. If I were interested, for example, in the effect of leader age on the recurrence of international crises, this would certainly warrant a closer look at the impact of time-dependent variables and hazard ratios. In contrast, there is little theoretical reason to believe that the primary variables of interest are problematic in this regard.

Furthermore, concerns over the proportional hazards assumption of the Cox model can be easily and accurately tested for (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez 2008; Hosmer, Lemeshow, and May 2008), and I am mindful to conduct these tests as part of my robustness checks. For these reasons, the advantages of the Cox model outweigh its limitations as a useful tool in understanding the effects of leader behavior on the onset of future crises.

5.2 Patterns of Crisis Initiation and Variable Specification

The primary purpose of the analysis in this chapter is to determine how a leader's behavior in one crisis affects the onset and timing of future crises. According to the logic of reputation for resolve, a leader who strongly asserts his resolve during one crisis should have a lower risk of being targeted in the future. These leaders should either not be targeted again or should enjoy a longer period of time before they are targeted when compared to leaders who failed to demonstrate their resolve initially. In this chapter, I examine three distinct models of how a target leader's behavior in a crisis affects the onset of future crises. In the first model, I consider the time until a target

leader is engaged in a future crisis by the same challenger leader. In other words, I examine: How does target leader A's response to the crisis initiated by challenger leader B affect the amount of time that elapses before challenger leader B engages target leader A in another crisis? This is the primary model of interest for my hypotheses as this model tests for the reputation for resolve between a single target leader and a single challenger leader. As discussed in Chapter 2, challenger leaders should utilize their direct experience with a target leader when making assessments of the target leader's resolve, and these direct interactions should be most influential to the development of the target leader's reputations for resolve as perceived by the challenger leader.

For the second model, I examine the time until a target leader is engaged in a future crisis by either the same challenger leader or a new challenger leader in the same state (i.e. a successive challenger). In other words, I consider: How does target leader A's response to the crisis initiated by challenger leader B₁ from state B affect the amount of time that elapses before either challenger leader B₁ or challenger leader B₂ from state B engages target leader A in another crisis? In addition, I test a third leader-based model which considers the time until a target leader is engaged in a crisis by a challenger leader from any state. In other words, I consider: How does target leader A's response to the crisis initiated by challenger leader B₁ from state B affect the amount of time that elapses before challenger leader B₁ from state B or challenger leader B₂ from state B or challenger leader C from state C engages target leader A in another crisis? These two

additional models test for the reputational effects of a single target leader across new challengers from within the same state as well as challengers from new states (i.e. extra-dyadic challenges). In other words, these test for the effect of a reputation for resolve based on a challenger's direct and indirect experience with the target leader. In doing so, it examines the extent to which challenger leaders use information regarding a target leader's interactions with other leaders in their assessments of the target leader's resolve.

Within the dataset, I define a target leader as the leader who was the defender in an international crisis, indicated in the ICB data at the state-level as the ACTOR. I define the challenger leader as the leader who initiated the international crisis as identified in the ICB data at the state-level as SOUTHV, the "perceived external source of threat to values."⁶ Preliminary analysis of the data indicates that 79% of the leader-dyads with the same target leader and challenger leader in the data only engage in a single crisis. An additional 18% of these leader-dyads engaged in two or three international crises, while the remaining 3% engaged in four to seven recurrent crises with the same target-challenger leader pairing. This suggests that most leaders are only targeted once by a single challenger leader. When considering the number of times that a target leader engages in a crisis with a new challenger leader from the same state (i.e. an initial challenger leader and then a successor from the same challenger state), the data reveals

⁶ Please see the International Crisis Behavior Dataset codebook at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/data/ICB2-2010-final.pdf>.

that 72% of these dyads engage in a single crisis, while 22% engage in two or three crises with a remaining 6% engaging in four to eight crises. This indicates that the majority of crisis interactions between a target-challenger leader-dyad (or a successive challenger leader in the same state) only happen once. In this chapter, I consider whether a target leader's behavior can explain this pattern of crisis initiation. Are leaders who demonstrate their resolve during a crisis less likely to be targeted again in the future? Do they enjoy longer periods of time without being the targets of international crises than leaders who failed to demonstrate their resolve?

In addition to examining the effects of leader behavior on leader reputations for resolve, I also test the effects of state behavior on state reputations for resolve. To do so, I employ the same data but at the state-level, not the leader-level. Accordingly, I examine two models of state resolve: 1) the time until a target state is targeted again by the same challenger state and 2) the time until a target state is targeted by any challenger state. These two models are comparable to the analysis performed at the leader-level. The first state-based model tests for a state reputation for resolve based on the challenger state's direct experience with the target state, while the second state-based model examines a target state's reputation for resolve based on both direct and indirect experience with the challenger state. Across both levels of analysis, I consider not just the extent to which a target's resolve affects future crises with the same challenger, but also whether a target's behavior affects patterns of crisis initiation with other challengers. In doing so, I test for

the effects of demonstrated resolve on both direct reputations between targets and challengers and the extent to which targets can gain reputations for resolve through indirect extra-dyadic actions.

5.2.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable for the duration analysis is the number of days that elapse between the end of one crisis and the initiation of a new crisis involving the same target leader or state (depending on the model). The data only includes target leaders and target states that were the subject of a crisis in at least one instance. Accordingly, the dataset does not include information for those leaders and states that were never the target of a crisis to begin with. As previously discussed, one could argue that the data is skewed towards those instances in which target leaders were forced to take action to assert their resolve. This may suggest that those targets which successfully communicated their resolve prior to a crisis are omitted from the dataset. This is a limitation as my analysis focuses on the effects of crisis behavior on the timing of future crises. An alternative analysis, which could account for this omission, would be comprised of a dataset which included information for all leaders and then observed whether or not those leaders were engaged in a crisis to begin with. This approach, however, would address a different type of question than I am interested in answering. Rather than focusing the analysis on understanding which factors contribute to a leader or state being targeted originally, I instead seek to understand how the resoluteness of a

target's response to a potential threat affects the probability that the target will be engaged in a future crisis.

5.2.2 Measuring Resolve

The primary independent variable is the resoluteness of the target's response to the crisis trigger. As resolve is about demonstrating a willingness to face high costs, I primarily measure resolve in terms of the severity of the target's crisis response. In doing so, I employ multiple constructs to measure the target's resolve during an international crisis. First, I consider the target's main crisis management technique. The ICB dataset measures the overall crisis management technique in the CRISMG variable on a scale of increasing violence, ranging from negotiation to non-military pressure to the use of violence. This variable is distinct from the target's major response (MAJRES) variable, which I will employ later as a relative measure of resolve, as the CRISMG variable is defined as the "primary crisis management technique used by a crisis actor, as distinct from a specific act, which was the focus of the major response variable." Upon closer analysis it is unclear whether certain values on the CRISMG variable scale actually increase in intensity, such as the negotiation vs. adjudication/arbitration vs. mediation values. To account for this, I use the coding scheme suggested by Gelpi and Griesdorf (2001) as I recode the values of this variable into four categories: strategies which involve negotiation, arbitration, or mediation, strategies which involve non-violent military actions, strategies involving the use of violence, and strategies that rely exclusively on

military violence. In doing so, I am able to account for the importance of comparable strategies of crisis management. While I believe that focusing on the use of violence – as accounted for in the crisis management variable - is a poor conceptual measure of resolve, the current literature frames reputation for resolve in terms of war fighting. Accordingly, employing the crisis management technique variable addresses the conceptual definition of resolve used by other scholars in the literature. If resolve truly is about war fighting, than those leaders or states who respond to a crisis trigger with a more violent overall response may be perceived as more resolute and will enjoy greater periods of time without being the target of an international crisis than those leaders or states who fail to use violence.

While I utilize the crisis management variable in the analysis as a baseline measure of resolve, I question whether simply measuring the response of a target to a crisis trigger captures the essence of resolve.⁷ If resolve is about a target demonstrating its willingness to pay costs in the face of a threat, it may not be the specific action which is important to signaling resolve but the proportionality of that response to the crisis trigger which matters. Furthermore, the type of costly signal that is necessary to communicate resolve may vary in response to the nature of the trigger. Responding to a verbal crisis trigger with verbal response, for instance, may communicate resolve as the

⁷ It is important to note that Gelpi and Griesdorf (2001) do use a relative measure of resolve, but I choose to employ a different relative measure.

two responses are comparable in their severity. However, responding to a violent military trigger with a verbal threat may not be sufficient to communicate resolve as it does not demonstrate enough of a costly signal in the face of an imminent violent militarized threat.

Accordingly, I transform the values of the ICB's major response variable, MAJRES, to create a measure of relative resolve capturing the proportionality of the response of the target to the crisis trigger. I recode the classification values of the major response and the crisis trigger, TRGGR, variables to better capture responses that are comparable in their resolve. For example, I would argue that responding with either a political act or an economic act are comparable in their severity of response, yet the current coding scheme suggests that an economic act is more severe than a political act. Next, I recode the values for both the trigger of the crisis and the target's response to reflect the relative severity of each action. For the crisis trigger, values were recoded into the following categories: verbal trigger (1), political, economic, or other non-violent trigger (2), non-violent military action (3), or violent action (4). This scale not only accounts for the level of violence of the trigger, but also the type of trigger, such as differentiating between a verbal action and a political one. For the major response of the target as coded by the MAJRES variable, values were recorded into the following categories: no response (0), verbal response (1), political, economic, or other non-violent act (2), non-violent military action (3), or violent act (4). I then created a continuous

measure of relative resolve to account for the target's reciprocity of the severity of the crisis trigger. To do so, I subtracted the recoded crisis trigger value from the recoded target's major response value and transform the variable into three values: less resolute response (-1), equally resolute response (0), or more resolute response (1).⁸ Using this relative scale in the severity of the response to the trigger, I hypothesize that leaders (or states) which increase the severity of the crisis will be less likely to be targeted again and will enjoy longer periods of time without being targeted in the future. Conversely, those leaders (or states) whose response fails to match the severity of the crisis trigger will be targeted more quickly in the future. Finally, this coding scheme is particularly beneficial as it does not simply focus on the use of violence as a measure of resolve. Rather, it allows for leaders (and states) to communicate their resolve by standing firm or escalating the conflict short of the use of violence. As this measure of resolve may be related to the target's overall crisis management technique, I include the relative resolve measure and crisis management technique measure separately. A detailed explanation of the coding of each variable used in the analysis can be found in Appendix D.

Finally, I include an additional measure for resolve accounting for the time it takes in days for the target to respond to a crisis trigger as this may be related to the target's ability to signal its resolve. Targets that have a delayed response to a crisis

⁸ This scale mimics the measures of resolve used in the experiments in which participants could predict that the opposing leader would back down, stand firm, or escalate the conflict.

trigger may be perceived as less resolute by challengers than those targets who respond to crises more promptly. Accordingly, one could hypothesize that the longer it takes the target to respond to the initial crisis trigger, the sooner the target is to be engaged in the next crisis. The ICB dataset includes a variable (TRGRESRA) which measures, in days, the elapsed time between the initiation of a crisis and the target's major response to the crisis trigger. Conceptually, this variable helps to capture the decisiveness of the target's response. While the other measures of resolve account for both the severity and relative resolve of the response, this timing variable instead helps to capture the determination and swiftness with which an actor responds to a crisis.

While I am diligent to include for different conceptualizations of resolve to take into account both various aspects of resolve as well as divergent definitions of the concept, my analysis primarily measures resolve in terms of actions, not statements. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, this is a limitation of this analysis if one considers that the second set of experiments presented in the last chapter indicates that resolve can be communicated through statements, not just actions. In response to this potential critique, I offer two considerations. First, while both sets of experiments indicated that statements can be influential in the development of reputation for resolve, participants in the second experiment were more likely to look to a leader's past behavior when making assessments of resolve. Furthermore, the second set of experiments also revealed that a leader's previous behavior both in similar situations and in the previous stage of

interactions had a stronger and more consistent statistically significant effect on participants' perceptions of leader resolve than did a leader's statements. Thus, while statements are certainly important for reputations for resolve, they are less influential than a leader's behavior. Second, the international crisis database does include verbal acts as both the initial crisis trigger and the target's response to this trigger. The dataset defines a verbal act as a "protest, threat, accusation, demand, etc." Accordingly, the data does take into account, to a limited degree, a leader's statements, although these effects are not isolated. It is also important to note that within the terminology used for the ICB dataset, this type of verbal act is considered an "action" as opposed to doing nothing in response to the crisis trigger. Finally, one of the advantages, as previously discussed, in using the ICB dataset is that it includes a variety of types of international crises, not all of which may require military action to communicate resolve. Accordingly, by using multiple measures of resolve capturing the direct response of the target and the proportionality of this response to the severity of the crisis trigger, I further address concerns regarding my measurements' accuracy in measuring resolve conceptually.

5.2.3 Control Variables

In addition to measuring the target's resolve during a crisis, I identify and include a number of control variables which may also affect both the propensity for conflict and the amount of time that elapses before a new crisis occurs. These include previously identified state-based variables drawn from the hypotheses presented in

Chapter 2, such as state interest, regime type, and relative military capability, as well as other state-based variables derived from the literature on crisis onset, such as the distance between two states and crisis outcome.

5.2.3.1 State Interest

As discussed in previous chapters, state interest may be a strong conditioning factor on the development of reputations for resolve. Most notably, the results of the first experiment indicate that communicating an issue is of low priority can negatively affect a leader's ability to signal his resolve, while signaling an issue is a high priority can boost perceptions of resolve. Similarly, the second set of experiments also found that state interest could be an important influence on perceptions of resolve, particularly when communicated state interest in the dispute is low. As a proxy measure for state interest in a crisis, I rely on the ICB dataset's GRAVITY variable, which is intended to measure the severity of the crisis as perceived by the target's decision-makers. This variable includes seven values for the perceived gravity of the issue at stake ordered in increasing severity ranging from economic threats to territorial threats to threats to the target state's existence.⁹

⁹ I also considered using the ISSUE variable to measure state interest, but believe the GRAVITY variable is preferable as it directly measures the severity of the dispute according to the perceptions of the target.

5.2.3.2 Relative Military Capability

I also include multiple measures to capture the military capabilities of the target and challenger. The results of the first experiment suggest that targets which have a military advantage over the challenger are perceived as more resolute, while a weaker military can make it more difficult for a target to signal its resolve. However, the results of the second set of experiments were more ambiguous regarding the impact of relative military power on perceptions of resolve. As such, the analysis conducted in this chapter will be critical to fully teasing out the effect of relative military capability on resolve. To measure the target's military capability relative to the challenger, I employ the standard measure of relative military capabilities by using the COW data's Composite Index of National Capability (CINC). I divide the target's CINC score by the target and challenger's combined CINC score. A score less than 1 indicates the challenger has an advantage over the target, while a score greater than 1 indicates the target has the relative advantage. In addition to this composite score, I also take into account the major power status of both the target and the challenger as captured in the COW dataset, particularly as other research indicates that major-power dyads are more likely to be engaged in conflict (Bremer 1992).

5.2.3.3 Regime Type of the Target

To test for the effect of the target's regime type, I include the standard Polity IV measure for democracy of the target. While the current literature indicates democracies

should be perceived as more resolute, the results of both the first and second set of experiments suggest that the regime type of the target has little impact on perceived resolve. Regarding the impact of regime type on crisis onset, other research indicates that democracies are more likely to be targets of international crisis than are non-democracies (Gelpi and Grieco 2001). Like Gelpi and Greico (2001), I recode the Polity IV data to a range of 1 to 21 for ease of interpreting the results, with a value of 1 indicating a highly undemocratic state and a value of 21 indicating a highly democratic state.

5.2.3.4 Intra-War Crises

I also include a dummy variable measuring whether a crisis took place during an on-going war. One could argue that targets and challengers engaged in an on-going war are likely to have a shorter time span between crises. Accordingly, a target could signal its resolve in one crisis, but unless the war is concluded, the target could be targeted again more quickly in the future than a target who had responded similarly to a crisis in a non-intra-war environment. To measure the intra-war status of a crisis, I recoded the ICB dataset's four-part Intra-War Crisis variable (IWC) to a dummy variable with a 1 indicating a crisis occurred during war and a 0 indicating a non-intra-war crisis. Within the dataset, 87.6% of crisis events were non-intra-war crises, while 12.4% crisis events were intra-war crises.

5.2.3.5 Distance

Other scholarship indicates that the proximity between states can significantly affect the propensity of conflict between two states (Bremer 1992; Oneal and Russett 1997). More specifically, states which are geographically closer to each other are more likely to be engaged in disputes with each other. To control for the geographic proximity of two states, I use the COW dataset's measurement of distance between the target state's and challenger state's capitals.

5.2.3.6 Crisis Outcome

The outcome of a crisis may also impact the target's risk for future crisis onset. Previous research suggests that states which lose successive crises are more likely to be targeted in the future (Leng 1983). To measure the outcome of the crisis, I rely on the ICB data's OUTCOM variable, in which crises can result in a victory, compromise, stalemate, or defeat for the target. In the final dataset, 36.69% of crises resulted in victories for the target while 22.46% ended in compromise, 20.53% in a stalemate, and 20.33% concluded in a defeat for the target. Like Gelpi and Griesdorf (2001), I recode this variable into three categories: victory, compromise/stalemate, and defeat.

5.2.3.7 Interaction between Interest and Outcome

Finally, I include a control variable to take into account a potential interaction effect between the outcome of a crisis and the severity of the crisis. One could argue that target's which lose a high stakes dispute may be more likely to be targeted in the future.

I create a dummy variable to account for the target's loss of a crisis involving a major security threat. There were 143 cases in which the target lost a security threat, comprising 14.53% of the crisis events in the dataset.

5.3 Results and Analysis

As discussed earlier, I separate my analysis across five different models. The first three models consider the effects of leader-based behavior and state-based factors on future crisis initiation through directed-leader-dyad interactions while the last two models examine the effects of state behavior and other state-based characteristics through directed-state-dyad interactions.

5.3.1 Leader-Based Models

The first model (Model 1) considers the effects of key variables on future crisis onset between a target leader and a single challenger leader (i.e. Target Leader A and Challenger Leader A). This model is of primary interest as it tests for reputation for resolve amongst a consistent target-challenger leader pairing and thereby examines the extent to which target leaders develop reputations based on their direct interactions with a challenger leader. To test for the effects of a single target leader's behavior on future crisis onset across different challenger leaders, I employ two additional models. Model 2 tests the effects of the variables on crisis initiation between a target leader and either the same initial challenger leader or a new challenger leader in the same state (i.e. Target Leader A and Challenger Leader B₁ or B₂ from state B). The third model (Model 3)

examines the effects of the variables on crisis onset between a target leader and a challenger leader from any state (i.e. Target Leader A and Challenger Leader A, B, C, etc. from any state). Accordingly, Model 1 tests for the development of a target leader's reputation for resolve based upon a challenger leader's direct interaction with the target leader. Model 2 tests for a reputation based upon either a challenger leader's direct interaction with the target leader or the target leader's direct history with the challenger leader's predecessors. Finally, Model 3 tests for a reputation based upon both direct interaction (if the target leader and challenger leader interact more than once) and indirect interaction. In this regard, this final model considers the extent to which challenger leader's rely on the target leader's previous interactions with other leaders from different states in their assessments of the target leader's resolve.

According to the logic put forth in Chapter 2, a target leader's behavior should be most salient for the first model and then become less relevant for the second and third models as challenger leaders are most likely to rely on their direct experience with the target leader in making assessments of the target leader's resolve. In Table 23 on the next page, I present the hazard ratios, confidence intervals, and levels of significance for the independent variables from the Cox proportional hazards model in each leader-based model.

Table 23: Crisis Onset among Leader Dyads

Independent Variable	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 3a	Model 3b
<i>Relative Resolve of Response</i>						
Less Resolute	0.832 (0.129)		0.924 (0.124)		1.083 (0.114)	
More Resolute	0.398** (0.133)		0.671 (0.160)		1.170 (0.187)	
<i>Crisis Management Technique</i>						
Non-Violent Military		1.416 (0.279)		1.366 (0.235)		1.328* (0.179)
Violent Military		1.102 (0.219)		1.142 (0.193)		1.109 (0.146)
Violence Only		1.213 (0.271)		1.302 (0.246)		1.386* (0.204)
Time Until Target Response	0.995 (0.002)	0.995* (0.002)	0.996* (0.002)	0.996* (0.002)	0.999 (0.001)	0.999 (0.001)
Relative Capability	0.642 (0.214)	0.587 (0.184)	1.041 (0.296)	0.950 (0.254)	1.709* (0.368)	1.580* (0.317)
Target Major Power	2.171*** (0.479)	2.054*** (0.414)	1.737** (0.332)	1.618** (0.285)	2.471*** (0.360)	2.369*** (0.319)
Challenger Major Power	1.614* (0.331)	1.802** (0.343)	1.748** (0.312)	1.831*** (0.303)	1.536** (0.218)	1.595*** (0.207)
Gravity of Issue	1.099 (0.058)	1.104* (0.055)	1.085 (0.049)	1.101* (0.048)	1.042 (0.038)	1.037 (0.035)
Target Democracy	0.992 (0.010)	0.995 (0.009)	0.991 (0.009)	0.996 (0.008)	0.994 (0.007)	1.000 (0.006)
Distance between capitals	0.999* (0.00004)	0.999** (0.00004)	0.999* (0.00004)	0.999* (0.00003)	0.999* (0.00003)	0.999* (0.00003)
<i>Crisis outcome</i>						
Defeat	0.479 (0.202)	0.427* (0.168)	0.782 (0.229)	0.668 (0.188)	0.987 (0.215)	0.812 (0.170)
Victory	0.907 (0.144)	0.803 (0.120)	0.839 (0.116)	0.728** (0.095)	0.909 (0.097)	0.874 (0.087)
Intra-war crisis	1.740** (0.327)	1.599* (0.326)	1.750** (0.292)	1.532* (0.273)	1.698*** (0.234)	1.541** (0.222)
Lost security threat	2.162 (0.973)	2.335* (0.984)	1.233 (0.403)	1.362 (0.429)	1.064 (0.261)	1.269 (0.210)
N (Failures)	823 (209)	961 (242)	823 (282)	961 (324)	822 (465)	960 (541)
Log Likelihood	-1255.936	-1493.446	-1650.495	-1942.110	-2627.786	-3135.220
X ²	84.05***	88.38***	74.76***	82.73***	126.91***	153.87***

Hazard Ratios as coefficients; Standard Errors in (); ***p<0.001; ** p<0.01; *p<0.05

5.3.1.1 Measures of Resolve

The table above indicates the hazard ratio, confidence intervals, and level of significance for each variable. The results of the effects of leader-based and state-based variables on patterns of crisis initiation among leaders reveal that not all measures of resolve have a statistically significant effect on a leader's risk of being targeted again in the future. Each of the models labeled with an "a" use the relative resolve of the major response to measure resolve, while the models labeled with a "b" employ the crisis management technique measure of resolve. Models 1a and 1b are the primary models of interest as they consider the effect of a target leader's behavior on future crisis onset with the same challenger leader. For Model 1a, the results indicate that the relative resolve of the leader's response is highly significant. Accordingly, those target leaders who respond to a crisis trigger with a more resolute response are significantly less likely to be targeted in the future. Furthermore, the effect of a resolute response in this regard is quite substantive, as the hazard ratio indicates these leaders are approximately 60% less likely to be targeted in the future. The survival rates for this variable in the first model are graphically represented in Figure 22 on the next page.




Figure 22: Kaplan Meier Survival Estimates – Relative Resolve of Response of Leader (Model 1a)

While the relative resolve of the target's response is only significant for leaders who are re-targeted by the same challenger leader, the crisis management technique of the target leader is significant in the third model (Model 3b) in which the target leader may be challenged in the future by a challenger leader from any state. Contrary to the hypotheses of other scholars who measure resolve in terms of violence and war fighting, the hazard ratios of this variable suggest that, when compared to negotiation techniques, non-violent military responses and the sole use of violence significantly increase the likelihood that a leader will be targeted again in the future (as shown in Figure 23 on the next page).




Figure 23: Kaplan Meier Survival Estimates – Crisis Management Technique of Leader (Model 3b)

Regarding the final measure of resolve, I find that the amount of time it takes the target to respond to an initial crisis trigger is statistically significant in the second model (Models 2a and 2b) in which leaders can be targeted from a new challenger leader in the same challenger state as well as in Model 3a in which leaders can be targeted by a challenger leader from any state. The hazard ratios of this variable across these models indicates that leaders who take longer to respond actually enjoy longer periods of time before being targeted again in the future. However, the hazard ratio is very close to 1 indicating that the substantive effects of this variable are minimal. Overall, the results indicate that measurements of resolve are less influential than indicated in the previous

chapters, but that both the relative resolve of leaders and the crisis management technique leaders can affect a leader's risk of being targeted again in the future.

5.3.1.2 Measures of Power

The results of the Cox proportional hazard models indicate that state-based variables are also important. To begin, measures of power are significant across all three models. The major power status of both the target and the challenger are significant in each of the variations of the leader-based models. Across each of the three models, the target being a major power significantly increases the risk of a leader being targeted again in the future. Furthermore, the hazard rates for this variable indicate that the substantive effects of the target being a major power, particularly in the first and third model, are quite large. In addition, the major power status of the challenger also has a significant effect on a leader being the target of a crisis again in the future. Across all three models, a challenger being a major power significantly increases the risk that a leader will be targeted again in the future.

Finally, the capability of a target relative to a challenger is significant for both variations of the third model, in which a target leader can be challenged in the future by a challenger leader from any state. In this instance, a target state which is stronger than a challenger state has a significantly increased risk of being engaged in a crisis again in the future. Overall, the results from the leader-based models certainly suggest that state power can be an important factor on the risk of future crisis onset among leaders.

5.3.1.3 State Interest

In addition to state power, state interest also has a statistically significant impact on the amount of time that passes before a leader is targeted again in the future for certain models. For both the first and second models which employ the crisis management technique measure of resolve, targets which are engaged in more severe issues are at a statistically significantly greater risk of being the target of a future crisis by either the same challenger leader (Model 1) or a new leader from the same challenger state (Model 2). However, the hazard ratios for both instances in which this variable is significant suggest that the substantive impact of the severity of the crisis is relatively small. While these results support the findings from the experimental chapters that state interest can have an impact on the development of leader-based reputations, the results suggest that state interest may be less influential than indicated by the experiments.

5.3.1.4 Other Variables

In addition to variables measuring leader resolve, state power, and state interest, other control variables also have a significant effect on patterns of crisis onset for target leaders. Most notably, the intra-war crisis dummy variable is significant across each of the variations in all three leader-based models. For each of these models, leaders who are engaged in a crisis during war are more likely to be targeted again in the future. This finding supports the notion presented earlier in this chapter that it will be difficult to

communicate resolve during intra-war crises and that leaders will be at a greater risk of being future targets during times of war.

The distance between the target and challenger states' capitals also has a significant effect on patterns of crisis initiation across each variation of the models. The direction of the hazard ratio suggests that states which are closer together have a higher risk of engaging in a crisis, as expected based on previous findings in the literature. However, the value of the hazard ratio is very close to 1, indicating that the substantive effects of this variable are minimal across models. In addition, crisis outcome has a significant effect on a leader being the target of future crises when the crisis management technique variable is used to measure resolve in the first and second models (Models 1b and 2b). For Model 1b, in which a leader is targeted in the future by the same challenger leader, the target leader being defeated in a crisis leads the target leader to be significantly less likely to be targeted again in the future. For Model 2b, in which a leader is targeted in the future by a new leader from the same challenger state, the target leader winning a crisis leads the target to be significantly less likely to be targeted again in the future.

Overall, the results from the leader-based models provide mixed support for the results from the previous chapters. For the primary model of interest, Model 1, a target leader's demonstrated resolve as measured by the relative resolve of his response has a significant effect on the risk of that leader being targeted again in the future. However,

this variable is not significant across all models. Similarly, while the crisis management technique is significant for the third model, current scholarly definitions of resolve would suggest that the use of violence should make a leader less vulnerable to future targeting, which is not supported by the results. These results also indicate state power is more important factor than indicated by the experimental results. Finally, these results suggest that state interest in the dispute remains an important factor, but may be less influential than indicated by the experiments.

5.3.2 State-Based Models

Next, I turn to the two state-based models, which examine the effects of state behavior on future crisis initiation. In doing so, I consider the extent to which a state develops a reputation based on its behavior during previous disputes. The fourth model (Model 4) considers the effects of key variables on crisis onset between a target state and the same challenger state. Accordingly, this focuses on the extent to which a target state's direct history with a challenger state affects the target state's reputation. In contrast, the fifth model (Model 5) examines the effect of the variables on crisis onset between a target state and any challenger state. Accordingly, it considers the extent to which a target state can develop a reputation based on both its direct and indirect conflict histories with the challenger state. In Table 24, on the next page, I present the hazard ratios, confidence intervals, and levels of significance for the independent variables for the Cox proportional hazards model for each state-based model.

Table 24: Crisis Onset among State Dyads

Independent Variable	Model 4a	Model 4b	Model 5a	Model 5b
<i>Relative Resolve of Response</i>				
Less Resolute	0.998 (0.101)		1.047 (0.089)	
More Resolute	0.833 (0.132)		1.219 (0.154)	
<i>Crisis Management Technique</i>				
Non-Violent Military		1.470** (0.189)		1.297* (0.139)
Violent Military		1.100 (0.139)		1.149 (0.117)
Violence Only		1.227 (0.177)		1.342* (0.157)
Time Until Target Response	0.999 (0.001)	0.999 (0.001)	0.999 (0.0005)	0.999 (0.0004)
Relative Capability	0.889 (0.184)	0.866 (0.169)	1.650** (0.277)	1.470* (0.231)
Target Major Power	1.583** (0.222)	1.500** (0.196)	2.244*** (0.254)	2.257*** (0.237)
Challenger Major Power	1.116 (0.148)	1.168 (0.146)	1.244 (0.141)	1.252* (0.131)
Gravity of Issue	1.051 (0.035)	1.053 (0.033)	1.020 (0.028)	1.010 (0.026)
Target Democracy	1.000 (0.006)	1.003 (0.006)	0.994 (0.005)	0.999 (0.005)
Distance between capitals	0.999 (0.00002)	0.999 (0.00002)	0.999 (0.00002)	0.999 (0.00002)
<i>Crisis outcome</i>				
Defeat	0.831 (0.163)	0.695 (0.131)	1.008 (0.165)	0.993 (0.149)
Victory	0.786* (0.082)	0.711** (0.070)	0.958 (0.083)	0.928 (0.075)
Intra-war crisis	1.371* (0.185)	1.311 (0.182)	1.453** (0.084)	1.387** (0.163)
Lost security threat	0.781 (0.176)	0.943 (0.204)	0.806 (0.150)	0.825 (0.141)
N (Failures)	827 (486)	965 (558)	826 (718)	964 (835)
Log Likelihood	-3013.785	-3541.739	-4183.297	-4990.3424
X ²	42.40**	59.07***	131.39***	166.94***

Hazard Ratios as coefficients; Standard Errors in ()***p<0.001; **p<0.01; * p<0.05

5.3.2.1 Measures of Resolve

Once again, the models labeled with an “a” employ the relative resolve of the target’s major response to measure resolve, while those labeled with a “b” use the principle crisis management technique of the target state to measure resolve. The results of the state-based models indicate the relative resolve of the target state’s major response does not have a significant effect on future crisis onset. In contrast, the crisis management technique of the target state does significantly impact the amount of time that elapses before a state is the target of a future crisis. For both the fourth model, in which a state is targeted in the future by the same challenger state, and the fifth model, in which a state is targeted by any challenger state in the future, the target state employing a non-violent military response makes that state significantly more likely to be targeted again in the future. Similarly, for the fifth model, the sole use of violence by the target state is associated with a shorter period of time before that state is targeted again. Contrary to other scholars’ conceptualization of resolve in terms of war fighting, these results suggest that the use of violence may actually make states less secure in the future. The survival curves for the crisis management variable across both state-based models are presented in Figures 24 and 25 on the next page.




Figure 24: Kaplan Meier Survival Estimates - Crisis Management Technique of State (Model 4b)




Figure 25: Kaplan Meier Survival Estimates - Crisis Management Technique of State (Model 5b)

5.3.2.2 Measures of Power

In addition to the resoluteness of a state's response as measured by the target's crisis management technique, measures of state power significantly affect the timing of future crisis onset for target states. Most prominently, the major power status of the target has a statistically significant effect in both state-based models. Like the findings from the leader-based models, target states that are major powers are significantly more likely to be targeted again in the future. The magnitude of the hazard ratio for the fifth model is particularly large in this regard. However, unlike the findings from the leader-based models, the major power status of the challenger is not statistically significant. In fact, it is only significant for one variation of the fifth model (Model 5b). The relative capability of the target in relation to the challenger is also significant for both variations of the fifth model. In both instances, target states which are stronger than the challenger are at a higher risk of being targeted by any future challenger.

5.3.2.3 Other Variables

In contrast to the effects of state power, I find that state interest as measured by the gravity of the issue under dispute has no significant effect on the target state's risk of future conflict. However, other variables are significant. For both variations of the fourth model, in which a state is targeted in the future by the same challenger state, the target state winning a crisis is associated with a significantly lower risk of being targeted again in the future. In addition, a crisis occurring during a time of war increases the risk that a

target state will be targeted again in the future across both variations of the fifth model and one variation of the fourth model.

Overall, the results of these tests at both the leader-level and state-level of analysis provide mixed support for my previous findings. While the relative resolve of the target's response is significant for the primary leader-based model, the crisis management technique is significant across the state-based models. However, the hazard ratios of this variable suggest that more resolute violent responses do not make states less vulnerable to future crises. Furthermore, while state interest is significant in the leader-based models, it is insignificant for the state-based models. In contrast, measures of state power are significant across the leader-based and state-based models.

5.4 Robustness Checks

The Cox model assumes that each of the covariates has a similar hazard rate (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001; Keele 2010). However, this assumption is often violated. A quick observance of the Kaplan Meier survival estimates for significant variables presented earlier in the chapter suggests that several variables may violate this assumption. To check the robustness of these results, I test for the proportionality of the hazard rates of each variable in each model. In examining the Schoenfeld residuals for

each model (Hosmer, Lemeshow, and May 2008; Therneau 2000), I find that multiple variables in each model violate the proportional hazards assumption.¹⁰

Beginning with the leader-based models, the Schoenfeld residuals indicate that the intra-war crisis variable and major power status of the target violate this assumption for first model in which a leader is only targeted in the future by the same challenger leader. For the second model, in which a target leader can be targeted by new challenger leaders from the same state, the Schoenfeld residuals indicate that the crisis in war variable, major power status of the target, and the target losing a security threat violate this assumption as well as the distance, democracy, and gravity variables. For the third model, in which a leader can be targeted by a challenger from any state, the Schoenfeld residuals indicate the relative resolve and distance variables may violate the proportional hazards assumption, while additional tests suggest crisis outcome and losing a security threat may also be problematic in this regard. Table 25, on the next page, indicates which variables are problematic for each model. Those variables that violate the proportionality assumption are indicated with an “X” for the relevant model.

¹⁰ I also perform additional tests regarding the proportional hazards assumption, including using logrank tests and interacting covariates within each of the models with time. See Hosmer, Lemeshow, and May (2008) and Therneau (2000) for a discussion of alternative non-proportionality tests.

Table 25: Variables Violating the Proportional Hazards Assumption

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Relative Resolve			X		
Crisis Management Technique					X
Target Major Power	X	X		X	X
Challenger Major Power				X	
Gravity		X			
Outcome			X		
Democracy		X			X
Distance		X	X	X	
Intra-War Crisis	X	X		X	X
Lost Security Threat		X	X	X	X

Like the leader-based models, multiple variables violate the proportionality assumption in the state-based models. For the fourth model, in which a state is targeted by the same challenger state in the future, the Schoenfeld residuals indicate the major power status of the target and challenger, as well as losing a security threat, the intra-war-crisis variable and the distance between the target and the challenger violate this assumption. Finally, for the fifth model in which a state can be targeted by any challenger state, the Schoenfeld residuals indicate the crisis in war, major power status of the target, and democracy variables may violate the proportional hazards assumption across both variations of the model as well as one subset of the crisis management technique variable – the use of a violent militarized response. Additional tests further indicate the target losing a security threat may also be problematic.

To correct for the effects of the covariates that violate the proportional hazards assumption, I re-run each respective model with the covariates that violate the proportionality assumption interacted with time to correct for the non-proportional hazards of these covariates (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez 2008; Hosmer, Lemeshow, and May 2008; Therneau 2000).¹¹ Furthermore, due to the relatively high number of variables which violate the proportionality assumption, I interact each of these covariates individually to avoid producing multicollinearity within each model. The full results of these tests can be found in Appendix D.

5.4.1 Relative Resolve and Crisis Management Technique

To begin, I re-ran each model addressing the measures of resolve which violate the proportionality assumption. The relative resolve of the target's response violated the proportional hazards assumption in the third model, in which a leader can be targeted in the future by a challenger leader from any state. I find that the original model underestimates the effect of the relative resolve of the target's response, but that even when accounting for time dependency, this variable remains statistically insignificant. Accordingly, the results indicate that the relative resolve of the target's response is only significant for the first leader-based model in which a leader is re-targeted in the future by the same challenger leader.

¹¹ Cresenzi (2007) uses a similar robustness check.

Turning to the target's crisis management technique as a measure of resolve, I find that a subset of this variable violated the proportional hazards assumption in the second state-based model (Model 5) in which a state can be targeted in the future by any state. While the original model indicated that a state using a violent military response did not have a significant effect, I find that the original model highly underestimates the effect of this crisis management technique. Once accounting for time dependency, this variable becomes statistically significant. Accordingly, these results suggest that a target state responding to a crisis trigger with a violent military response, rather than a negotiation technique, makes the state more vulnerable to future attacks.

Overall, I find measures of resolve can impact future crisis onset. In particular, the relative resolve of the target is significant in delaying future crisis against the same challenger leader. This provides support for my primary hypothesis. I also find that the crisis management technique of a state, in terms of the increased use of violence, can impact the timing of future crises. However, unlike the current literature which assumes that more violent responses should result in a lower probability of future crisis onset, the data indicates that more violent responses actually increase a target state's risk of facing a future crisis. Instead, those states which employed a negotiation or mediation strategy were least likely to be the target of a future crisis.

5.4.2 Major Power Status of the Target and Challenger

Turning to measures of state power, I find that the major power status of the target violates the proportionality assumption in multiple instances. Most notably, the effect of a target being a major power is highly overestimated in the original leader-based models. While this variable was significant across all three leader-based models, it violates the proportional hazards assumption in the first and second leader-based models (Models 1 and 2). Once accounting for time dependency, I find this variable becomes insignificant for both the first and second leader-based models, in which a leader is retargeted by either the same challenger leader (Model 1) or a new challenger leader from the same state (Model 2). Similarly, I also find that the effect of the major power status of the target is highly overestimated in both state-based models. While this variable was highly significant across these two models, it becomes insignificant once accounting for time dependency. In contrast, I find that the first state-based model (Model 4), in which a state is re-targeted by the same challenger state, highly underestimates the effects of the major power status of the challenger. While the original model found this variable to be insignificant, this variable becomes highly significant once accounting for time dependency. Furthermore, the new hazard ratio of this variable suggests that targets engaged in crises involving a major power challenger state are less likely to be targeted again in the future. These results suggest that measures of power are less consistently significant than predicted by other scholars. Furthermore, it appears

that it is the major power status of the challenger, not the major power status of the target or the relative capability of the target to the challenger, which is most important in this regard.

5.4.3 State Interest

The results of the robustness checks reveal that the variable used to measure state interest – the gravity of the issue at stake – is appropriately estimated in the original models. In the one instance where it violated the proportional hazards assumption (the second leader-based model), I find the original model accurately estimates the effect of this variable. Accordingly, these results suggest that the effect of gravity of the issue under dispute depends on the level of analysis used. While it was significant for two of the leader-based models (Models 1 and 2), it was insignificant for the state-based models.

In contrast, the effect of a target losing a security threat is consistently highly underestimated in the state-based models. While each original state-based model indicated the target losing a security threat did not have a significant effect on future crisis onset, this variable becomes significant once accounting for time dependency. Furthermore, the hazard ratio of this variable indicates that a target state losing a security threat makes it less likely to be targeted in the future by either the same challenger state or another challenger state. Interestingly, this variable is not consistently

significant across the leader-based models, indicating losing a security threat has a more meaningful impact at the state-level of analysis than at the leader-level of analysis.

5.4.4 Intra-war crises

Across all five original models, a crisis occurring during a time of war had a statistically significant effect on both leader and states being the targets of future crises. However, when accounting for time dependency, the effect of this variable largely diminishes across multiple models. For both the first and second leader-based models (Models 1 and 2) as well as the final state-based model (Model 5), in which this variable violated the proportional hazards model, the intra-war crisis variable is no longer significant once interacted with time. For those models in which this variable remained significant (Model 3 and 4), leaders and states who were engaged in a crisis during a time of war had a shorter amount of time before being targeted again. Accordingly, the intra-war crisis variable has an inconsistent effect on the timing of future crisis onset.

5.4.5 Other Variables

Several other variables also violate the proportionality assumption across models. To begin, I find that the effects of the distance variable are inconsistent once accounting for time dependency. While the second leader-based model (Model 2) highly overestimates the effect of this variable, the third leader-based model (Model 3) accurately estimates the effects of distance. Conversely, the first state-based model underestimates the effects of the distance between the target and the challenger as this

variable becomes significant once interacted with time. Accordingly, the overall effects of the distance variable are unclear across models.

Regarding other variables which violate the proportional hazards assumption, I find that the democracy variable is appropriately estimated by the original models as this variable remains insignificant in the two models where it violated the proportional hazards assumption (Models 2 and 5). Accordingly, democracy does not have a significant effect in any of the models on the timing of future crises, supporting the results from the experiments. Finally, I also find that the third leader-based model (Model 3) accurately estimates the effects of crisis outcome as this variable remains insignificant. Overall, the effects of crisis outcome are inconsistent across models.

5.5 Conclusion

The statistical analyses performed in this chapter sought to determine the extent to which a leader's behavior affects a leader's risk of being the target of a future crisis. The results indicate that a leader's behavior can affect his risk of being targeted in the future, but that the effects of leader behavior are inconsistent. Most notably, a more resolute response by a leader can serve as a significant and effective signal of a leader's resolve when that leader is facing a recurrent challenger leader. This finding supports the results of the experimental chapters regarding the impact of leader behavior on perceptions of resolve.

In contrast, it appears that it is the state's crisis management technique, not the relative resolve of the state's response, which has a significant effect on future crisis onset. Furthermore, as this variable is measured in terms of the target's use of violent strategy, the hazard ratio of this variable across each state-based model actually suggests that target states may fare better by using a negotiation technique, rather than a violent response. If resolve is best communicated through the use of violence as a costly signal (as current scholarly conceptions of resolve suggest), the use of violence should result in states having a lower risk of being future targets. However, the data indicates the opposite is true. This may suggest that states are able to communicate their resolve through non-violent means or that the current scholarly conceptualization of resolve purely in terms of war fighting is insufficient. It remains unclear, however, as to why negotiation techniques have the lowest hazard ratio, and further research would be particularly fruitful in understanding the dynamic between crisis management technique and future crisis onset.

Once accounting for time dependency, the results of this analysis also suggest that measures of power can be an important influence on resolve. However, unlike the current literature predicts, relative military capability of the target to the challenger state is not consistently significant across models. Instead, I find it is the major power status of the challenger which is most influential to future crisis onset. Furthermore, I find that the major power status of the challenger is the only variable besides the crisis

management technique of the challenger which has a consistently significant effect across models. While this suggests that considerations of power may be more influential than indicated by the results of the experiments, it remains unclear as to why the major power status of the challenger rather than the relative military capability of the target to the challenger is most influential in this regard.

Overall, the results of this study provide mixed support for both my hypotheses regarding the development of leader-based reputations for resolve and alternative hypotheses. The results do indicate that the behavior of both states and leaders can influence future crisis onset. Furthermore, for the primary model of interest, the first leader-based model in which a leader is targeted in the future by the same challenger leader, leaders who use a more resolute response are significantly less likely to be targeted in the future. This finding suggests that the behavior of leaders is indeed influential, and supports my findings from the experiments that challenger leaders will rely on their direct interactions with a target leader when making assessments of resolve. While this variable is highly significant for the first leader-based model, it is not significant at the state-level of analysis. Similarly, I find that the effects of state interest in the dispute, as measured by the gravity variable, and a target losing a security threat are highly dependent on the level of analysis used. While the gravity of the dispute was significant in two of the three leader-based models, it remained insignificant across the

state-based models. Conversely, the target losing a security threat was significant in the state-based models, but not in the leader-based models.

These results, coupled with those regarding the effects of relative resolve and crisis management techniques at the leader- and state-levels of analysis, may suggest that the level of analysis matters. Such divergent findings may indicate that scholars who focus exclusively on the resolve of states may miss the importance of other key variables. Most notably, the relative resolve of a leader's behavior can have a significant effect on future crisis onset, highlighting my argument from Chapter 2 that scholars need to take into account the importance and role of leaders in order to fully understand both the development and impact of resolve on international relations, particularly during international crises and interstate conflict. In the next chapter, I further address the ability of leaders to develop reputations for resolve based on their behavior by examining the extent to which challenger leaders directly rely on leader-based or state-based factors in their assessments of a target leader's resolve.

6. The Khrushchev Crises: Lessons in Leader-Based Reputations for Resolve

In the previous chapters, I presented evidence supporting my hypothesis that leaders can develop reputations for resolve separate from the state and based on their statements and actions while in office. In both experiments, participants clearly perceived leaders as independent of the state in their resolve. Furthermore, the second set of experiments indicated that early perceptions of resolve can have a significant impact on later perceptions of resolve. In other words, both statements and actions appear to matter for reputations, and early interactions are particularly influential in the development of leader-based reputations for resolve. In addition, the experiments also indicated that a state's past behavior, communicated state interest, and (to a more limited degree) relative military capability can also influence perceptions of a leader's resolve. The statistical analysis presented in the last chapter showed that the relative resolve of a leader's response to a crisis trigger can be a significant influence on future crisis onset. The statistical analysis chapter also indicated that a state's military power may be linked to considerations of resolve.

In this chapter, I tie the results of the experiments and statistical tests together by rooting my analysis in historical evidence. While the experimental surveys provided a rigorous test of the causal mechanisms of my theory and the statistical analysis applied my theory to a large sample of cases, the case study presented here has two strong advantages for the testing of my theory. First, it further provides an in-depth testing of

the specific mechanisms by which individual leaders may develop reputations for resolve. Through the use of process tracing methods, I am able to determine the type of information a potential challenger leader uses when making assessments of a target leader's resolve as well as how that information is processed to make these assessments. In this regard, I am able to continue to tease-out the extent to which leader-based vs. state-based factors matter for perceptions of resolve as well as further determine the extent to which a leader's statements vs. actions influence these reputations. Second, the case study presented here demonstrates that real world leaders can think in the manner hypothesized by my theory. In this chapter, I will show that target leaders can develop reputations for resolve based on their statements and actions while in office and that challenger leaders can process information regarding the target leader's resolve in a manner consistent with my theory of the development of leader-based reputations for resolve.

The case study presented in this chapter analyzes the series of American-Soviet crises from 1955 to 1962 involving Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev and United States Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy. Using historical and archival sources, I examine how Khrushchev's perceptions of Eisenhower's and Kennedy's resolve changed over time. To test my primary hypothesis that individual leaders can develop reputations for resolve based on their statements and behavior while in office, I focus my analysis on the information, signals, and cues Khrushchev

used to evaluate each president's resolve. In this analysis, I consider the extent to which Khrushchev sought-out and utilized leader-based information, such as a leader's actions and statements, or state-based information, such as state conflict history or state interest, in making assessments of each president's reputation for resolve. In doing so, I explicitly address the following questions related to the development of reputation for resolve:

What information did Khrushchev use to determine Eisenhower's and Kennedy's resolve? How did Khrushchev use this information in assessing each president's resolve? How did the reputations of each president change over the course of their interactions with Khrushchev? Where these reputations for resolve updated with new information or were they resistant to change once established?

6.1 Case Selection and Use of Sources

The Khrushchev Crises provide a strong and appropriate test of the extent to which leaders may develop reputations for resolve independently of the state. This case study is particularly well suited to examine the ability of leaders to develop reputations for resolve as the perceptions and assessments of a single challenger leader (Khrushchev) are observed over time. In doing so, both internal and external variables can be better controlled for, such as Khrushchev's personality or domestic pressures affecting his perceptions. Furthermore, this particular case study can be broken down into two distinct periods: Khrushchev's perception of Eisenhower's resolve and Khrushchev's perception of Kennedy's resolve. For Eisenhower, I trace the development

of a reputation for resolve beginning with the Geneva Summit, spanning the Berlin Crisis (and Khrushchev's first Berlin Ultimatum), and culminating in the U-2 crisis and Paris Summit. For Kennedy, I examine the informational cues garnered by Khrushchev before Kennedy took office (through his Presidential campaign) and then trace the development of Kennedy's reputation through the Bay of Pigs incident, the Vienna Summit, Kennedy's Berlin Crisis (and Khrushchev's second Berlin Ultimatum), and the Cuban Missile Crisis. This within case variance allows for an analysis of Khrushchev's perceptions of the resolve of each leader over the same issues across time, providing a direct comparison of the development of the two president's individual reputations for resolve.

This case acts as a hoop test by examining the possibility that leaders can acquire reputations for resolve independently of the state (see Collier 2011). By analyzing the type of information Khrushchev sought-out and how this information was processed to determine each president's reputation for resolve, I test the applicability of my theory and alternative approaches to the development of these reputations. As such, this case study does not prove that my theory is valid in all instances and does not rule out the possibility that states may also acquire reputations for resolve. It can demonstrate, however, that it is possible for individual leaders to develop reputations for resolve that are separate from the state and consistent with my hypotheses.

Finally, the Khrushchev crises have been central to the study of international relations, particularly during the Cold War period (Lebow and Stein 1994, 5). These crises, particularly the Cuban Missile Crisis, are exquisite examples of brinkmanship and high-level high-stakes leader-based interactions, making them excellent cases for the study of reputation for resolve and individual decision-making (Allison and Zelikow 1999; Press 2005; Roberts 1988). Recently declassified and translated archival documents provide new insight into Khrushchev's perceptions. Accordingly, analysis of these documents allows for a fuller and more accurate account of Khrushchev's decision-making during this period.¹² In my analysis, I rely extensively on primary sources including translated Soviet memorandums, translated Politburo meeting notes, speeches and press conferences by Khrushchev, American documents from key summit meetings, interviews with high ranking Soviet and American officials, and Khrushchev's own memoirs. In addition to these sources, I also utilize secondary sources where translated primary documents are not available. Rather than relying on the author's interpretation of events in these sources, however, I try to focus only on direct translated quotations and passages from Khrushchev where the author had access to documents that were not publicly available. Through the analysis of these primary and secondary sources, I show how Khrushchev perceived and assessed the behavior of Eisenhower and Kennedy, resulting in the development of unique and divergent reputations for each president. I

¹² These documents directly quote, and in many instances are written by, Khrushchev.

analyze these crises in chronological order beginning with President Eisenhower and the Geneva Summit of 1955.

6.2 *The Eisenhower Years*

6.2.1 Eisenhower: The Geneva Summit

When Dwight D. Eisenhower became president in 1953, he had already attained a highly visible and successful military career, retiring from the army as a Five Star General after WWII. While Nikita Khrushchev would not become Premier of the Soviet Union until 1958, he served as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) starting in 1953 and was highly influential on matters of foreign policy. Eisenhower and Khrushchev first met in July 1955 at the Geneva Summit, which was meant to facilitate more open communication between the Soviet Union and the West and which was considered critical to the future of Soviet-American relations. Geneva also marked the first time Eisenhower and Khrushchev sat at the bargaining table face-to-face.

While Khrushchev knew that Eisenhower had strongly divergent positions from the Soviets on disarmament and Berlin, Khrushchev based his initial hope that progress could be made at Geneva on the President's military record. Khrushchev's initial impression of Eisenhower prior to their meeting at Geneva was based on the President's actions during World War II (quoted in S. Khrushchev 2004, 28):

Our confidence in him [Eisenhower] came about as a result of his behavior during the war. I am talking mainly about the last stages of the war when the

Germans were removing many of their troops from the Western front, where they were fighting against the Allies who had landed [at Normandy]. Hitler wanted to hold us back and not let us take Berlin. Stalin said that he appealed to Eisenhower, pointing out that this would be unjust. In effect, the Germans had ceased any active resistance against the American and British troops. Eisenhower held back the offensive of his forces...Eisenhower's reply was that the Russians should be given moral satisfaction.

Rather than assuming the President's military background would make him more prone to violence, Khrushchev believed Eisenhower would be open to peaceful negotiation: "Although Mr. Eisenhower is a general, he is not one of those military men who rely only on guns for the settlement of knotty problems and who would like to settle all problems by force of arms." (N. Khrushchev 1959f). Khrushchev publicly stated in a press conference in 1954 that he believed Eisenhower to be an "honest soldier and true partner" (quoted in New York Times 1954). Multiple other private and public statements further indicate Khrushchev took the President's prior behavior during his time as a military leader as a signal of Eisenhower's fairness, honesty, and willingness to negotiate (CPSU CC 1962a; N. Khrushchev 1958b; 1959a; 1959j). As such, Khrushchev hoped the President would be amenable to a compromise at Geneva and tried to submit proposals Eisenhower may be willing to negotiate on. For example, during the drafting of the Soviet declaration on Germany to be sent to Geneva, Khrushchev cautioned his colleagues during a private Central Committee meeting that the initial language was too "quarrelsome" and suggested the document be re-written in order to help facilitate compromise with the Americans (CPSU CC 1955a).

Publicly, Eisenhower indicated that, while his administration would be firm in their positions, he too hoped a compromise could be reached, stating this position in multiple press conferences: “We will stay strong and we’ll stay vigilant, but we’re not going to extinguish the hope that a new dawn may be coming, even though the sun rises slowly” (New York Times 1955; see also Eisenhower 1955b). Eisenhower, however, had been strict with the Soviets since taking office, remained distrustful of their motives, and was consistent in his position on Berlin (Aldrich 1955; Boyle 1993, 122; Eisenhower 1955b; Lyon 1955; Turginov 1953). Going into the Geneva Summit, Khrushchev became increasingly concerned that Eisenhower would be firm in his position on Berlin, one of the primary issues to be discussed at the upcoming conference and one of the top security priorities for the Eisenhower administration (S. Khrushchev 1998; Turginov 1953). Khrushchev’s impression of Eisenhower based on the President’s actions during WWII, however, may have prolonged Khrushchev’s hope that progress could be made, even if it would require a firm hand.

Despite his optimism that Eisenhower would be open to compromise, it became evident early during negotiations that the original divergent positions on Berlin held by both sides would remain unyielding. At the summit, Eisenhower openly told Soviet leaders the meeting was only meant to start a dialogue, not to reach key decisions on major issues (Department of State 1955; Eisenhower 1955a; Reston 1955a; 1955b). As the summit wore on, it became clear the American and Soviet visions for the future of

Germany were essentially “irreconcilable” (Dobrynin 1995, 37). As a result, the Geneva Summit failed to reach any agreements.¹³ In his report on the summit to the Kremlin, Khrushchev indicated Soviet leaders had done all they could, but the American proposals were “not worth agreeing to” (CPSU CC 1955b). In private discussions, Khrushchev expressed disappointment that the American delegation had agreed to come to Geneva, but had remained resolute in their positions (Bohlen 1956b).¹⁴ In a Central Committee meeting directly after the Summit, Khrushchev openly advocated the Soviets “show patience and persistence” and stand firm in their position on Berlin and the German question (CPSU CC 1955b).

Khrushchev’s statements during this time indicate he attributed America’s firm stance at the Geneva Summit to U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, not President Eisenhower. For example, in a speech to the Supreme Soviet in 1957 regarding the outcome of the Geneva Summit, Khrushchev referenced Dulles’ actions and foreign policy position 11 times, but did not once mention Eisenhower (N. Khrushchev 1957b). In describing the summit negotiations to the Kremlin’s Central Committee, Khrushchev framed the discussion in terms of Dulles’, not Eisenhower’s, political “maneuvering” (CPSU CC 1955b; see also Bohlen 1956b and N. Khrushchev 1959a). Khrushchev further

¹³ For a full American analysis of the meetings see Dulles 1955.

¹⁴ In hindsight, scholars have argued that the result of the Geneva Summit should not have been a surprise to those involved as it was the first summit since Potsdam and little more could be expected than to “clarify the areas of difference between the two powers” (Crockett 1995, 129).

described U.S. policy on Berlin as the work of Dulles' strategy of "squeezing" and applying "pressure" to the Soviets in order to force a compromise (CPSU CC 1957). Such statements suggest that Khrushchev did indeed perceive the American delegation to be resolute, but that this firm position was not attributed to Eisenhower. Khrushchev later suggested that if Dulles had not been present at the meetings, Eisenhower would have been more willing to find middle ground: "The U.S. was not able to make concessions at that time. After all, John Foster Dulles was still alive, and it was he who was deciding U.S. foreign policy, not President Eisenhower after all" (quoted in S. Khrushchev 2000, 37).

At the Geneva Summit, Khrushchev was particularly disapproving of Eisenhower's reliance on Dulles: "When the President had to speak, Dulles would write him notes. He ought in decency at least to have turned his back while studying the note, but he would take the note, read it and lay it aside. Then, when the President had to speak again, he would take the next note, again prepared by Dulles" (N. Khrushchev 1960b). This behavior greatly disappointed Khrushchev as it ran counter to his prior perception of Eisenhower as a confident military leader: "When I saw that Eisenhower was reading aloud whatever notes Dulles slipped into his hand, all my hopes immediately faded. The Eisenhower we remembered was a different man, an outstanding military leader, but now we encountered a run-of-the-mill politician" (quoted in S. Khrushchev 2004, 29). He was confused over the extensive role Dulles took

in the negotiations as Eisenhower's military leadership led Khrushchev to believe the President would be a strong and independent statesman (N. Khrushchev 1970, 397). In contrast, Khrushchev would later describe Eisenhower during this period as weak, too willing to rely on his subordinates, and too unfamiliar with important issues to contribute meaningfully to the conversation (S. Khrushchev 1998).

Other scholars have noted that Eisenhower's reliance on his subordinates was intentional and part of his presidential management style. With regards to international policy specifically, this "hidden-hand leadership" approach allowed Eisenhower to meet his foreign policy goals while making it appear that Dulles was in control of foreign policy (Greenstein 1982). As such, Eisenhower was able to achieve favorable outcomes by using Dulles' authority in international affairs, but was also able to place blame on Dulles when diplomatic efforts failed (Greenstein 1982, 88-89). Accordingly, while it appeared the Eisenhower took a back-seat to foreign policy and national security policy, Eisenhower was actually an active strategist (Greenstein 1982; Millen 2012).

During the Geneva Summit, it appears that this management style affected Eisenhower's ability to gain a reputation based on his behavior at the conference. As Khrushchev's statements indicate he focused primarily on Dulles' behavior and attributed U.S. policy at Geneva to the Secretary, not the President, evidence suggests Eisenhower did not acquire a reputation for resolve based on his actions in Geneva; neither did he develop a reputation for lacking resolve. Khrushchev's statements at the

time of negotiations and passages from his memoirs indicate that Eisenhower did leave Khrushchev with the impression, however, that he was not in control of American foreign policy. Despite the lack of a clearly defined reputation for resolve, Khrushchev's first impressions of Eisenhower do provide insight into the ability of leaders to develop reputations for resolve. Most notably and in accordance with my primary hypothesis, when making initial determinations of how the President would behave during negotiations, Khrushchev turned to leader-based factors. Rather than focusing on America's historical record or the past behavior of Eisenhower's predecessors in dealing with Stalin and other Soviet leaders, Khrushchev's analysis focused on Eisenhower's previous actions prior to taking office, specifically his military record. This provides positive evidence for the hypothesis that challenger leaders will look for informational cues based on the actions of individual target leaders, rather than states, when making judgments about a leader's future behavior. Furthermore, this supports my notion that, lacking other information, challenger leaders will look to the actions of a target leader prior to taking office if that target leader has held some form of highly visible office (such as Eisenhower's role as a prominent five-star general).

6.2.2 Eisenhower: The Berlin Crisis

After the Geneva Summit, Khrushchev pursued the Berlin issue diligently, maintaining high-level diplomatic contact with the administration (Crockett 1995, 129). The German question and the fate of Berlin was considered the primary security threat

to Soviet foreign interests in Europe as the possibility of a nuclearized West Germany was both real and terrifying for the Kremlin (Harrison 1993; National Intelligence Estimate 1955b; Zubok and Pleshakov 1996). Accordingly, Khrushchev requested a meeting with the President to continue face-to-face negotiations. In response, Eisenhower presented himself more assertively than he had in Geneva by directly denying Khrushchev's request for direct negotiations. Declassified Central Intelligence Agency documents from this time indicate the Eisenhower administration believed Soviet leaders would be unwilling to "negotiate a German settlement on terms acceptable to the West" (National Intelligence Estimate 1955b) and concluded the Soviets had "no intention in the foreseeable future of moving toward a settlement of major issues" (National Intelligence Estimate 1955a). Accordingly, Eisenhower saw little reason to potentially disrupt the status quo through extended direct negotiations with Khrushchev.

Khrushchev's statements on Berlin certainly signaled he was unwilling to compromise. For example, when asked if he would be willing to accept the "reunification of Germany within the framework of the European security pact and on the basis of German neutrality," Khrushchev replied with a stern and simple "no" (Department of State 1958c). In light of Khrushchev's position, Eisenhower rejected the possibility of another meeting with the Soviet Premier. The president publicly stated his position would not deviate from the Potsdam Agreement, and Eisenhower reaffirmed

his belief that the Soviets had demonstrated an “apparent unwillingness to negotiate seriously on concrete points at issue” (Eisenhower 1958; see also S. Khrushchev 2000, 307). Khrushchev expressed dismay over Eisenhower’s stringent adherence to and articulation of his positions: “What do Eisenhower and Dulles want? Apparently they want to talk about the liquidation of the socialist system of the Soviet Union” (quoted in Taubman 2003, 401). Khrushchev became increasingly pessimistic about the possibility of a settlement. During private negotiations, he stated that he believed Soviet-U.S. relations were going “very slowly” and had deteriorated since Geneva (quoted in Bohlen 1956b; see also Department of State 1956).

It was during this time that Khrushchev’s statements indicate he began to perceive Eisenhower as both firm and determined in his position on Berlin. Khrushchev referred to the U.S. position in terms of Eisenhower, not Dulles, indicating a change in his perception of who was in control of American foreign policy. Khrushchev protested in a public interview that the President was neither willing to negotiate on Berlin nor consider the Soviet position (N. Khrushchev 1957a; see also Bohlen 1956a; Kohler 1958; N. Khrushchev 1958d):

The duel of words is continuing and it is leading not to relaxation and improvement of the relations between our countries but, on the contrary, to deterioration and aggravation of our relations. We are dissatisfied with this situation and are doing all we can to improve relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. But this depends not only on us. The other side, that is, the American ruling circles, do not appear to want this.

Khrushchev publicly accused the President of purposely “working to worsen the international situation” in Berlin (N. Khrushchev 1958a). In addition, in a letter to President Eisenhower, Khrushchev directly questioned the President’s willingness to negotiate, further suggesting he viewed Eisenhower as resolute (N. Khrushchev 1958c):

After studying the documents recently received from the three Powers in reply to the proposals made by the Soviet Government on May 5, we have discovered, to our profound regret, that in these documents questions are raised which do not bring the possibility of agreement any closer but rather make it more remote and which we have repeatedly and clearly stated to be unacceptable to us. We ask ourselves: why are the governments of the Western Powers acting in this way – does this possibly reflect a desire to insult us in some way?

Khrushchev would later describe Eisenhower’s firm position as rooted in concerns over “prestige” (Department of State 1959d), arguing during negotiations that the only reason the President stood firm on Berlin was because America’s reputation would be tarnished if Eisenhower compromised.¹⁵

It is during this period of negotiations that Khrushchev’s statements indicate Eisenhower’s reputation for resolute action began to take hold. When assessing future American action on Berlin, Khrushchev looked to the President’s statements and actions, becoming increasingly pessimistic regarding the possibility of a negotiated resolution. Khrushchev’s framed Berlin in terms of Eisenhower’s individually held resolve, further demonstrating his growing perception of the President as an independent and resolute

¹⁵ Eisenhower also viewed the issue in terms of reputation for resolve and credibility telling his son that “if West Berlin surrendered to Soviet pressure, then no one in the world would have any confidence in any pledge we make” (Bechloss 1986, 162-163). Throughout the Berlin Crisis, the President would continue to frame the issue in terms of honor and commitment (Eisenhower 1959a).

statesman. Khrushchev also appears to have believed that Eisenhower faced significant potential costs in maintaining his position in Berlin, stating in a Central Committee meeting that the President was aware the Soviets could “raze West Germany to the ground” if Eisenhower did not agree to the Soviet position (CPSU CC 1958, 202). The evidence during this period suggests that Eisenhower had laid the foundations for a reputation for resolve through his statements and actions.

6.2.3 Eisenhower: The Berlin Ultimatum

Khrushchev responded to the lack of movement on Berlin by escalating the situation. At a speech two weeks before his now famous Berlin Ultimatum, Khrushchev declared he would sign a separate peace treaty with East Berlin if Eisenhower refused to compromise on German unification (N. Khrushchev 1958e). Eisenhower and his administration interpreted this as a direct test of their “resolve and unity of will” (Department of State 1958d, 57; see also Department of State 1958a, 1958b, Herter 1958b, and Thompson 1958a). The President further believed Khrushchev underestimated the “strength and promptness” of any American reaction to a perceived Soviet threat (Department of State 1959c) and feared that giving into Khrushchev’s demands could destabilize Germany and injure the Western alliance (Murphy 1958; Taubman 2003). Eisenhower’s advisors recommended a prompt and firm response to demonstrate their resolve without escalating the situation unnecessarily (Burns 1958; Herter 1958a; Thompson 1958a; 1958b). Accordingly, Eisenhower publicly warned that, if such action

were taken, the U.S. would respond with military force (S. Khrushchev 2000, 309).

Private discussions confirm that Eisenhower was not bluffing as he was truly willing to risk war over the issue if necessary (Herter 1958c). Declassified memoranda from these discussions indicate American analysts believed that, while Khrushchev remained unsure of whether Eisenhower would actually go to war over Berlin, Khrushchev also knew a concession by Eisenhower on the issue would be a sore spot for America's reputation and international prestige (Konig 1958, 37; Thompson 1958d).

On 27 November 1958, Khrushchev issued his now famous Berlin Ultimatum accusing the Western Powers of "grossly" violating the Potsdam Agreement and informing Eisenhower (and other Western leaders) that the Allied Powers had six months to demilitarize West Berlin and declare it a "free city." Khrushchev publicly warned that if these demands were not met, the Soviets would sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR and terminate "all contacts" between the U.S.S.R. and the West "on questions pertaining to Berlin" (CPSU 1958). Eisenhower responded with a strong diplomatic presence, increased troop levels in Germany, and a public reiteration of America's commitment to Berlin (Gelb 1986, 47). In the first news conference after the Berlin Ultimatum, Eisenhower repeatedly asserted that neither he nor other Western leaders would concede on Berlin and reaffirmed America's moral duty to maintain the freedom of West Berlin (Kenworthy 1958; Eisenhower 1959b). In another news conference, Eisenhower further clarified that the U.S. would not alter its position on the

issue: "We are not going to give one single inch in the preservation of our rights, and of discharging our responsibility in this particular region, especially Berlin. There can be no negotiation on this particular point of right, and of retention of possibility" (Eisenhower 1959c).

Almost immediately after Eisenhower took action, Khrushchev changed the focus of his demands, calling for the withdrawal of Allied troops and indicating he would entertain any reasonable proposal that included this measure (Thompson 1958e). American analyses of negotiations directly after the ultimatum describe Khrushchev's behavior as marked by increased agitation, particularly when the discussion turned to the U.S. response to his ultimatum (Herter 1959; Thompson 1958c). As the articulated six month deadline drew nearer, Eisenhower's resistance to compromise was hardened, and Khrushchev became less militant in both his tactics and position over Berlin (Frankel 2004). Instead of acting on his ultimatum, Khrushchev agreed to a meeting at Geneva. Other scholars interpret Khrushchev's behavior as a direct result of Eisenhower's resolute response to the ultimatum and argue that Khrushchev became increasingly concerned that his own reputation for resolve would be affected by the crisis (Boyle 1993, 131; Taubman 2003, 403).

Going into the Council of Foreign Ministers Geneva Conference in May 1959, Khrushchev expressed his intention to propose an agreement with Eisenhower to the Central Committee, but remained highly doubtful the President would accept such a

proposal: "From Eisenhower's letter, it is clear that we can't expect any great results from the Geneva conference" (CPSU CC 1959c; see also CPSU CC 1959b; N. Khrushchev 1959h; 1959i). Furthermore, in another Central Committee meeting prior to the conference, Khrushchev stated his belief that the President's actions were driven by concerns over reputation, stating that Eisenhower did not "want to recognize the GDR" for "prestige reasons" (CPSU CC 1959b). Indeed, Eisenhower remained adamant that he would "not think of risking our [America's] honor by accepting, under the threat of force, conditions which would undermine our ability to fulfill our commitment to the people of Berlin" (Eisenhower 1959a). The President's consistent hardline position throughout his presidency led Khrushchev to view the issue as a test of wills between himself and Eisenhower. For example, at a meeting of the Central Committee on June 18, he reiterated his belief in the necessity that the Soviets stand firm in their position: "If we were weak, [the U.S.] would have resolved the German question to their advantage" (CPSU CC 1959c, 216; see also CPSU CC 1959b, 208).

At the end of the conference, Khrushchev stated he felt the Soviets had put forth new proposals "taking into account the position of the Western powers and the real situation" (N. Khrushchev 1959b). In a speech soon after the conclusion of the conference, he further indicated the meeting had been a success in clarifying the positions of both sides and defining areas of disagreement (N. Khrushchev 1959c):

However, despite disagreements that have come to light in Geneva, the work the Ministers have already accomplished has a definite positive significance. The

attitudes of the sides on a number of issues have been brought out more clearly at the conference, existing discordant views have been clarified and attempts made to some extent to accommodate the sentiments of the sides on individual questions.

In multiple statements following the Geneva Conference, however, Khrushchev expressed his disappointment in the results of the conference (N. Khrushchev 1959b; 1959d; 1959m).

After the failure of the Berlin Ultimatum and the lack of movement at the 1959 Geneva Conference, Khrushchev refrained from pressing Eisenhower further over Berlin. The issue remained the critical “irritant to the relationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.” throughout Eisenhower’s tenure (Department of State 1959a), yet Khrushchev’s behavior after the failed ultimatum changed dramatically. Previously, Khrushchev was bold and brash in his dealings with the President, but afterwards he became more willing to work with Eisenhower and refrained from testing the President further. Whereas Khrushchev had originally demanded a reduction in American troops, he later proposed a tit-for-tat strategy whereby both the Soviets and Americans would reduce their forces. However, Khrushchev expressed doubt to the Central Committee that the President would accept the proposal and was concerned that any compromise the Soviets put forth would be viewed as a “retreat” by Eisenhower (CPSU CC 1959a). Khrushchev further stated he believed the President wanted “to freeze the issue” and keep Berlin in its contemporary state (CPSU CC 1959a; see also N. Khrushchev 1959i). Such changes in both Khrushchev’s tactics and statements suggest that Eisenhower had

successfully communicated his resolve to the Premier, particularly as Khrushchev became concerned with his own reputation.

Other scholars attribute much of Khrushchev's behavior during this period to the internal pressures Khrushchev faced from within the Kremlin. While Khrushchev had consolidated his power and become Premier earlier that year, he continued to face fierce internal competition as his main political rivals were highly critical of Khrushchev's failure to make significant progress with Eisenhower towards an acceptable outcome in Berlin (Cumming 1959; Zubok and Pleshakov 1996, 187). These internal pressures may help explain why Khrushchev continued with his issuing of the Berlin Ultimatum, even after the President had been tough and determined in both his statements and actions. In addition, Khrushchev had staked his domestic reputation on achieving a favorable outcome in Berlin, and these pressures may have contributed to both the timing of the ultimatum and Khrushchev's ultimate willingness to bargain with Eisenhower at the subsequent Geneva Conference (Broderick 1998). Accordingly, while Khrushchev's statements prior to the Ultimatum indicate he did perceive Eisenhower to be resolute, other factors may have prevented him from acting directly on this perception. This may suggest that, while an actor can carry a reputation for resolve, reputation alone may not guide all crisis behavior (providing support for the findings from the last chapter).¹⁶

¹⁶ The extent to which a reputation for resolve is acted upon, however, is a different empirical and analytical question than the one presented here regarding the formation of reputation for resolve. Other scholars

Alternatively, the fact that Khrushchev later backed down on Berlin after his failed Berlin Ultimatum and a stalemate at the following Geneva Conference in the face of this continued domestic pressure may provide further support as to the extent to which Eisenhower was able to develop a robust reputation for resolute action.

Khrushchev's statements during the Berlin Crisis as a whole indicate that Eisenhower did develop an individual reputation for resolve, particularly after standing firm against the Berlin Ultimatum. When introducing new proposals after the failed ultimatum, Khrushchev expressed continued doubt that the President would accept or even entertain them. These expectations were based on past interactions with Eisenhower and the President's repeated refusal to give into Soviet demands on such issues. While Khrushchev's behavior is not directly indicative of Eisenhower's reputation, Khrushchev did significantly alter his behavior and approach to negotiations after Eisenhower rejected the Soviet ultimatum. The Premier not only became more willing to negotiate with the President, but also put forth proposals that were more conciliatory. Finally, Eisenhower's demonstration of his resolve led Khrushchev to become concerned for his own reputation after being bested by the President. The evolution of Eisenhower's reputation supports my primary hypothesis that individual

should examine more closely the conditions under which a pre-existing reputation is used to directly guide behavior.

leaders can develop reputations for resolve independently of the state. When making assessments of Eisenhower's resolve, Khrushchev relied on the President's own statements and behavior while in office. Interestingly, while Eisenhower was persistently resolute in his statements on Berlin, it was not until his resolve was tested through direct action that Khrushchev's perception of the President's reputation was solidified. This provides further evidence that resolve is best communicated through behavior rather than statements.

6.2.4 Eisenhower: The U-2 Crisis and the Paris Summit

Although Khrushchev and Eisenhower had a combative history over Berlin, the two men also developed a personal friendship built upon foundations of mutual respect. The cornerstone of this relationship began during the Geneva Summit of 1955, where Khrushchev and Eisenhower would frequently chat about non-political topics during downtime from formal negotiations (Dobrynin 1995, 38). This trust and respect the two men built at a personal level developed most prominently after Eisenhower proved to be a resolute statesman. Prior to the Berlin Ultimatum, Khrushchev perceived the President as a "run-of-the-mill politician" (quoted in S. Khrushchev 2004, 39). After Khrushchev's failed ultimatum, however, Khrushchev publicly stated he thought Eisenhower to be a wise and intelligent statesman who was dedicated to peace: "I spoke quite frankly with President Eisenhower about problems of ensuring peace. I must say I liked talking with him; he is an intelligent man who realizes the seriousness of the international situation"

(N. Khrushchev 1959j; see also N. Khrushchev 1959k; Zubok and Pleshakov 1996, 203).¹⁷

It was during his visit to America after the Berlin Ultimatum that Khrushchev became convinced the President was committed to finding a peaceful resolution to Soviet-American disputes (Fursenko and Naftali 2006, 241). In public statements during this period, Khrushchev repeatedly stressed his perception that the President was committed to peace and his belief that a mutual understanding could be reached to ease tensions (N. Khrushchev 1959d; 1959e; 1959g; 1959m). For example, in a television broadcast to the American public, Khrushchev definitively stated: “I do not have the slightest doubt that the President sincerely desires better relations between our countries” (N. Khrushchev 1959e). Similarly in a speech before the United Nations General Assembly, Khrushchev reiterated his faith in Eisenhower: “We believe that Mr. Eisenhower wishes to contribute to removing the tension in relations between our states” (N. Khrushchev 1959m).

Despite their personal relationship, tensions again came to a head with the U-2 Crisis and Paris Summit. There is much debate as to whether Khrushchev purposely ruined the Paris Summit or if he legitimately believed Eisenhower would apologize for infringing on Soviet territory during the U-2 incident. One interpretation of these events suggests that, on a personal level, Khrushchev could not accept that Eisenhower

¹⁷ It is interesting to note that a similar pattern would later emerge with Kennedy after the Cuban Missile Crisis. This may suggest that such behavior is a personality characteristic inherent to Khrushchev. Once he was politically bested by his opponent he gained a deep personal respect and admiration for each man.

approved the secret flights. His faith in Eisenhower as a partner committed to peace was strong enough that, even in the face of direct evidence and Eisenhower's own admission, Khrushchev remained unconvinced of Eisenhower's culpability (S. Khrushchev 2004, 250).¹⁸

In contrast, American analyses after the failed Paris Summit suggest the Premier's reaction was influenced by personal considerations but was primarily strategic in nature (Department of State 1960c; Herter 1960; Thompson 1960c). This view was strongly advocated by U.S. Ambassador Thompson (Thompson 1960a):

Khrushchev was in fact personally embarrassed in U.S.S.R. and bloc by our handling of the U-2 affair in view of his personal commitment to 'spirit of Camp David' and he has shown lack of respect for President's role in field of foreign affairs. Nevertheless from my conversation with him both before and after U-2 incident including our last conversation, I am convinced he was greatly impressed by President's personality and on purely personal basis has warm feelings toward him. In any event Soviet leaders are not type to let personal feelings affect high policy decision. [illegible] believe we must look elsewhere for reasons Soviets candid at time Paris Summit not attempt negotiations with present US administration...Most obvious explanation is that Soviets realized final conclusion of agreements on such questions as Berlin, Germany, and [illegible] unlikely to be reached on first round of negotiations and probably not before new elections. They would therefore be at disadvantage in that they could not be sure that in return for any concessions they offered in negotiations, new administration would honor proposals put forward on U.S. side.

Regardless of the motivations driving Khrushchev's behavior, Khrushchev's statements indicate Eisenhower came into the U-2 Crisis and Paris Summit with a reputation for resolute action. However, Khrushchev's behavior during the crisis and

¹⁸ Vertzberger (1990) notes that personal considerations can interact with cognitive decision-making limitations to affect both perceptions and behavior (see pages 82-86).

accompanying summit was not solely based on Eisenhower's reputation but was instead directed by other considerations. Khrushchev's reaction to the U-2 incident and his near blinding quest to force Eisenhower to apologize at the summit ran in direct contrast to the behavior one would expect based on Eisenhower's established reputation. Given Khrushchev's prior perception of the President as a resolute statesman, Khrushchev should have expected Eisenhower to stand firm during the U-2 Crisis and Paris Summit, which the President did indeed do. When faced with what the Eisenhower administration perceived to be an ultimatum to accept Soviet terms on aerial reconnaissance (Department of State 1959b; 1960a), the President stood firm and reiterated the American position while also encouraging Khrushchev to continue negotiations (Department of State 1960b; Herter 1960). Khrushchev's behavior at the summit suggests that reputation alone may not sufficiently explain crisis behavior. In particular both strategic and personal factors may contribute to the extent to which reputation for resolve is able to affect crisis outcome.¹⁹ More specifically, other scholars have argued that internal power struggles may help explain Khrushchev's behavior as he faced tremendous internal pressure to put on a tough show against Eisenhower at the

¹⁹ In particular, if the issue was truly perceived as personal in nature, this may indicate that reputations for resolve may not extend to issues that are perceived to be beyond the scope of statecraft. While outside observers viewed the U-2 crisis and following Paris Summit as a matter of state foreign policy, Khrushchev may have perceived the issue as personal in nature rather than political. Khrushchev took the President's actions as a personal betrayal both of this trust and of their perceived friendly partnership for peace. Other factors too may have been in play. For further analysis regarding strategic, personal, and domestic motivations, see Sheldon 1960 and Department of State 1960d.

Paris summit, especially after the affront of the U-2 crisis (Bechloss 1986, 40; Geelhoad 1987). Eisenhower's decision to employ the U-2 flights was highly embarrassing for Khrushchev both internationally and domestically, especially considering his positive comments regarding the President. One could argue that Khrushchev needed to react strongly in order to save-face publicly.

While there are multiple explanations for Khrushchev's behavior at Paris, his statements suggest that Eisenhower's actions during both the U-2 Crisis and the Paris Summit reinforced the President's reputation for resolute action. Eisenhower consistently remained firm on his stance regarding U.S. obligations and urged Khrushchev to focus on the issues at hand during the summit, not on the U-2 incident (Dobrynin 1995, 39; Department of State 1960b). Khrushchev's statements indicated his frustration over the President's resolve on these issues. For example, in a public statement during the Paris Summit, Khrushchev expressed his dismay at the President's resolute statements and actions (N. Khrushchev 1960a; see also Department of State 1960b; N. Khrushchev 1960c; 1960d):

How is it possible to productively negotiate and examine the questions confronting the conference when the U.S. government and personally the President have not only failed to condemn the provocative intrusion of an American military plane into the Soviet Union, but on the contrary, have declared that such actions remain official U.S. policy towards the U.S.S.R.?

The Paris Summit ended abruptly as Khrushchev refused to continue negotiations with the President and withdrew Eisenhower's invitation to visit the Soviet

Union. Instead, Khrushchev stated he would wait six to eight months before continuing high-level negotiations (Department of State 1960b), after which time a new president would be elected to office. In doing so, Khrushchev expected Eisenhower's successor to be more open to negotiation and less resolute following the election or immediately after the inauguration (Department of State 1960e; Houghton 1960; N. Khrushchev 1960b; Taubman 2003, 472).²⁰ Indeed, other scholars argue that Khrushchev was betting on Nixon to lose the presidential race (Broderick 1998). It was well known that Khrushchev did not like Nixon and was rebuffed by the tough tone Nixon had taken during discussions on his trip to the U.S.S.R. (Fursenko and Naftali 1997). American officials took this as a sign that Khrushchev believed Nixon would be equally resolute if he took office. Khrushchev hoped the Democratic candidate would be less so and later joked that he voted for Kennedy by not pressing the Berlin issue during the campaign (S. Khrushchev 2004).

It is particularly telling that Khrushchev refused to negotiate with Eisenhower and eagerly awaited the upcoming presidential election. Eisenhower had consistently demonstrated his resolve throughout extended negotiations over Berlin, and Khrushchev's decision to suspend talks until a new president took office indicates the Premier believed any future interactions with Eisenhower would yield similar results.

²⁰ For a discussion of Khrushchev's views of foreign policy in the upcoming American elections see Thompson 1960b.

Not only was Eisenhower viewed as resolute, but this perception was used as an expectation by Khrushchev as to how the President would behave in future interactions after the Paris Summit. Even more so, Khrushchev's optimism that the next president would be less resolute and more willing to negotiate provides strong support for my primary hypothesis: leaders can develop their own reputations for resolve independently of the state and separate from their predecessors.

6.3 *The Kennedy Years*

6.3.1 Kennedy: Prior to the Presidency

Khrushchev's perception of John F. Kennedy prior to taking office was based primarily on Kennedy's presidential campaign speeches and statements. The Kremlin knew little about Senator Kennedy as a politician before he became president, but Kennedy was perceived to have "an excellent mind" and to be quick, sharp, and tactful (S. Khrushchev 2004, 294). During this period, Khrushchev received mixed signals regarding Kennedy's potential resolve, particularly over Berlin. In August of 1960, five months before Kennedy was elected to the presidency and in the midst of campaign season, Khrushchev received a file on Senator Kennedy prepared by the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The contents of this file suggested that, if Kennedy been in office during the U-2 incident, the Senator would have apologized to Khrushchev for the flights. However, with regards to Berlin, Kennedy was described in the file as "bellicose" (Taubman 2003, 485).

Indeed, Kennedy took a hardline on Berlin publicly as he stated at one point that he was willing to use atomic weapons to defend the city and pledged in his inaugural address that he would “pay any price, bear any burden, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and success of liberty” (J. Kennedy 1961a). Kremlin insiders in Washington, however, painted a different picture of Senator Kennedy and his position on Berlin. The Soviet Ambassador to Washington told Khrushchev that Kennedy was not truly committed to the security of Berlin and that such harsh rhetoric was purely for the electorate (Smyser 2009, 29). Furthermore, Khrushchev was unsure what to make of Kennedy’s ambiguous senatorial record or his youth (Bechloss 1991, 37).²¹ The information available, however, indicated Kennedy would be more flexible and willing to compromise on Berlin than Eisenhower had been (Bruce 1961; S. Khrushchev 2000).

Other scholars note that, during Kennedy’s first months in office, Khrushchev tested the new President’s resolve by sending various proposals and examining Kennedy’s reactions (Fursenko and Naftali 1997, 79; Taubman 2003, 485). During this time, Kennedy’s position on Berlin vacillated considerably, switching from “conciliation to militancy” and back again (Bechloss 1991, 149). Despite Kennedy’s public hardline stance on Berlin, the President was flexible in private discussions (Taubman 2003, 488). Declassified Soviet documents indicate this behavior was interpreted as irresolute by

²¹ Khrushchev would repeatedly harp on Kennedy’s youth through the President’s tenure.

Khrushchev, who privately stated his belief that the new President was unwilling to stand up to the Soviets: "I remain almost certain that the Western powers will not start a war if we [the Soviets] sign a peace treaty with the GDR" (N. Khrushchev and Ulbricht 1960). In a private letter to East German President Walter Ulbricht, however, Khrushchev stated his intention to gather more information regarding Kennedy's policy positions before taking action (N. Khrushchev 1961a). Overall, Kennedy sent early mixed signals regarding his resolve, which suggested to Khrushchev that the President may be hesitant in his commitment to Berlin.

6.3.2 Kennedy: The Bay of Pigs

The first formative test of Kennedy's resolve came with the Bay of Pigs incident. Although the operation did not directly involve the Soviet Union, Kennedy's handling of the situation did affect Khrushchev's perception of the President's resolve. The island had been an issue of contention during the Eisenhower administration, and Kennedy had publicly signaled the strategic importance of the island to his national security policy (see Kudryavtsev 1961; Mao and Roca Calderio 1960). In October 1960, Eisenhower imposed a partial economic embargo on Cuba and remained undeterred by Khrushchev's assertive statements over the maneuver (Department of State 1958-1960). Accordingly Khrushchev and his advisors anticipated Cuba would also be a priority for Kennedy and were unsurprised when the President increased the embargo restrictions

against the island upon taking office. Unlike Eisenhower, however, Kennedy's actions during the Bay of Pigs operation were rooted in indecisiveness.

On 17 April 1961, the U.S. sent over 1000 Cuban exiles to land at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. After the operation quickly went sour, Kennedy declined to send reinforcements or rescue those exiles that had survived. Khrushchev attributed the failure of the Bay of Pigs directly to Kennedy and warned the President in multiple private letters that actions against Cuba would not be tolerated by the Soviets (N. Khrushchev 1961c; see also N. Khrushchev 1961g):

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, there should be no mistake about our position: We will render the Cuban people and their government all necessary help to repel armed attack on Cuba. We are sincerely interested in a relaxation of international tension, but if others proceed toward sharpening, we will answer them in full measure.

Furthermore, Khrushchev was surprised that Kennedy would approve the U.S.-sponsored invasion yet withdraw support for the mission in the middle of its execution. Even more so, Khrushchev assumed Kennedy would quickly strike again in Cuba, yet Kennedy did nothing (Taubman 2003, 533). Khrushchev was baffled by these actions, stating "I don't understand Kennedy. Perhaps he lacks determination" (quoted in S. Khrushchev 2000, 436).

Other scholars note that Kennedy's failure to act decisively laid the foundations for a reputation for irresolute action as the failure in Cuba left the President looking both indecisive and irresolute (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 89; Department of State 1961d; Frankel 2004, 50). Directly after the incident, Khrushchev described Kennedy as

inexperienced and easily pushed around (Taubman 2003, 495). Even Kennedy and his advisors were aware of his new reputation as the President blamed himself for the failure of the operation and expressed concern over how he would be perceived by Khrushchev (Pious 2008, 35; Schlesinger 1965, 44). Kennedy further worried that his failure to act decisively in Cuba would lead to tougher behavior by the Soviets in future interactions (Bechloss 1991, 143-144; Department of State 1961d). Indeed, I find that Kennedy's actions during the Bay of Pigs fiasco and his accompanying reputation for irresolute action did guide Khrushchev's behavior in future negotiations. While Khrushchev was unsure how to approach Kennedy prior to the incident, afterwards Khrushchev took a strongly aggressive tone towards Kennedy in their private communications (see N. Khrushchev 1961c; Smyser 2009, 34). Kennedy's newly minted reputation would be particularly influential on Khrushchev's strategy towards the upcoming Vienna Summit.

Khrushchev's early perceptions of Kennedy's resolve provide key insight into the extent to which leaders can develop independent reputations for resolve. Prior to taking office, Khrushchev looked to Kennedy's statements, senatorial actions, and personal characteristics to predict the new President's approach to negotiations. He did not, however, focus on state characteristics, state history, or the actions of previous leaders in his early assessments of Kennedy. Prior to the Bay of Pigs, Khrushchev relied heavily on Kennedy's public statements, but did not assume the new President would

be resolute like his predecessor. Nor did he assume Kennedy would be irresolute based on that fact that he came from a different party than Eisenhower. Khrushchev did, however, hope the Kennedy would be less resolute than Nixon would be. Regarding Kennedy's behavior at the Bay of Pigs, the President communicated Cuba was strategically important to the U.S. by increasing embargo restrictions against the island, and this combined with his public statements confirming the importance of Cuba led to the expectation that the President would act decisively. However, Kennedy's behavior resulted in a reputation for irresolute act. This demonstrates that, while challenger leaders may rely on a target leader's statements or actions prior to taking office to gather clues about that leader's resolve, this information will be replaced by an individual's statements and behavior after assuming power when making assessments of the target leader's resolve

6.3.3 Kennedy: The Vienna Summit

The Vienna Summit of June 1961 was the first time Khrushchev and Kennedy met directly to discuss key foreign policy issues, most notably the continued crisis in Berlin. The Vienna Summit also marked the first test of Kennedy's resolve after the Bay of Pigs, and Khrushchev's strategy at the summit was based on his newly minted perceptions of Kennedy's lack of resolve. Other scholars note that Khrushchev jumped at the opportunity to meet the young President face-to-face, prematurely replying to the summit invitation despite the six month pause Khrushchev said he would impose on

high-level negotiations (Burridge 2011, 47; see also Broderick 1998). At a Presidium meeting less than two weeks before Vienna, Khrushchev expressed his intention to pressure Kennedy on Berlin, insisting that the weakness the President showed during the Bay of Pigs needed to be thoroughly exploited to the Soviets' advantage (Taubman 2003, 495). Khrushchev was confident that his tactics of intimidation and threats would be successful as he thought Kennedy would not put up any real fight: "The risk that we are taking is justified; there is a more than 95 percent possibility that there will be no war" (quoted in Smyser 2009, 59). In addition, Khrushchev publicly stated directly prior to the Summit that Kennedy and the Western powers were afraid of losing their "prestige" over Berlin (N. Khrushchev 1961d). Furthermore, Khrushchev believed he could force Kennedy to concede on Berlin as he decided Kennedy had acted so irresolutely at the Bay of Pigs out of fear of retaliation in Berlin (Dobrynin 1995, 44). This gave Khrushchev the strong impression that Kennedy would be unlikely to use nuclear weapons to fulfill American commitments in Germany (Bechloss 1991, 177). Accordingly, his strategy going into Vienna was to "exert as much pressure as possible on Kennedy" (Dobrynin 1995, 45).

To make matters more difficult for the President, Kennedy seemed to lack a coherent policy on Berlin. Initially, Kennedy stated he would pursue a "zero-point policy," breaking with the previous administration's position and effectively starting over with negotiations. Later, however, Kennedy indicated that he would follow his

predecessor's policy of strong commitment to Germany, the stance he pursued at Vienna (Burridge 2011, 28). In response, Khrushchev stated his disappointment and "regret" with the continuation of Eisenhower's policy (Department of State 1961c; see also N. Khrushchev 1961h). Despite the continuation of the previous administration's approach, American analysts believed Khrushchev viewed Kennedy as more flexible on the issues than Eisenhower had been (Department of State 1961c; see also S. Khrushchev 2004).

Although Kennedy ultimately spoke a hardline going into the summit, the President's change in policy and other actions signaled he was unwilling to accept the costs necessary to pursue tough policies (Fursenko and Naftali 1997, 130; Gelb 1986, 79-80; N. Khrushchev 1961b; Ulbricht 1961b). At a speech in Moscow during this time, while Khrushchev declared Kennedy had "essentially threatened [the Soviets] with war" if the Soviets signed a separate peace treaty with East Germany, in the same speech he expressed his intention to move forward with the peace treaty: "It is now time to occupy ourselves with the simultaneous and immediate preparation for the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR so as to implement this step if the Western powers do not give up their negative position" (N. Khrushchev 1961b). This indicates that Khrushchev did not take Kennedy's position on the GDR seriously and did not believe the President was truly willing to risk war over the issue. As Kennedy was continuing his predecessor's hardline policies, one may expect his reputation to be similar to that of Eisenhower; yet the two were viewed differently in their resolve on the issue. It was

Kennedy's actions, not his statements, which Khrushchev focused on as he believed Kennedy would be less resolute than Eisenhower.

During negotiations at Vienna, Khrushchev warned Kennedy that the Soviets would take decisive action on Berlin if a resolution was not met by the end of the summit (Department of State 1961b; 1961c). This hardline strategy culminated in Khrushchev's second Berlin Ultimatum of 7 June 1961 in which he threatened to sign a separate peace agreement with East Germany, cut Western access to Berlin, and use force against the U.S. if necessary (Burridge 2011, 59). In an effort to convince Khrushchev of his resolve on Berlin, Kennedy famously responded that it would be a "cold winter." Despite Kennedy's harsh statements at the end of the summit, Khrushchev remained doubtful Kennedy would risk war over the issue (Dobrynin 1995, 46; Taubman 2003, 766). Afterwards, Khrushchev stated he was glad for the frank discussions at Vienna, but believed he had maintained the upper hand over Kennedy, cautioning the President that it was policy, not rhetoric, that was most important (N. Khrushchev 1961d; 1961e; S. Khrushchev 2000, 436).²² Furthermore in a public televised address, Khrushchev publicly reiterated his willingness to defend Soviet interests against Western forces if necessary: "The Soviet Union is against the use of force in relations between states. We are for peaceful settlement of issues between states.

²² This particular response could also be interpreted as being driven by Khrushchev's concerns over his own prestige, rather than a timely assessment of the President's resolve.

Nevertheless, we are in a position to meet any resort to force with a fitting repulse, and we have the means to defend our interests" (N. Khrushchev 1961d).

The President later lamented Khrushchev's aggressive and unrelenting tactics at Vienna (Smyser 2009, xiv), blaming himself for the way he was treated by Khrushchev: "I think he thought that anyone who was so young and inexperienced as to get into that mess [the Bay of Pigs] could be taken....And anyone who got into it and didn't see it through had no guts" (quoted in Frankel 2004, 51-52). Indeed, Kennedy had previously developed a reputation for being irresolute, and it would require firm action, not just statements, to alter this perception. While Kennedy stood firm at the end of the summit, his actions early during negotiations at Vienna reinforced his pre-established reputation. His failure to present himself as tough and decisive at the beginning of the summit undermined his later attempts to verbally demonstrate his resolve. As a result of this failure and Khrushchev's accompanying behavior towards the President, Kennedy sought to decisively and effectively demonstrate his resolve over Berlin.

6.3.4 Kennedy: The Berlin Crisis

In his immediate response to the Berlin Ultimatum, the President informed Khrushchev that the U.S. would be willing to use nuclear weapons to protect West Berlin (Bechloss 1991, 256). Earlier that same year, Khrushchev was advised that Kennedy would not consent to a treaty accepting two German states and was unlikely to waiver in this position (Pervukhin 1961a). However, Kennedy had also expressed

dissatisfaction with the near constant flow of refugees entering the West through Berlin. Kennedy and his administration were particularly concerned with growing discontent among these refugees and believed that “unilateral East German action” would carry strong “advantages” for the American position (Thompson 1961). While failing to take action could injure America’s “prestige and influence in Germany,” Kennedy’s advisors cautioned that “the U.S. should not do anything...to exacerbate the situation” (Ausland 1961).

At the same time, Kennedy became increasingly concerned with the potential Soviet response to the refugee problem. The administration concluded that the large flow of refugees out of East Germany would be disastrous and unsustainable for the East German economy (Central Intelligence Agency 1961c; Koczak 1961). Furthermore, Kennedy and his administration considered a settlement with the Soviets on Berlin “extremely difficult, if not impossible to obtain” (Thompson 1961). While he remained skeptical that Khrushchev would risk war over the issue, Kennedy and his advisors believed it was of utmost importance to find an immediate peaceful settlement to the Berlin problem (Central Intelligence Agency 1961a; Department of State 1961e). The administration was quick to prioritize these issues and form a strategy to deal with Berlin (Department of State 1961e):

Our real vital interests, the Secretary [Rusk] said, were (1) the Western presence in West Berlin and (2) our physical access to the city with a view to sustaining not only our military forces but also the life and liberty of the civilian population of the city. In everything that Khrushchev has said so far, one can find a certain vagueness which still justifies us in believing that he may not intend directly to

attack the vital interests of the West. It is not too late to assume that he is still open to negotiation on many points which affect those interests. In the nuclear age, war, though it may well occur, can no longer be a deliberate instrument of national policy, and peaceful settlement of issues such as Berlin is now essential. Furthermore, Kennedy's advisors predicted Khrushchev would either "call for a showdown on Berlin" or do something decisive to slow the flow of refugees (Rusk 1961; see also Central Intelligence Agency 1961b).

Other scholars note that, while it remained in the best interests of the U.S. for the Soviets to take unilateral action, this view could not be publicly declared. Rather, Kennedy publicly threatened action over the construction of a wall separating the two Berlins, but privately suggested this may be an acceptable solution (Frankel 2004, 52). Indeed, I find strong evidence supporting this finding. Such signals led Khrushchev to believe that Kennedy simply wanted the "consolidation of the economic" problem (CPSU CC 1962e). Accordingly, Khrushchev expressed his doubt Kennedy that would be willing to risk war over the issue during a meeting of the Central Committee: "I say once again with regard to a peace treaty [on Germany], that I believe there would be no war" (CPSU CC 1962e). East German President Walter Ulbricht also pushed Khrushchev to solve the refugee issue, and Khrushchev agreed that a wall dividing Berlin would be both feasible and agreeable to the Americans. By early July 1961, plans were underway regarding the appropriate steps to close the border effectively and prevent a "mass exodus of the population to West Germany" (Pervukhin 1961b).

While Kennedy publicly pledged to defend West Berlin, Soviet and East German leaders did not believe Kennedy was resolute, as evidenced by Ulbricht's public declaration at a speech in Moscow: "We cannot trust the words of assurance about unity and resolve used in the notes of the Western powers" (Ulbricht 1961b; see also N. Khrushchev 1961b). Furthermore, televised statements by Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee William Fulbright on 3 August 1961 supported this perception as Fulbright stated it would not be illegal for the East Germans to close their border (Department of State 1961a). Khrushchev reiterated his belief to the Central Committee that the U.S. was afraid of the situation in Berlin coming to a head, stating that "if the border is closed, the Americans and West Germany will be satisfied" (CPSU CC 1961). Khrushchev strongly believed that Kennedy would not use force if the border was closed, writing in a report to the Central Committee that Kennedy was highly "inclined to seek a solution to the German problem" (N. Khrushchev 1961f, 52).

On the American side, the Kennedy administration recognized the situation was a "source of embarrassment to Khrushchev" that had weakened the Soviet bargaining position (Central Intelligence Agency 1961c). The President had increasingly little doubt that Khrushchev would take decisive action over Berlin. In this regard, Kennedy and his advisors came to believe that it was better to allow the Soviets to "bear full responsibility rather than agreeing even indirectly" to a border closing (Thompson 1961). While

Kennedy and his advisors did not express this view publicly, leaders within West Berlin began to worry that both the Americans and the British may have been willing to make “damaging compromises” on the state of Berlin to settle the issue (Central Intelligence Agency 1961a).

6.3.5 Kennedy: The Berlin Wall

On 13 August 1961, the Soviets closed the border and began construction of the Berlin Wall. Internal CIA documents called the move a “fait accompli” and noted that such behavior was to be “anticipated” (Lightner 1961). Other scholars note that immediate public action from the Kennedy administration was sparse, so much so that the administration was harshly criticized by its allies in Berlin (Smyser 2009, 113-114).²³ My archival research supports this finding. A private note from Kennedy to Khrushchev on 17 August in response to the Wall called the closing off of East Berlin a “flagrant and particularly serious violation of the quadripartite status of Berlin” that could “increase existing tensions and dangers” (Department of State 1961f). However, Kennedy neither pushed the Soviets further nor threatened American action if the situation was not changed. In his speech to the United Nations after construction on the wall began, Kennedy asserted the West’s resolve to protect Berlin, but also stressed the possibility of a peaceful settlement to the issue (J. Kennedy 1961b). After consulting with his advisors,

²³ In contrast, Davis (2000) argues that Kennedy purposely employed a strategy of “concession” to “deter further Soviet action against Berlin (20). McCalla (1974), however, argues that the Americans were unsure of what to do in response to the Berlin Wall, particularly considering the refugee issue, and so allowed for the completion of the wall due to the lack of acceptable policy alternatives.

Kennedy called for an additional battle group. These reinforcements arrived in West Berlin on August 23 (Smyser 2009, 120), and tensions finally came to a head at the famous Checkpoint Charlie standoff.²⁴

Despite the showdown, Kennedy's response to the Berlin Wall did not dramatically alter Khrushchev's perception of the President. Kennedy's delayed reaction and seemingly weak diplomatic statements in the days following the closing of the border appear to have reinforced his reputation for indecisive action. While Kennedy called up troops and supported the showdown at Checkpoint Charlie, Khrushchev maintained his belief that Kennedy was unwilling to risk war over the issue and would pull back American tanks if the Soviets showed signs of doing so as well (N. Khrushchev 1970). Ulbricht also expressed surprise by the U.S. response and the lack of "countermeasures" pursued against the Soviets after the wall was built (Ulbricht 1961a). Although the wall helped to avoid immediate and direct conflict over Berlin (Trojanovski 1998), Khrushchev stated the issue remained a "bone in the throat" that bothered Kennedy (CPSU CC 1962b) and doubted Kennedy had the courage to settle the issue with force (Kempe 2011, 493; Kohler 1962). In Khrushchev's view, Kennedy did little to either prevent the building of the wall or quickly demonstrate his resolve in the days following the border closing. Khrushchev expected a stronger public stand from

²⁴ While Kennedy was the first to call for a compromise, Khrushchev was also eager to end the standoff (Zubok and Pleshakov 1996, 257).

the President despite backdoor negotiations. In fact, a leading Soviet expert within the State Department would later assert that Kennedy's lack of early decisive response to the Berlin Wall reinforced Khrushchev's perception of Kennedy's lack of resolve and encouraged the Soviets to later place missiles in Cuba (Smyser 2009, 114).

6.3.6 Kennedy: The Cuban Missile Crisis

Kennedy's reputation for irresolute action would carry through to the early stages of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Going into the crisis, Kennedy was aware of his poor reputation, believing that Khrushchev thought him to be "spineless" (Frankel 2004, 75). The President was deeply troubled by his earlier actions as well as his treatment by Khrushchev at Vienna and was increasingly anxious to communicate his resolve. Later in the crisis, Khrushchev and his advisors would interpret Kennedy's behavior as a response to his poor showing in Vienna, asserting the President's actions were driven by a desire to return to the status-quo which had been damaged by both Kennedy's performance in Vienna and the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba (Dobrynin 1962b; 1962d). Furthermore, Khrushchev's advisors repeated this belief in Kennedy's lack of resolve, citing Kennedy's own concern that he "will not be able to prove to Americans in time [for reelection] his ability to make agreements and reconcile continuous questions about the Soviet Union" (CPSU CC 1962a). Indeed, Kennedy had developed a robust reputation for irresolute action and was actively working to alter Khrushchev's perception of his resolve. Yet despite perceiving Kennedy as irresolute, Khrushchev

remained convinced that the President would take action in Cuba, particularly after the failure of the Bay of Pigs (Alekseev 1962; CPSU CC 1962a; Dobbs 2008, 46; Lebow and Stein 1994, 31; Schechter and Luchkov 1990, 172).

Previous scholars have argued that the expectation of future action in Cuba by Kennedy explains why Khrushchev placed the missiles secretly rather than publicly (Lebow and Stein 1994, 5). In this interpretation, Khrushchev was concerned about Kennedy's potential action in Cuba. In contrast, other scholars argue that Soviet decision-makers, including Khrushchev, believed that Kennedy's response to the missiles would not be severe and that this perception was based on Kennedy's past actions (George and Smoke 1974; McCalla 1992). Indeed, I find evidence suggesting that Khrushchev received conflicting signals as to how Kennedy would act in Cuba and based his expectations of Kennedy's response to the missiles on the President's past behavior. Kennedy's failure at the Bay of Pigs led Khrushchev to believe the President would take further action in Cuba, yet the President's behavior during previous disputes indicated a pattern of irresolute action. Despite American military power, strategic interest in the island, and the ability to respond forcefully to Soviet action in the region (N. Khrushchev 1962), Khrushchev pursued his plan to place missiles in Cuba.

While Khrushchev believed Kennedy would take a stand against this action, as evidenced in part by his decision to sneak the missiles into the island, he did not believe that Kennedy would take a tough and decisive position. Most notably, Khrushchev

firmly believed that the operation would be successful, directly stating his confidence to the Central Committee: "I think we can win this operation" (CPSU CC 1962f). In addition, Khrushchev doubted the President's ability to be a decisive leader stating that Kennedy "can neither stand up to the American public, nor can he lead them" (Kremlin Decision Making Project 2003). Khrushchev was so confident in his assessment that Kennedy would not risk war over Cuba that the Premier had "no fall back plan" in the event Kennedy did put forth a strong showing of resolve in response to the missiles (Dobrynin 1995, 79). While Khrushchev was convinced Kennedy would take some type of action in Cuba, he believed that by acting first the Soviets could prey upon Kennedy's previously demonstrated lack of resolve during crisis situations and use this to their advantage. In this regard, Khrushchev's beliefs echoed the President's actions in response to the Berlin Wall, which were perceived as delayed and not particularly tough. Even more so, an October 23 memo from Dobrynin to the Soviet Foreign Ministry is particularly telling regarding assessments of Kennedy's reputation for resolve prior to the crisis. Regarding Kennedy's blockade, Dobrynin (1962d) stated:

Kennedy apparently believes that a further demonstration by the United States of indecisiveness and lack of will to risk a war with the Soviet Union for the sake of its positions would unavoidably lead to an even quicker and more serious undermining of their position around the globe.

Kennedy clearly went into the Cuban Missile Crisis with a reputation for irresolute action. It would take persistent communication of the President's resolve through deliberate action for Khrushchev to alter his perception of Kennedy's resolve.²⁵

From the beginning of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy worked to consistently demonstrate his resolve.²⁶ The President asserted he would use any force necessary to protect the U.S. against Cuban and Soviet aggression and implemented an "unyielding" blockade of the island (Dobrynin 1962c; see also Alekseev 1962). Despite these actions, Khrushchev remained skeptical that Kennedy was willing to accept any real costs over the issue. In particular, the Premier doubted the resolve of Kennedy's blockade: "Our ships...headed straight through the armada of the American navy but the Americans didn't try to stop our ships or even check them. We kept in mind that as long as the United States limited itself to threatening gestures and didn't actually touch us, we could afford to pretend to ignore the harassment" (N. Khrushchev 1970, 496). This doubt was fueled by both Kennedy's previous actions and the mixed messages the administration sent to the Soviets during the early part of the crisis. Khrushchev and his advisors were told repeatedly by both President Kennedy and his subordinates that the U.S. did not intend to attack Cuba (CPSU CC 1962a). At the same time, the President

²⁵ In examining American decision-making during the crisis, Press (2005) finds that the Americans based their information search solely on issues of power and interest. In contrast, I find that on the Soviet side, Khrushchev did rely on Kennedy's past behavior to make judgments about how the President would act during the crisis.

²⁶ Indeed, other scholars argue that American actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis were driven by concerns over reputation for resolve (Lebow 2008; Lebow and Stein 1994).

warned Khrushchev that the situation was the “most dangerous since the end of the Second World War” (Gromyko 1962a). During the first week of the crisis, Khrushchev and his advisors remained uncertain as to whether Kennedy would launch an invasion, even after the implementation of the blockade (Dobrynin 1962a). They believed Cuba to be a “political problem, not a problem of security for the USA; thus, political, economic, and other means are needed to solve it rather than military” (Dobrynin 1962f).

Khrushchev did not update his assessment of Kennedy’s resolve until after the crisis was well-underway. Internal Kremlin documents show that it was not until after 22-23 October 1962 and Kennedy’s public declaration regarding U.S. action against the Soviet missiles (J. Kennedy 1962b), that Khrushchev finally became convinced Kennedy was seriously willing to act on the missiles in Cuba. At a Central Committee meeting during this time, Khrushchev finally expressed his belief in the seriousness of American action: “The USA has set out on the path of preparing and unleashing a third world war” (CPSU CC 1962g; see also CPSU CC 1962c). On 25 October, Khrushchev confirmed his belief in Kennedy’s resolve stating to the Central Committee that, while Kennedy was “frightened,” he believed the President was willing to resort to force if provoked: “If we fire, they will also fire” (CPSU CC 1962h). As such, he suggested the Soviets “should not inflame the situation and should conduct a reasonable policy” (CPSU CC 1962h). On 27 October, Dobrynin echoed Khrushchev’s analysis, indicating Kennedy was demonstrating his “determination to achieve at any price the liquidation of the missile

emplacements in Cuba with the aim of putting on that issue the maximum pressure on us and on Cuba" (Dobrynin 1962e). Similarly in other Soviet communications, Kennedy was described during this period of the crisis as "a hot-tempered gambler" that "has put at stake his reputation as a statesman and politician" (Dobrynin 1962a). In an effort to make the best of the situation, Khrushchev tried to negotiate a "quid-pro-quo" settlement, but Kennedy sternly communicated through his subordinates that if the Soviets "did not remove the bases, [the Americans] would remove them" (R. Kennedy 1962).

Private communications between the two statesmen further demonstrate Khrushchev's late change in assessment of Kennedy's resolve. Early letters from Khrushchev to Kennedy reveal a combative and boisterous Khrushchev who blatantly challenged the President by warning him of the potential consequences of U.S. action. In response, Kennedy warned Khrushchev not to underestimate the "will and determination of the United States" (J. Kennedy 1962a). Other scholars find that as the crisis continued, however, Khrushchev's tone changed to become more open to negotiation and finding a peaceful resolution to the crisis (Frankel 2004, 120). My research reveals similar findings. Even in private discussions with members of the Central Committee, Khrushchev's tone became increasingly conciliatory once he changed his assessment of Kennedy's resolve. During Central Committee meetings, Khrushchev was originally boisterous and derisive of Kennedy and his motives, but

later questioned whether the Soviets made a mistake by putting the missiles in Cuba and spoke of Kennedy with less contempt: "I think that we should not be obstinate. Did we commit a mistake or not? This can be assessed later on" (CPSU CC 1962i). Furthermore, towards the end of the crisis Khrushchev became willing to damage the Soviet relationship with Cuba in order to secure an agreement with Kennedy (Mikoyan 1962). After the crisis, Khrushchev expressed frustration over his own actions by suggesting that if the Soviet Union had presented a stronger threat earlier during the crisis, the President would have capitulated: "We wanted to intimidate and restrain the USA vis-à-vis Cuba. The difficult thing is that we did not concentrate everything that we wanted and did not publish the treaty" (CPSU CC 1962g; see also CPSU CC 1962d). Indeed, assessments mid-way through the crisis suggest the Soviets thought Kennedy did not believe Khrushchev would "respond with military actions directly against the USA itself or by delivering a blow to their positions in West Berlin" (Dobrynin 1962d).

Khrushchev's change in perception of Kennedy's resolve was not just linked to the President's actions, but was also based on the communicated strategic importance of Cuba to American security.²⁷ Early during the crisis, Kennedy's public statements placed the trouble brewing in Cuba within the context of the disagreement over Berlin. In a

²⁷ Other scholars have argued that it was the American military buildup combined with Khrushchev's assessment of the President as resolute that led to the end of the crisis (see McCalla 1992, 160-165 for an overview). However, I find little evidence for this line of argument as I did not find reference to the American military buildup or American military power by Khrushchev. Instead, America's interest in the dispute was communicated by Kennedy's words, not by his military actions.

closed conference on 16 October, Dobrynin reported that Kennedy described Berlin as a “vitally important issue for both sides,” and suggested that Cuba was important due to its connection to Berlin (Dobrynin 1962b; see also Gromyko 1962b). Accordingly, Cuba was believed to be of secondary importance and “not the main issue for the USA” as the “West Berlin issue at present remains the sharpest and most fraught with dangers” (Dobrynin 1962a). In statements later during the crisis, the President put greater emphasis on the importance of Cuba to American national security: “President Kennedy considers that issue very important, that it carries great significance for the USA, since it concerns the security of the Western hemisphere” (Gromyko 1962c). Furthermore, Soviet interpretations of Kennedy’s actions during the crisis emphasized the importance of the crisis to the President’s 1964 re-election campaign, which the Soviets believed to be a strong motivator of Kennedy’s crisis behavior. Kennedy publicly staked his domestic foreign policy reputation on his actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis and “largely engaged himself before the public opinion of America and not only America,” putting his “prospects for re-election in 1964” at stake (Dobrynin 1962a; see also Dobrynin 1962d). The timing of these statements both regarding the importance of Cuba to national security and Kennedy’s re-election concerns coincide with Khrushchev’s change in perception of Kennedy’s resolve around 22 October. It was not until the President both consistently demonstrated his resolve throughout the crisis and communicated the issue was a top priority for the U.S. that Khrushchev updated his

perception of Kennedy's resolve. This supports my primary hypothesis: Individuals leaders can develop reputations for resolve independently of the state. These reputations will be based on a leader's statements and behavior while in office (H₁). Reputations will be robust and resistant to change once established (H₈). It will take a consistent strong showing of resolve on an issue communicated to be of high interest to the target to alter an established reputation (H₉).

By the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy was able to dramatically alter his reputation for resolve. Afterwards, Khrushchev described Kennedy as "sober-minded" and strong yet not reckless (N. Khrushchev 1970, 500). Kennedy demonstrated his resolve so firmly that Khrushchev became flustered and "did not play the one good card in his hand – Kennedy's agreement to withdraw U.S. missiles from Turkey" (Dobrynin 1995, 79). Furthermore, Khrushchev and his advisors became concerned that the Kennedy administration believed they had won the crisis so decisively that the Americans would try to renege on their agreed to concessions and commitments (CPSU CC 1962j). As other scholars highlight, it is important to note that the crisis was not ameliorated solely by Kennedy's demonstration of resolve. Rather, it was a combination of factors on both sides that led to the peaceful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis, including compromises by Kennedy and Khrushchev as well as both leaders' commitment to a peaceful resolution (Lebow and Stein 1994, 144). In addition, Khrushchev also altered his characterization of Kennedy on a personal level. After the

crisis and until the President's untimely death, Khrushchev extolled Kennedy as a very strong politician and expressed his utmost respect for the man (S. Khrushchev 1998; Schechter and Luchkov 1990). Even more so, other scholars note that Khrushchev was impressed by Kennedy's demonstration of both resolve and constraint (Lebow and Stein 1994, 145). This reinforces the notion that a reputation for resolve is more than just a reputation for militancy.

The evolution of Kennedy's reputation for resolve provides support for my primary hypotheses regarding reputation development. Kennedy emerged from the Bay of Pigs with a reputation for irresolute action, which he actively worked to alter. Realizing his reputation, Kennedy tried to put on a strong showing at the Vienna Summit, where his reputation for irresolute action was reinforced due to his vacillation over Berlin. During the Berlin Crisis and the building of the Berlin Wall, Kennedy again tried to convey his resolve. Despite a strong diplomatic presence and supporting the Checkpoint Charlie showdown, Kennedy's reputation for resolve remained unaltered, due primarily to the private signals he sent the Soviets prior to the creation of the wall. Even after a clearly resolute early showing against the Soviet implementation of missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev remained doubtful of Kennedy's resolve. It was not until halfway through the Cuban Missile Crisis that Khrushchev finally became convinced Kennedy was resolute. In the end, Kennedy reversed his reputation for irresolute action, but only

after a consistent demonstration of resolve on a policy issue that he communicated was of utmost importance to American national security.

6.4 Reputation for Whom? Discussion and Implications

Evidence from the Khrushchev Crises indicates that individual leaders can acquire reputations for resolve independently of the states they serve as both Eisenhower and Kennedy developed individual reputations for resolve.²⁸ Where did Khrushchev look for information to determine if each president would act resolutely? In accordance with my primary hypothesis, Khrushchev sought out leader-based information when making assessments of both Eisenhower's and Kennedy's resolve. In making these judgments, Khrushchev's perceptions were based on the actions and statements of each individual president. Furthermore, reference points for each leader's resolve were located temporally within each administration. In other words, and in contrast to state-centric theories of resolve, Khrushchev did not rely on the past actions of the U.S. to predict the resolve of each president. Even when he had little and highly uncertain information about how the president would behave, Khrushchev relied on statements and other individual-level indicators in predicting resolve. This is most notable in Khrushchev's early analysis of Kennedy. Rather than assuming Kennedy would be similar to (or different from) Eisenhower in his resolve, Khrushchev looked to

²⁸ Khrushchev would even later compare the two directly in this regard (Khrushchev 2004, 297).

Kennedy's campaign statements and senatorial records to make early judgments about the incoming president's future behavior.

Even more so, evidence from this case study suggests that these perceptions of resolve are not perfectly updated. Instead, early assessments of resolve are highly influential on the development of a leader's reputation. Once Khrushchev formed a judgment regarding each president's resolve it was difficult to alter this perception. This is most striking in the development and change of President Kennedy's reputation. Khrushchev initially received mixed signals as to how Kennedy would act once in office. However, a reputation for irresolute action was quickly solidified after the botched Bay of Pigs invasion. While Kennedy repeatedly tried to alter his reputation, Khrushchev's perception of the President as irresolute remained robust until midway through the Cuban Missile Crisis. It was not until Kennedy demonstrated his resolve on an issue he clearly communicated to be a high priority that his reputation changed. Similarly, Eisenhower developed a strong reputation for resolute action fortified by his response to the Berlin Ultimatum which persisted throughout his presidency. His reputation was so robust that Khrushchev gave up on negotiations after the Paris Summit, waiting instead to open further discussions once a new president was elected.

As mentioned above, other factors do appear to contribute to the development of a reputation for resolve. Most notably the communicated level of state interest over an issue can affect leader reputations in a manner consistent with my hypothesis. In his

examination of American decision-making during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Press (2005) finds that the Americans based their information search and assessments of Soviet credibility on issues of power and interest to determine how the Soviets would act during the crisis. Based upon this evidence, and other case studies, Press concludes that a state's credibility during crises "is not driven by its past behavior but rather by power and interests" (2005, 1). In contrast, I find that while state interest is an important influence on reputations, this is not the driving factor behind reputation development. Instead, I find that state interest may interact with a leader's actions to affect the degree to which a reputation for resolve develops. When an issue is communicated to be of great strategic importance and the leader follows through with decisive action, the leader's reputation for resolve may be strongly reinforced or altered. This was the case with Eisenhower in Berlin after Geneva and with Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, if an issue is signaled to be of central importance and the leader does not act decisively, a reputation for irresolute action can be amplified. This was the case with Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs invasion. Even more so, Kennedy's reputation for resolve indicates that once a reputation for irresolute action is solidified, it requires consistent resolute action on an issue of significant strategic value and importance for that reputation to be altered. For example, it was not until Kennedy both consistently demonstrated his resolve *and* communicated that Cuba was the top priority for American national security that his reputation for resolve was altered.

Finally, this case study provides little support for other hypotheses drawn from the extant literature on reputation for resolve, particularly regarding dispositional vs. situational hypotheses (Mercer 1996). While Mercer argues that adversaries should only be able to develop reputations for resolute action, I find in this case study that target leaders may develop reputations for both resolute and irresolute actions. Even more so, reputations for irresolute action for these target leaders can be based on leader disposition, not the situational context. Kennedy's early reputation for irresolute action, in particular, was clearly viewed as a personal failing within his control and not based on external factors. While the development of each president's reputation was based on dispositional factors, Khrushchev's assessment of Eisenhower during the U-2 Crisis does suggest that situational context can play a role, but in unexpected ways. Most notably, the framing of an issue, such as one of statecraft or as personal, may affect the extent to which a reputation for resolve is relied upon to inform behavior.

In addition, I find some contrarian evidence to the hypothesis that an actor's type cannot be reinforced. Instead, assessments of resolve may deepen through repeated confirmation. Again, the development of Kennedy's reputation is exemplary in this regard. His early reputation for lacking resolve at the Bay of Pigs was repeatedly confirmed through the Vienna Summit and the Berlin Crisis. Accordingly, his reputation for irresolute action deepened and strengthened. However, it is difficult to fully discern from this analysis the exact extent to which his reputation was reinforced.

While my analysis focused on the extent to which leaders may be able to develop independent reputations rather than on the extent to which reputation affects behavior and crisis outcomes, Khrushchev used his perceptions of Eisenhower's and Kennedy's resolve to inform his strategic behavior towards each of the presidents. Most notably, Khrushchev based his strategy towards negotiations in Vienna on Kennedy's irresolute and indecisive actions during the Bay of Pigs. I do not, however, argue that such actions on the part of Khrushchev were based exclusively on Kennedy's reputation. Rather, as other scholars show, external environmental and contextual influences were also influential on Khrushchev's behavior. Most notably, internal Kremlin competition and Khrushchev's concern over his own reputation did inform the Premier's crisis behavior. Reputations do not exist in a vacuum and will interact with other variables to affect outcomes. While reputation may not directly affect crisis outcome in all instances, evidence from this case study indicates reputations certainly can inform the strategy and tactics used during negotiations and crises. Accordingly, scholars should be careful not to conflate the existence or influence of a reputation for resolve with crisis outcome and should focus instead on the effect of reputations on crisis behavior.

6.5 Conclusions

Through this case study, I have shown that individual leaders can develop independent reputations for resolve. Furthermore, I have suggested a process by which these reputations for resolve may develop that is supported by this case study. In

particular, I have demonstrated that when making assessments about an opponent's resolve, decision-makers rely on leader-based, not state-based, factors. Throughout this analysis, I focused on the primary leader for each state, the Soviet Premier and the American President. Khrushchev's perceptions of Eisenhower and Dulles at the Geneva Summit highlight a particularly interesting result in this regard. The observation that Khrushchev attributed U.S. actions at the summit to Dulles suggests that other high-level decision-makers, not just the primary leader, may develop reputations for resolve. More specifically, it appears that it is the actor which the perceiver believes to be the main arbiter of foreign policy decision-making that may develop a reputation.

This case study yields two further results that have strong implications for the study of reputations for resolve. First and in accordance with my argument from Chapter 2, reputations for resolve are not objective. An actor may think he has effectively communicated his resolve, but it is the interpretation of his actions by others that determines both reputation and the behavioral response to this reputation. Kennedy, in particular, clearly indicates this dynamic. The President was acutely aware of his reputation for irresolute action after the Bay of Pigs and, in response, repeatedly tried to demonstrate his resolve over Berlin at both the Vienna Summit and throughout the Berlin Crisis. While Kennedy attributed Khrushchev's tactics at Vienna to his poor reputation for resolve, American assessments of the Vienna Summit indicate the Kennedy administration genuinely believed they had communicated their resolve on the

issue. Likewise, Kennedy was confident he further demonstrated his resolve with his response to the Berlin Wall. In contrast, Khrushchev interpreted the President's actions during this period as lacking in resolve, in large part due to Kennedy's pre-existing reputation for irresolute action but also as a result of private communications and signals Kennedy sent regarding America's willingness to risk war over Berlin. Similarly, Kennedy believed he sternly communicated his resolve throughout the Cuban Missile Crisis, but it was not until midway through the crisis on October 22-23 that Khrushchev updated his assessment of the President's resolve. This again was in large part due to Kennedy's pre-existing reputation, but was also influenced by the unintentional mixed signals the administration sent the Soviets regarding their strategic interests and the priority of Cuba during this time.

Second, the foundation of reputation for resolve is laid through statements, but solidified by actions. In the cases of both Eisenhower and Kennedy, each president presented strong statements asserting their resolve on the Berlin issue. While Khrushchev took these statements seriously, each president's reputation was solidified through their actual behavior. In particular, face-to-face interactions during direct negotiations appear to carry more weight than other statements regarding the development of reputations for resolve. It is these interactions that lay the foundation for reputation for resolve which is then tested and solidified through direct crisis behavior. Furthermore, it is the perceptions that emerge from these less intense interactions that

can dictate tactics and strategy during crises. This result coupled with the finding that early interactions appear to carry more weight for reputation for resolve indicates that statesmen must be aware that their interactions are continually judged by their adversaries, even during non-crisis events (such as summit negotiations). As such, early showings of resolve (or lack of resolve) can quickly lead to accordant reputations.

7. Conclusions: The Development of Leader-Based Reputations for Resolve

In Chapter 2, I argued that leaders can develop reputations for resolve independently of the state and based on that leader's statements and actions while in office. I hypothesized that early interactions between two leaders will be most prominent in the development of these reputations due to the ways in which individuals access and process information. In the empirical chapters that followed, I thoroughly tested my theory of leader-based reputations against alternative hypotheses of reputation development through multiple methods, including two distinct experimental surveys, a statistical duration analysis, and a historical case study using process tracing methods. Overall, the results of these chapters provided consistent evidence for my theory regarding both the ability of leaders to develop reputations for resolve of their own and the process by which these reputations develop over time. In this final concluding chapter, I carefully put forth the evidence for each of the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2. In addition, I suggest avenues of future research based on the support (or lack of support) for each of these hypotheses. I then discuss the policy implications of my findings regarding the development of leader-based reputations for resolve. Finally, I conclude my dissertation by examining the scholarly implications of my theory of leader-based reputations for resolve.

7.1 Support for Hypotheses

The results of the empirical chapters indicate that, while some hypotheses put forth in Chapter 2 are strongly supported, there is little evidence for other hypotheses. Most notably, I find consistent evidence supporting my theory of the development of leader-based reputations for resolve. In addition, I find that certain state-based factors can also have an effect on these reputations. In the sections below, I discuss the evidence for each hypothesis put forth in the theory chapter, beginning with alternative hypotheses and concluding with the hypotheses derived from my Leader Interaction Theory of Reputation. During this discussion I also present relevant future research questions pertaining to each hypothesis.

7.1.1 State-Based Characteristics and Reputations for Resolve

Beginning with the state-based hypotheses, I find little evidence to support the argument that reputations for resolve will be attributed exclusively to states. In fact, as I will discuss further in the next section, I find repeated confirmation from each of the four empirical chapters that individual leaders are able to develop reputations for resolve independently of the state. However, it is also evident that state-based characteristics can have an impact on these perceptions of leader resolve. To begin, past state behavior may influence a leader's reputation for resolve (H₂). The results of the experiments indicate that a state history of resolute behavior can positively impact perceptions of a leader's resolve, and a state history of irresolute behavior can have a

negative influence on these perceptions. While the second set of experiments presented in Chapter 4 indicate that state past history has a significant effect on perceptions of leader resolve even when controlling for leader behavior, the first set of experiments presented in Chapter 3 suggest that the effect of state behavior is largely diminished once a leader's actions are included in the analysis. Turning to the duration analysis from Chapter 5, I find that state behavior during a crisis can have an effect on the risk of that state being the target of a future crisis. More specifically, I find that states which employ negotiation techniques rather than other non-militarized techniques or violent techniques are less vulnerable to future targeting. This may suggest that either a state's resolve in terms of war fighting may not matter for future crises or that state's may be able to develop reputations for resolve through non-violent actions. Future research is necessary to distinguish between these two pathways. Finally, the results of the case study in Chapter 6 suggest that it is leader behavior, not state behavior that determines a leader's reputation for resolve. When making determinations of the resolve of Eisenhower and Kennedy, Khrushchev looked to each president's statements and past actions, not to America's past behavior. Overall, while the evidence regarding the magnitude of the impact of state behavior on a leader's reputation for resolve is mixed, I conclude that state behavior has the ability to influence perceptions of leader resolve, but that leader behavior remains the driving force behind these reputations.

Furthermore, the results of the experimental work suggest states may be able to acquire their own reputations for resolve based on their behavior during past crises. This brings up important questions worthy of future research. First, at what point does a leader's reputation for resolve become part of a state's reputation for resolve? Once leaders leave office, it may be possible that their actions while in office contribute to their state's overall reputation. In other words, after a certain amount of time, a leader's history may become part of a state's history. Scholars should consider how this dynamic affects state reputation for resolve and the extent to which a leader's individual actions are able to affect these state-based reputations. Second, are both states and leaders able to have independent but concurrently held reputations for resolve? In Chapter 2, I put forth the possibility that both leaders and states may obtain reputations for resolve based on their behavior. The results from the statistical analysis, in particular, appear to support this notion as I find that the crisis behavior of both leaders and states can affect future crisis onset depending on the level of analysis used. However, while it may be possible for both states and leaders to develop reputations for resolve, I find through the case study that challenger leaders rely heavily on a target leader's reputation, not the state's reputation, when making assessments of resolve about the leader. This result may help explain the scholarly finding of why, even when states should develop reputations for resolve, these state-based reputations have little effect on international conflict. Instead, other factors may mitigate the direct effect state reputations have on the

outcome of international conflicts. Scholars, however, should more fully research the potential for concurrent reputations for resolve and further analyze the conditions under which the reputation of a leader or state is more influential to international behavior.

I next turn to the hypothesis that reputations for resolve will be based on communicated state interest over the issue under dispute (H₅). Overall, I find some support for the hypothesis that state interest alone can be influential on perceptions of leader resolve. In particular, the results of both experiments indicate that, by itself, high state interest has a positive effect on perceptions of resolve, while low state interest has a negative effect on a leader's reputation for resolve. While the results of the second set of experiments show that state interest is a significant factor on perceptions of resolve even when controlling for leader behavior, the first set of experiments suggest that these effects are largely diminished once accounting for leader action. Similarly, the statistical duration analysis finds that the gravity of the issue at stake does not have a consistent effect on future crisis onset. This conflicting evidence indicates that, once accounting for leader behavior, communicated state interest may not be as significant to the development of reputations for resolve as other scholars find (see Clare and Danilovic 2012 and Press 2005). However, evidence from the case study suggests that it is the interaction between a leader's behavior and communicated state interest which is most influential for perceptions of resolve. This result is discussed more fully in the next section, as it is one of the primary hypotheses of my theory of leader-based reputations.

I also find conflicting evidence as to the effect of relative military capability on these reputations. According to the findings of previous scholars (see Press 2005), a state's ability to carry out its threats or promises should be the driving factor behind reputations. As such, target states with a relatively stronger military should be viewed as more resolute, while states with a relatively weaker military should be viewed as less resolute (H₆). The results of the two experiments suggest that relative military capability has little consistent effect on perceptions of leader resolve. The effects of relative military capability, for the first set of experiments in particular, are highly dependent on a leader's behavior. The results of the second set of experiments also indicate there may be an interaction effect between a leader's behavior and the state's relative military capability, although the magnitude and direction of this effect remains unclear. Scholars may want to examine this potential interaction effect more closely in future studies. In addition, the results of the duration analysis indicate that it is the major power status of the challenger which is important for future crisis onset, not the relative capability of the target to the challenger. Finally, the case study finds little direct evidence to support the notion that reputation will be based on relative military capability. In particular, Khrushchev made few references to the relative power capabilities of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. when making assessments of Eisenhower's and Kennedy's resolve, but did frequently rely on each president's past actions while in office. Accordingly, while I cannot conclude that relative military capability has no effect on reputation, I do find

that it has little consistent effect on perceptions of a leader's resolve. Where relative power may be more important is in the effect of these reputations on conflict and crisis outcome rather than on the development of these reputations for resolve to begin with. This certainly warrants further research.

Finally, I examine the effect of regime type on the development of leader-based reputations for resolve. According to prominent scholars within international relations (e.g. Fearon 1994), democratic leaders should be more likely to develop reputations for resolute action than non-democratic leaders due to key institutional mechanisms within democracies that make democratic leaders more accountable to their publics (H₇). However, I find virtually no evidence to support this hypothesis across each of the four empirical chapters. To begin, regime type was insignificant across both experimental chapters. Even more so, when examining the effect of regime type without accounting for leader behavior, the impact of regime type on perceptions of resolve was inconsistent. In some instances, democracies were viewed as more resolute than non-democracies, while in other cases democracies were viewed as less resolute. Furthermore, this result does not appear to be due to a lack of comprehension by the experimental subjects. Rather, survey participants were aware of the differences between democracies and non-democracies, and, in multiple instances, participants assigned to the democratic regime type groups referenced the exact accountability mechanisms cited by key scholars in their request for more information. In addition, the

results of the duration analysis clearly indicate that regime type does not have a significant effect on future crisis onset. Furthermore, the case study indicates that democratic leaders can develop reputations for both resolute and irresolute action. Within the case study, however, I did find one instance in which the institutional accountability within democracies was important for perceptions of resolve. It appears that when determining Kennedy's resolve during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy's decision to publicly stake his domestic reputation and re-election chances on his actions in Cuba did help Kennedy to assert his resolve. In doing so, Kennedy was able to help communicate his serious interest in the crisis and demonstrate that Cuba was an important issue in and of itself, not just due to its connection to Berlin. Accordingly, this result may suggest that such democratic commitment mechanisms are important due to their ability to signal state interest in the dispute at hand. As such, future scholars may wish to further examine the connection between these commitment mechanisms and communicated state interest in other instances of resolve.

7.1.2 Alternative Theories of Reputation Development

In addition to the impact of specific state-based characteristics on reputations for resolve, other scholars have put forth hypotheses as to how reputations for resolve may develop. Most prominently, Mercer (1996) argues that reputation development is dependent on the relationship between two actors. He asserts that adversaries can develop reputations for resolute action, while allies can develop reputations for

irresolute action. As I only look at adversarial relationships in my work, applying this theory to my research indicates that targets can only gain reputations for resolute action, not irresolute action (H₃). In contrast to Mercer's hypothesis, I find strong evidence that targets can develop reputations for both resolute and irresolute action. As I will discuss further in this chapter, the experiments clearly indicate that irresolute leader behavior is particularly influential for reputation development. Participants assigned to the irresolute leader behavior condition were more likely to view these target leaders as less tough and determined and were more likely to be predicted to back down in the face of a potential threat. This suggests that adversaries can develop reputations for irresolute action. More damaging to Mercer's theory is evidence from the case study regarding the development of Kennedy's reputation for resolve. While Eisenhower developed a reputation for resolute action during his tenure, Kennedy quickly developed a reputation for irresolute action. Although this reputation would later change based on his actions and communicated interest during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev's robust perception of Kennedy as an irresolute and indecisive president runs counter to Mercer's hypothesis.

In addition, Tomz (2007b) hypothesizes that reputations can be changed, but not reinforced (H₄). In general, this hypothesis is difficult to test as it requires a quantitative baseline measure of resolve upon which later perceptions are then measured. Clearly the evidence from the case study suggests that reputations for resolve can be altered,

although (as I will discuss in the next section) reputations are resistant to change once formed. Most notably, Kennedy was able to reverse his reputation for irresolute action during the Cuban Missile Crisis and obtain a reputation for resolute behavior. The case study may also suggest that leaders may be able to deepen their reputations for resolute or irresolute behavior through repeated confirmation. While I find that reputations develop quickly after initial interactions, it appears that both Eisenhower's reputation for resolute action and Kennedy's reputation for irresolute action were solidified through repeated interaction. In Eisenhower's case, the President's initial reputation was based on his statements and was then fortified by his behavior. Conversely, Kennedy's reputation for lacking resolve was initially based on his behavior during the Bay of Pigs and was then confirmed through his statements and behavior leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is difficult to determine, however, the exact extent to which each of these leaders' reputations was strengthened through repeated interactions. Examining the results of the second experimental chapter may provide further analytical leverage over this hypothesis. Among those participants who only received information about the leader and this information was consistent regarding the leader's resolve across each stage of the survey (i.e. the leader was always resolute or irresolute), I find little change in the perceived level of resolve of the leader at each stage. This may provide initial support for Tomz's hypothesis. It is also interesting to note, however, that participants who were only given information regarding the leader and who were assigned to a

group in which the leader was always resolute viewed the leader as very resolute: mean of 4.72 out of 5 during the summit stage. Conversely, participants who were only given information regarding the leader and who were assigned to a group in which the leader was always irresolute viewed the leader as quite irresolute: mean of 2.17 out of 5 in the summit stage. Furthermore, for this second group of participants the predicted level of resolve of the leader declined for the negotiation stage (mean of 1.99 out of 5) and crisis stage (mean of 2.06 out of 5). This may indicate that over time these irresolute leaders were perceived as even more irresolute, although the differences between each stage are not statistically significant.

Accordingly this may suggest that initial perceptions of resolve are what matter most, not the extent to which perceptions are confirmed and deepened. If one takes a rational choice approach to reputation development, then the strengthening of an actor's reputation is particularly important to the robustness of this reputation. This is particularly true if perceptions of resolve are updated after new interactions. If, however, reputations for resolve form early on and are resistant to change, the notion of a reputation strengthening becomes less critical to reputation development. While repeated confirmation of behavior early during interactions is necessary for a strong reputation to develop in the rational model, a single interaction can create an initial reputation for resolve in my model of reputations development (e.g. Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs). Accordingly, while I am unable to either negate or confirm Tomz's

hypothesis, I question the extent to which this hypothesis is necessary to understanding reputation development based on other evidence suggesting early interactions are critical to these reputations. I discuss this evidence more fully in the next section.

7.1.3. Leader Action and Reputations for Resolve

While I find evidence that some state-based characteristics can influence perceptions of a leader's resolve, the results of my empirical chapters overwhelming indicate that leaders can develop reputations for resolve separate from the state. Furthermore, across each of the empirical chapters, I find that these leader reputations are based on a leader's statements and actions while in office (H_1). Beginning with the first experimental chapter, I find that leaders who have acted irresolutely in the past are more likely to be perceived by participants as less tough and determined and are more likely to be predicted to back down in the face of a potential threat. Conversely, I find that leaders who were resolute in the past are more likely to be perceived as tough and determined and are more likely to be predicted to stand firm or escalate a crisis in the face of a threat. Even when accounting for state-based factors, a leader's statements and behavior remain a significant conditioning factor on reputations for resolve. In addition, I find that the perceived level of a leader's resolve has a highly significant impact on that leader's future predicted behavior. Leaders who are perceived to be less tough and determined in their actions are more likely to be predicted to back down, while leaders

who are perceived to be more tough and determined in their actions are more likely to be predicted to stand firm or escalate the conflict.

In addition, the second set of experiments provides further support for my primary hypothesis. Once again, a leader's statements and past behavior have a highly significant effect on that leader's predicted behavior throughout each stage of the survey. Leaders who signaled they will be resolute through their statements and past behavior are more likely to be perceived as tough and determined throughout the survey. They are also more likely to be predicted to stand firm or escalate the situation in the face of a potential threat. The opposite is true of leaders who signal a lack of resolve as they are more likely to be viewed by participants as less tough and more likely to be predicted to back down. Furthermore, participants are more likely to seek out information regarding a leader's statements and behavior rather than state-based characteristics and are more likely to access leader-based information first. As such, the results of the second survey indicate that, not only is leader-based information influential on perceptions of resolve, it is also highly valued and prioritized by participants. Regarding the results of the statistical analysis, a leader's relative resolve in response to the crisis trigger reduces the risk of that leader being targeted in the future by the same challenger leader. This provides further support for the argument that a leader can signal his resolve through his behavior. However, relative resolve has little

effect on the future targeting of a leader by other leaders, indicating that resolve may only be communicated through direct interaction.

Finally, the case study further supports my primary hypothesis. Most notably, when making assessments of Eisenhower's and Kennedy's resolve, Khrushchev looked to each leader's statements and behavior while in office. Khrushchev relied on this past behavior when making assessments of each president's future resolve. In addition, the case study also provides support for my argument that challenger leaders may rely on a target leader's actions prior to taking office if the target leader has held a highly visible position. Initially, Khrushchev lacked information regarding Eisenhower's and Kennedy's resolve as each president was new to office. Both presidents, however, had held highly visible positions before assuming the Presidency. Prior to his first direct interactions with both Eisenhower and Kennedy, Khrushchev looked to the past behavior of each of these men to garner cues regarding their potential resolve. For Eisenhower, Khrushchev looked to the President's past military record, predicting that Eisenhower would be a tough but open-minded negotiator. For Kennedy, Khrushchev looked to the President's senatorial record and campaign speeches, but was unable to make a clear assessment of Kennedy's potential resolve, especially regarding Berlin. Accordingly, Khrushchev's information search indicates that, absent information from direct interactions with each president, he valued Eisenhower's and Kennedy's actions

prior to taking office. He did not, as a state reputational hypothesis would predict, rely on state-based characteristics for cues about each president's potential resolve.

Turning to my hypotheses regarding reputation development, I argued in Chapter 2 that, due to the ways in which individuals access and process information, early interactions will be highly influential on perceptions of resolve. Furthermore, once a leader's reputation for resolute (or irresolute) action is established, it will be difficult to change (H₈). In the second experimental chapter and the case study chapter, both of which directly tested the causal mechanisms of my theory, I find support for this hypothesis. The second set of experimental surveys, presented in Chapter 4, indicates that early perceptions of resolve are highly influential on later perceptions. More specifically, I find that participants' assessments of a target leader during the summit stage (stage 1) were not only significant during the negotiation stage (stage 2), but also remained influential during the crisis stage (stage 3). In addition, perceptions of resolve from the negotiation stage also influenced participants' perceptions of leader resolve at the crisis stage. Even more so, the content of specific information accessed during earlier stages remained influential during later stages of the survey. This suggests that it is not just early perceptions of resolve that can carry far into the future, but that specific pieces of information may also be influential during later interactions.

Evidence from the case study further supports these results as I find that Khrushchev's early perceptions of both Eisenhower and Kennedy were resistant to

change once established. During the Geneva Summit, Eisenhower's reliance on Dulles appears to have given the Secretary a reputation for resolute action as Eisenhower left Geneva with neither a reputation for resolute nor irresolute action. However, during negotiations directly after the Summit, Eisenhower consistently asserted his resolve through his statements. Eisenhower's reputation for resolute action was solidified through his response to the first Berlin Ultimatum, and this reputation for resolve would carry Eisenhower through to the end of his tenure. In contrast, Kennedy's reputation developed very differently, and the effect of early actions on reputation formation is particularly obvious in Kennedy's case. Kennedy's reputation for irresolute action began after his behavior in the Bay of Pigs and was confirmed by his vacillating policy on Berlin at the Vienna Summit. Although Kennedy tried to assert his resolve during the Berlin Crisis, statements made during private negotiations gave Khrushchev the impression that the Americans would not up a fight over the construction of the Berlin Wall. This reputation for irresolute action would carry Kennedy through to the Cuban Missile Crisis, where it was not until he repeatedly asserted his resolve and indicated the crisis was a high national security priority that his reputation was changed.

This result regarding the development of Kennedy's reputation for resolve provides support for my final hypothesis (H₉). In Chapter 2, I theorized that communicated state interest in a dispute can act as an attention-getting mechanism. Issues that are communicated to be of high strategic importance to the target will be

particularly influential in the view of the challenger. Accordingly, the target's behavior during these disputes will have a large impact on a target's reputation for resolve. I find this to be especially true regarding Kennedy's actions in Cuba. Part of the reason Khrushchev paid such close attention to Kennedy's behavior during the Bay of Pigs was because Kennedy had signaled that this was an important issue for American security interests. As such, when Kennedy failed to assert his resolve, he quickly developed a reputation for lacking resolve based on these actions. Later during his tenure, Kennedy tried to demonstrate his resolve during the Cuban Missile Crisis, but was initially unsuccessful. While Kennedy had acted resolutely from the beginning of the crisis, he was unable to change his reputation for resolve in large part because he signaled that his actions in Cuba during the early days of the Cuban Missile Crisis were based on American strategic interests in Berlin. Khrushchev firmly believed that the only reason Kennedy was acting so resolutely was out of fear of retaliation over Berlin, not because Kennedy valued Cuba in and of itself. It was not until mid-way through the crisis when Kennedy and his administration indicated that Cuba was of central importance to American national security interests regardless of any connection to Berlin that Khrushchev took Kennedy's actions seriously. Accordingly, it required both resolute behavior and communicating the issue was a top priority for Kennedy to change his reputation.

7.2 Further Considerations and Policy Implications

In addition to providing support for my theory of leader-based reputations for resolve, the evidence from across the empirical chapters sheds light on additional considerations regarding the development of these reputations, which should be of keen interest to policy-makers. To begin, the results of the first set of experiments indicate that irresolute behavior is particularly influential to the development of a leader's reputation. Although resolute leader behavior sometimes fails to have a significant effect on perceptions of resolve after state-based factors are included in the analysis, irresolute behavior is consistently significant across each of the experiments, even once controlling for state-based variables. If one further takes into account the finding that early actions matter most for reputations for resolve, this highly suggests that leaders should avoid being perceived as irresolute early during their tenure. In particular, leaders who signal they may be irresolute based on their statements and/or behavior during early interactions may find it particularly difficult to reverse this perception later on.

While it remains unclear as to the precise effect these reputations substantively have on crisis outcome or initiation, initial evidence from the duration analysis chapter indicates that those leaders who fail to signal their resolve during one interaction may be more prone to future conflict. Furthermore, these results suggest that challenger leaders may not just base their perceptions of resolve on direct interactions with a target leader, but may also rely on a target leader's interactions with other leaders when making

assessments of resolve. Additional evidence from the case study further supports these findings. Most notably, the ability of Eisenhower and Kennedy to signal their resolve had real consequences as to how they were treated by Khrushchev. Once Eisenhower gained a reputation for resolute action after his response to the Berlin Ultimatum, Khrushchev used softer rhetoric and was more willing to work with the President. Conversely, Khrushchev based his unrelenting tactics at the Vienna Summit on Kennedy's poor showing in the Bay of Pigs. Kennedy's newly minted reputation for irresolute action made negotiations significantly more difficult for him in the future. Accordingly, my research indicates that the early actions taken by policy-makers with regards to communicating their resolve can have potential real world consequences as to how they are both viewed and treated by other leaders in the future.

If a leader communicating his resolve during early interactions is so critical to his developing a reputation for resolute action, how can leaders successfully demonstrate their resolve to potential challengers in order to avoid a reputation for irresolute action? Overall, the results of my analysis indicate that both statements and actions are influential in the development of reputations for resolve. Furthermore, the results of the statistical analysis combined with evidence from the other chapters suggest that leaders need not resort to violence to demonstrate their resolve. Instead, the results of the duration analysis indicate that simply using a more severe response than the crisis trigger can communicate a leader's resolve when faced with the same challenger leader,

such as responding to a verbal threat with economic sanctions. In addition, the second set of experiments suggests that a leader's statements can have a significant impact on perceptions of resolve independently of a leader's behavior. In addition, the case study demonstrates that consistently firm statements can lay the foundations for a reputation for resolute action. Eisenhower was particularly successful in implementing this strategy where he was able to communicate his resolve through a firm stance in negotiations after the Geneva Summit. Eisenhower's response to the Berlin Ultimatum through the use of firm statements and non-violent military action also shows that leaders can successfully demonstrate their resolve without resorting to violence.

Accordingly, these results imply that policy-makers should be able to communicate their resolve through non-violent means. Early in their tenure, policy-makers can use consistently firm statements on key policy issues to help communicate their resolve to potential challengers. Furthermore, interactions that occur during negotiation processes may be particularly important in this regard as they provide policy-makers with an opportunity to present a clear policy position on important issues before those issues become the center of an international crisis. As such, these venues afford policy-makers the chance to communicate their stance on key issues without having to resort to reactionary statements later during a full-fledged crisis. In addition, policy-makers should remember that they have a wide range of tools at their disposal to communicate their resolve. This includes verbal actions, economic sanctions, non-violent

military actions, etc. Policy-makers should first attempt to communicate their resolve through these lower-level and less severe policy choices prior to resorting to higher intensity options, such as the use of violence. If policy-makers can use these lower intensity actions, including firm statements, to communicate their resolve early in their tenure, they may be able to avoid being a target of aggression all together. Furthermore, policy-makers should also keep in mind that when they must rely on higher intensity actions, they may not need to resort to the use of violent force to communicate their resolve. Instead, as Eisenhower's actions during the Berlin Crisis and Kennedy's actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrate, non-violent military action can often successfully communicate resolve where firm statements failed to keep a potential challenger at bay.

That being said, the results of the second set of experiments also suggest that actions may be more important than statements for communicating resolve. Likewise the first set of experiments indicates that irresolute actions can be particularly influential in reputation development. This is further showcased by the evolution of Kennedy's reputation as he initially communicated his lack of resolve through irresolute behavior and reinforced this perception by vacillating in his statements and position on Berlin during the Vienna Summit. While behavior may be more influential to reputations for resolve, this does not mean that talk is cheap. To the contrary, communicating an issue is a high priority through one's statements is particularly important. Even more so, it is

this interaction between communicated interest and communicated resolve that policy-makers should focus on when trying to assert their resolve. In particular, policy-makers should be careful not to bluff on issues they have communicated are of central importance to national security as these are the issues upon which irresolute statements and behavior will be most damaging to a reputation. In contrast, for those issues which policy-makers genuinely believe are truly of central importance to national security or national interest, policy-makers should work hard to clearly demonstrate their resolve through both firm statements and by ensuring their actions match their statements. To use the colloquialism, policy-makers need to be prepared to put their money where their mouth is and stand firm on issues they have communicated to be a high priority. In doing so, policy-makers have the opportunity to establish a robust reputation for resolute action. If this is done early on through firm statements and accompanying behavior, policy-makers can develop a reputation for resolute action without unnecessarily escalating the situation or having to resort to violence. In addition, this strategy of standing firm on an issue that is communicated to be a top priority may also help leaders who have initially developed a poor reputation for resolve. In other words, policy-makers should “pick their battles wisely” (to use the colloquialism) and be sure to follow through on their statements with firm actions for those issues they state are important. For those leaders who fail to communicate their resolve early on and develop a reputation for irresolute action, standing firm on a high interest issue may result in a

positive change in their reputation for resolve (as was the case with Kennedy). However, the best strategy for policy-makers seeking to develop a reputation for resolute action is to clearly communicate their policy positions from day one and to stand firm, in both their statements and behavior, on those issues which they have communicated to be a high priority.

Finally, the primary finding that leaders can develop reputations for resolve separate of both the state and their predecessors has significant policy implications in-and-of itself. Most notably, this finding indicates that policy-makers are not bound by the poor reputation of a state or their leadership predecessors. On the flip side, however, policy-makers may not benefit from the state or their predecessor having a reputation for resolute action. Instead, policy-makers will be judged primarily on their own statements and behavior. This finding may have particularly important implications for democratic leaders. Other scholars have found that democratic leaders are more likely to be the targets of international crises (Gelpi and Grieco 2001). Accordingly, this may suggest that democratic leaders should be particularly concerned with asserting their resolve early during their tenure such that they can reduce their chances of being targets of aggression. While I did not find that democratic leaders are viewed as more resolute based on their regime type alone, my results do have interesting implications for democratic leaders. Most notably, democratic leaders are able to develop reputations for resolve that are independent of their predecessors. This means that, while these leaders

may not benefit from a predecessor with a strong reputation for resolve, they are not bound by the poor reputation of a predecessor with a weak reputation for resolve. Instead, new democratic leaders may be able to learn from the mistakes and successes of their predecessors and work to communicate their resolve from the beginning of their tenure. This also suggests that democratic leaders need to be particularly aware that they will be judged and assessed by potential challenger leaders as soon as they take office. As such, democratic leaders need to carefully choose their words and pick their battles (as the saying goes). One could also argue that non-democratic leaders with a potentially longer tenure than democratic leaders need to be especially careful of their statements and actions once taking office. This is particularly true if one considers that a poor reputation for resolute action can haunt a non-democratic leader for years or even decades, depending on the length of their tenure. Once again, I would caution both democratic and non-democratic leaders that a reputation for resolute action does not need to be forged through agitation or violence. Rather, leaders can develop a robust reputation for resolute action by making their policy positions clear, communicating which issues are most important to them, and standing firm in their positions once tested.

7.3 Scholarly Implications and the Importance of Leaders

My theory of leader-based reputations for resolve and the results of the empirical chapters have further important implications for the scholarly study of resolve as well as

the centrality of leaders to international politics. While the concept of resolve has been extensively studied in the international relations literature, the results of my research carry interesting questions regarding both the processes and conditions under which reputations for resolve develop. To begin, context may be an important factor in the development of reputations for resolve. Most notably, I found that communicated state interest in the dispute when combined with a leader's statements and behavior is central to the development of these reputations. The conditions under which leaders interact regarding the importance of an issue under dispute can affect the extent to which challenger leaders pay attention to a target leader's behavior. This in turn influences how a target leader's statements and behavior are perceived by the challenger leader. Further study is required, however, in order to fully understand how the various conditions under which leaders interact can affect perceptions of resolve. Regarding the target's interest in an issue under dispute, how does this dynamic between communicated state interest and leader action play out for non-territorial or security issues? For example, can leaders develop reputations for resolve during economic negotiations or on issues regarding human rights? While the statistical analysis addresses this issue to a limited degree, my experiments and case study intentionally focused on issues potentially pertaining to international security for the purpose of comparability. In order to fully understand the conditions under which reputations for

resolve develop, however, scholars must also examine how the mechanisms by which reputations develop work under different types of disputes.

These conditions may also affect the extent to which a leader's statements or behavior drive perceptions of resolve. It may be that statements are more salient on those issues where negotiations are more prevalent and there is less risk of the use of violence to settle a dispute – such as with trade disputes. The results of the second set of experiments indicate that this may be the case as participants were more likely to rely on a leader's statements during the summit stage of the survey than they were during the crisis stage. Similarly, participants were more likely to access information pertaining to relative military capabilities during the crisis stage, where there was a potential military threat, than they were during the negotiation stage, where such a threat was absent. This suggests that the actions needed to communicate resolve may vary based on the context of the crisis or issue under dispute. Accordingly, I argue this provides support for my assertion that the discipline needs to move beyond its narrow definition of resolve in terms of war fighting and rely instead on a more expansive definition, such as my own, that allows for alternative forms of communicating resolve beyond the use of violence.

In addition, the results of the case study indicate there may be instances in which an actor is able to develop a reputation for resolve, but that other factors supersede the ability of this resolve to make a meaningful difference. For example, while Khrushchev viewed Eisenhower as resolute, internal domestic pressures prevented Khrushchev from

fully acting in accordance with Eisenhower's reputation. In order to understand the conditions under which reputations are (or are not) significant for international crises or international conflict, scholars must first understand how these reputations form to begin with. I argue that my work contributes to this gap in our knowledge regarding the development of reputations for resolve among leaders. Moving forward, scholars must next examine the conditions under which leader-based reputations for resolve, not state-based reputations, are able to affect international conflict. Wolford's (2007; 2012) work indicates that these reputations can affect the timing of future crises, and my statistical work supports this notion that leader-based reputations can have an impact on future crisis onset when faced with the same challenger leader. However, further work is needed to fully determine the conditions under which these leader-based reputations for resolve affect crises and conflict as well as the meaningful ways in which these leader-based reputations have an impact.

Furthermore, scholars must also consider the extent to which both leaders and states are able to develop these reputations for resolve concurrently. While I discussed this finding earlier in this chapter, it merits highlighting again. More specifically, scholars should examine the conditions under which these reputations are able to affect conflict and further explore the possibility that these state-based and leader-based reputations for resolve may interact. In addition, the results of the case study indicate that multiple leaders from within a state, not just the head of state, may be able to

develop reputations for resolve. More specifically, I find that Dulles was able to develop a reputation for resolute action, not just Eisenhower, based on his actions in Geneva. My research suggests that it may be the decision-maker who is perceived to be in control of foreign policy, not just the primary leader of the state, which may gain a reputation for resolve. While this may be a single person in some instances, it is also possible that multiple decision-makers may be able to develop reputations for resolve within a single administration. Accordingly, this brings up several questions worthy of future study such as how these multiple reputations may interact, whose reputation a leader will look to when making predictions of behavior, and whether these reputations are based on specific issues.

Even more so, this finding that there is the potential for multiple decision-makers within a state to develop reputations for resolve highlights what I believe to be the most important implication of my work: Leaders matter. The level of analysis at which scholars choose to focus can have a significant impact on their theory, findings, and conclusions regarding the impact of both leaders and resolve on international politics. By focusing on leaders, I presented a perception-based theory of reputation development that could not be analyzed by simply looking at state action. Furthermore, my robust results indicate that leaders are worthy of study as they are able to develop reputations for resolve of their own. In addition, I find counter evidence to scholars who have argued that reputations for resolve either do not form or are not based on past

behavior. While these scholars found support for their hypotheses by focusing on states, I show that, by focusing on leaders, reputations for resolve do form and are based on a leader's statements and behavior. Even more so, the results of my statistical analysis suggest that the level of analysis can affect the extent to which certain variables are significant. Scholars cannot make generalizations about the development and impact of resolve on international conflict by only examining the state-level of analysis. In the duration analysis I find that, while a state's crisis management technique has a significant impact on future crisis onset, a leader's relative resolve is also significant when faced with the same challenger leader.

These findings coupled with my robust findings from the experiments and case study that leaders are able to develop reputations for resolve independently of the state and based on that leader's statements and behavior further suggest that the scholarly reliance on the international- and state-levels of analysis may lead us to incorrect conclusions regarding the importance of central concepts in international security. Scholars cannot afford to omit leaders from their analyses. Instead, scholars need to make a concerted effort to incorporate leaders into their study. Leaders should remain a central focus in the international relations literature, especially regarding reputations for resolve and the conduct of international crises.

Appendix A

This appendix supplements the experiments presented in Chapters 3 and 4. This appendix contains the full text of the experimental surveys taken by participants in the Amazon Mechanical Turk sample pools. The final amended version of these experiments were approved by the Duke Internal Review Board (protocol B0544; expired on 2/11/2014).

The experiments begin with an informed consent form and choosing to continue with the survey serves as participants' consent to participate. The consent form for the first set of experiments presented in Figure 26 below:

<p>Thank you for your interest in participating in this research. Please read the following information before continuing.</p> <p>What you will be asked to do: Read a scenario and answer questions based on what you have read.</p> <p>Rights: The decision of whether or not to participate in any portion of this study is completely up to you.</p> <p>Benefits and Risks: There are no direct benefits or any anticipated risks associated with your involvement in this study.</p> <p>Compensation: If you qualify and participate in this study, you will receive a payment of \$0.70 for 5-10 minutes of participation. There will be an opportunity to receive an additional \$0.15 during the study.</p> <p>Confidentiality: Your responses to all survey questions are completely confidential. You will be asked for your Amazon Mechanical Turk Worker ID at the end of the study so we can make sure you get proper credit for completing the survey.</p> <p>By clicking on the NEXT button and completing this survey, I give my consent to participate in this study.</p> <p>Please click the NEXT button below to begin the 8-10 minute survey.</p>
--

Figure 26: Experiment 1 Consent Form

The consent form for the second set of experiments is presented in Figure 27 below.

Thank you for your interest in participating in this research. Please read the following information before continuing.

What you will be asked to do: Read a scenario and answer questions based on what you have read.

Rights: The decision of whether or not to participate in any portion of this study is completely up to you.

Benefits and Risks: There are no direct benefits or any anticipated risks associated with your involvement in this study.

Compensation: If you qualify and participate in this study, you will receive a payment of \$0.65 for 10-15 minutes of participation. There will be an opportunity to receive an additional \$0.10 during the study.

Confidentiality: Your responses to all survey questions are completely confidential. You will be asked for your Amazon Mechanical Turk Worker ID at the end of the study so we can make sure you get proper credit for completing the survey.

By clicking on the NEXT button and completing this survey, I give my consent to participate in this study.

Please click the NEXT button below to begin the 10-15 minute survey.

Figure 27: Experiment 2 Consent Form

On the next page of both survey experiments, participants are asked to answer a series of demographic and control questions as follows:

Q1. How interested are you in international politics?

- Extremely interested
- Somewhat interested
- Neither interested/nor disinterested
- Somewhat uninterested
- Extremely uninterested

Q2. How closely do you follow international events?

- Very closely
- Somewhat closely
- Not very closely
- I don't follow international events at all.

Q3. What is your primary source of information for international politics and events?

- Online news sources
- Blogs
- Television
- Friends and family
- Newspapers

I do not follow international politics.

Q4. In the past week, how often would you say you paid attention to the news?

Several times a day

Once a day

3-5 times a week

Once a week

Once a month

Not at all

Q5. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a...

Republican

Democrat

Independent

No preference

Other - please specify

Q6. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a....

Extremely Conservative

Conservative

Slightly Conservative

Moderate; Middle of the Road

Slightly Liberal

Liberal

Extremely Liberal

Don't Know, I haven't thought about it much.

Please tell us how much you agree with the following statements:

Q7. It doesn't really matter who is in office. A country would end up with the same policies regardless.

Agree strongly

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree

Disagree strongly

Q8. International leaders are important and have a large impact on international events.

Agree strongly

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree

Disagree strongly

Q9. The use of military force only makes problems worse.

Agree strongly

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree

Disagree strongly

Q10. States should be able to talk things out and reach a peaceful solution to their problems.

- Agree strongly
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree strongly

Q11. Sometimes the only way to solve a problem between states is through military force.

- Agree strongly
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree strongly

Upon answering these questions participants in the first experiment are directed to the scenario prompt and asked to answer questions regarding the opposing leader's perceived resolve:

In the next section, you will read a scenario and be asked to answer questions and make predictions based on what you read. If your predictions are correct, you will receive an additional [appropriate credit depending on subject pool] you complete the survey. Please take your time in reading the scenario and answer the questions as best you can.

You are the leader of the state. For the past year, you have been trying to negotiate with the leader of a neighboring state, {R1, R2} over who should control an area of land along your shared state border that is rich in mineral resources. Whoever controls this land will get both more power and resources. You have been unable to reach a compromise. Your advisors suggest issuing a threat to send military forces to the area to end the dispute. Before you decide to issue this threat, you need to correctly predict how the opposing state would respond to this threat. {I1, I2}. {S1, S2}, {M1, M2}. During negotiations, the leader of the opposing state {L1, L2}.

Q12. How determined or undetermined do you think the opposing leader would be in response to this threat?

- Highly determined
- Determined
- Neutral
- Undetermined
- Highly Undetermined

Q13. How tough or weak do you think this leader will be in response to this threat?

Very Tough

Tough

Neutral

Weak

Very Weak

Q14. How do you think the opposing leader would respond to this threat?

Stand firm and continue to try to negotiate

Escalate the conflict by sending their military forces to the area

Back down to your threat and agree to a settlement

Q15. How confident are you in this belief?

Very confident

Confident

Unconfident

Very unconfident

Q16. Given how you believe this leader will react, would you issue the threat?

Yes

No

If issue threat, give information regarding leader response that is same as L1, L2 above – The opposing leader [stood firm and did not give into your threat]. The opposing leader wanted to back down but left office before a settlement could be reached. Several months have passed and a new leader has just taken office in the opposing state. This new leader {L3, L4}. Once again, your advisors suggest issuing a threat to send military forces to the area to end the dispute.

Q17. How determined or undetermined do you think the opposing leader would be in response to this threat?

Highly determined

Determined

Neutral

Undetermined

Highly Undetermined

Q18. How tough or weak do you think this leader will be in response to this threat?

Very Tough

Tough

Neutral

Weak

Very Weak

Q19. How do you think this new leader would respond to this threat?

Stand firm and continue to try to negotiate

Escalate the conflict by sending their military forces to the area

Back down and agree to a settlement

Q20. How confident are you in this belief?

Very confident

Somewhat confident
Somewhat unconfident
Very unconfident

Q21. Given how you believe this leader will react, would you issue the threat?

Yes
No

Q22. What additional information would you have liked to be more confident in your beliefs?

Q23. What were your state and the other state arguing over?

A treaty
An island
An area of land along your border

The treatment options inserted into the scenario, as indicated by the { } brackets, depend on the condition to which the participant is assigned and include the following options:

Previous Leader:

- L1 (Resolute): has consistently stood firm and not backed down on his state's claims to the area.
- L2 (Irresolute): said he would like to end the dispute quickly and may not be willing to risk war over the issue.

Current Leader:

- L3 (Resolute): has said that he will stand firm and protect his state's claims to the area.
- L4 (Irresolute): has indicated that he would like to end the dispute and may not be willing to risk war over the issue.

State Government Type:

- R1 (Democracy): a democracy with an elected leader.
- R2 (Non-Democracy): not a democracy and the current leader has taken power without being elected

Level of Interest:

- I1 (Very interested): The disputed area is a high priority for the opposing state.
- I2 (Less interested): would like to control the area, but has indicated there are other foreign policy issues that are of a higher priority right now.

State History:

- S1 (resolute): In the past, this state has stood firm in similar situations.
- S2 (irresolute): In the past, this state has backed down in similar situations.

Military Strength:

- M1 (strong): The other state's military is stronger than your state's military.

- M2 (weak): The other state's military is weaker than your state's military.
- M3 (equal): Your state's military and the other state's military are equal in strength.

For the second experiment, participants are presented with a multi-stage questionnaire.

Upon answering these questions, participants are presented with the first scenario:

In the next section, you will read a series of scenarios and will be asked to answer questions and make assessments based on what you read. You will be able to access information to help you make these assessments. If your assessments are correct, you will receive a bonus payment of \$0.10 in addition to your base payment of \$0.65. However, each piece of information you click on will cost you \$0.01 from your bonus. This will not be deducted from your base payment of \$0.65. Please take your time in reading the scenarios and answer the questions as best you can.

You are the leader of a state that shares a disputed border with a neighboring state. You are about to enter into negotiations at an international summit with the leader of the neighboring state over who should control this disputed area of land along your shared border. This area of land is rich in mineral resources and whoever controls this land will get both more power and resources. Before you go to this important conference to negotiate with the opposing leader, you need to gather information as to how you think this leader will act during the summit meeting. You have never negotiated with this leader before.

On the next screen, you will find pieces of information that your advisors can gather to help you predict how the opposing leader may act during the summit. Please click on the pieces of information you would like to look at. Remember that each piece of information you access will cost you \$0.01. After one minute, you will be asked to predict how the opposing leader will act during the summit.

Participants are then asked to select which information they wish to view. The information options for each stage of the survey can be found in Appendix C.

Participants are then presented with the following questions:

Q12. During the summit, how likely do you think this leader is to be determined to strongly present in his position at the summit?

Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Neutral

Likely

Very Likely

Q13. During the summit, how tough or weak do you think this leader will be during negotiations?

Very Tough

Tough

Neutral

Weak

Very Weak

Q14. How likely you do you think it is a compromise will be reached during the summit?

Very likely

Likely

Neutral

Unlikely

Very Unlikely

Participants are then informed of how the opposing leader acted during the summit,

based on the group to which they are assigned, and asked to make further assessments

about the leader's future resolve:

During the summit, you were unable to reach a compromise with the opposing leader as to who should control the disputed area of land. Throughout the summit, this leader [wavered in his position. He did not appear very confident and presented himself weakly during negotiations. Unfortunately, the summit ended before a compromise could be reached.][was unwavering in his position on the border dispute. He was very confident in his position and presented himself strongly during negotiations. It was clear that a compromise would not be reached.]

Q15. How tough or weak do you think this leader will be in future negotiations?

Very Tough

Tough

Neutral

Weak

Very Weak

Q16. How likely to you think this leader will be determined to strongly present his state's position in future negotiations?

Very Unlikely

Unlikely

Neutral

Likely

Very Likely

Participants are then presented with the second scenario and asked to choose which information they would like to access. The full information options available to participants according to their condition and group can be found in Appendix C. The second scenario is presented below:

Since the summit ended a few months ago, you have decided to enter into on-going negotiations to try to find a solution to the dispute over who should control the disputed area of land. Before you enter into these negotiations you need to predict how the opposing leader will act during these negotiations. On the next screen, you will find pieces of information that your advisors can gather to help you predict how the opposing leader may act during these negotiations. Please click on the pieces of information you would like to look at. Remember that each piece of information you access will cost you \$0.01. After one minute, you will be asked to predict how the opposing leader will act during these negotiations.

Upon accessing information, participants are then asked to answer the following questions:

Q17. During negotiations, how likely do you think this leader is to be determined to strongly present in his position?

Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Neutral
Likely
Very Likely

Q18. During the summit, how tough or weak do you think this leader will be during negotiations?

Very Tough
Tough
Neutral
Weak
Very Weak

Q19. How likely you do you think it is a compromise will be reached during these negotiations?

Very likely
Likely
Neutral

Unlikely
Very Unlikely

As the final part of this stage of the survey, participants are informed as to how the leader acted during negotiations and are asked to predict how the leader would act during future negotiations:

It has been several months, and the negotiations over who should control the area of land continue. Throughout the negotiations, [the opposing leader has indicated he would be willing to compromise to reach a negotiated settlement.][the opposing leader has stood firm in his position.]

Q20. How tough or weak do you think this leader will be in future negotiations?

Very Tough
Tough
Neutral
Weak
Very Weak

Q21. How likely to you think this leader will be determined to strongly present his state's position in future negotiations?

Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Neutral
Likely
Very Likely

Participants are then presented with the final stage of the scenario and choose to access which information they wish to see. This information can be found in Appendix C. The final scenario is as follows:

Despite the continued negotiations over the disputed piece of land, a compromise has not been reached. You are getting impatient to end the dispute. You can issue a threat to send military forces to the border if a settlement is not reached within the next few months. Before you issue a threat, however, you must predict how the opposing leader would respond to the threat. On the next screen, you will find pieces of information that your advisors can gather to help you predict how the opposing leader may respond to this threat. Please click on the pieces of information you would like to look at. Remember that each piece of

information you access will cost you \$0.01. After one minute, you will be asked to predict how the opposing leader will response to the threat.

Participants are then asked to answer the following questions:

Q22. How likely do you think this leader is to be determined to have a strong response to the threat?

- Very Unlikely
- Unlikely
- Neutral
- Likely
- Very Likely

Q23. How tough or weak do you think this leader will be in response to this threat?

- Very Tough
- Tough
- Neutral
- Weak
- Very Weak

Q24. How do you think this leader would respond to your threat?

- Back down and agree to a settlement
- Stand firm and continue negotiations
- Escalate the conflict by sending military forces to the area

Q25. How confident are you in this belief?

- Very unconfident
- Unconfident
- Confident
- Very Confident

Q26. Given how you believe this leader will react, would you issue the threat?

- No
- Yes

As the final part of the last scenario, participants are asked to assess the leader's resolve in future crises:

Your advisors convinced you not issue the threat at this time and to continue negotiations instead. If you had issued the threat, [the opposing leader would have backed down and agreed to a settlement.][the opposing leader would have stood firm, and the crisis may have escalated further.]

Q27. How tough or weak do you think this leader will be in future crises?

- Very Tough
- Tough

Neutral
Weak
Very Weak

Q28. How likely to you think this leader will be determined to strongly present his state's position in future crises?

Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Neutral
Likely
Very Likely

Participants in both survey experiments are then asked to answer a final series of demographic questions as follows:

Q24/29. In what year were your born?

Q25/30. Please indicate your gender:

Male
Female

Q26/31. If you are currently a student, please indicate your year or level of study for the 2012-2013 school year:

Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior
Graduate Student
Professional Student
I am not a student

Q27/32. What is your current field of study? If not a student, please indicate with "N/A"

Q28/33. If you are not currently a student, please indicate the highest level of study you have achieved:

Grade school or some high school
High school diploma
Some college
Associates degree
Bachelors degree
Masters or Professional degree (MA, MBA, JD)
Doctorate (Ph.D., MD)

After answering these final questions participants are presented with the following debriefing information and complete the survey:

Thank you for participating in this study. The purpose of this study was to examine how different factors affect your prediction of how a state will react in a crisis. The overall purpose of this study is to add to our knowledge about how leaders and states can develop reputations for resolve. There was one piece of deception in this study. Regardless of the prediction you made about how the opposing state would respond to your threat, you still received the additional \$[] payment for a total of []. This was meant to mimic decision making in the real world where there is strong motivation to correctly perceive the adversary's resolve in international politics. Thank you again for your participation. Please do not share the details of this survey with other participants.

The entire survey procedure took approximately 8-10 minutes to complete.

Appendix B

This appendix provides additional supporting documentation for the statistical tests from the first set of experiments presented in Chapter 3. The tables below, starting with Table 26, present the Wilcoxon ranksum tests comparing the responses of participants assigned to different groups regarding perceived level of leader resolve and predicted future behavior of the leader.

Table 26: Perceptions of Resolve across Leader Information Only Groups

Leader1 Leader2	Resolute Resolute	Irresolute Irresolute	Irresolute Resolute	Resolute Irresolute
Irresolute Irresolute	Leader1: z=6.454 p=0.000 Leader2: z=6.227 p=0.000		Leader1: z=-0.529 p=0.597 Leader2: z=-7.225 p=0.000	Leader1: z=-7.214 p=0.000 Leader2: z=0.466; p=0.641
Irresolute Resolute	Leader1: z=6.592 p=0.000 Leader2: z=-1.747 p=0.081	Leader1: z=-0.529 p=0.597 Leader2: z=-7.225 p=0.000		Leader1: z=7.446 p=0.000 Leader2: z=-7.826 p=0.000
Resolute Irresolute	Leader1: z=-0.291 p=0.771 Leader2: z=6.990 p=0.000	Leader1: z=-7.214 p=0.000 Leader2: z=0.466 p=0.641	Leader1: z=7.446 p=0.000 Leader2: z=-7.826 p=0.000	

Table 27: Reputation for Resolve across Leader Information Only Groups

Leader1 Leader2	Resolute Resolute	Irresolute Irresolute	Irresolute Resolute	Resolute Irresolute
Irresolute Irresolute	Leader1: z=4.915; p=0.000 Leader2: z=5.746 p=0.000		Leader1: z=0.145 p=0.885 Leader2: z=-5.869 p=0.000	Leader1: z= -6.051 p=0.000 Leader2: z=2.454 p=0.014
Irresolute Resolute	Leader1: z=5.126 p=0.000 Leader2: z=0.666 p=0.505	Leader1: z=0.145 p=0.885 Leader2: z=-5.869 p=0.000		Leader1: z=6.275 p=0.000 Leader2: z=-7.906 p=0.000
Resolute Irresolute	Leader1: z=-0.894 p=0.371 Leader2: z=7.561 p=0.000	Leader1: z= -6.051 p=0.000 Leader2: z=2.454 p=0.014	Leader1: z=6.275 p=0.000 Leader2: z=-7.906 p=0.000	

Table 28: Perceptions of Resolve across State Past Behavior Groups

Leader1 Leader2	Leader Info + Resolute State	Leader Info + Irresolute State
Resolute Resolute	Leader1: z=-0.584 p=0.559 Leader2: z=-0.888 p=0.375	Leader1: z=4.928 p=0.000 Leader2: z=2.412 p=0.016
Irresolute Irresolute	Leader1: z=-4.120 p=0.000 Leader2: z=-2.262 p=0.024	Leader1: z=2.177 p=0.030 Leader2: z=1.382 p=0.167
Irresolute Resolute	Leader1: z=-2.399 p=0.017 Leader2: z=1.084 p=0.278	Leader1: z=2.001 p=0.045 Leader2: z=3.808 p=0.001
Resolute Irresolute	Leader1: z=-0.329 p=0.742 Leader2: z=0.388 p=0.698	Leader1: z=5.848 p=0.000 Leader2: z=1.315 p=0.189

Table 29: Reputation for Resolve across State Past Behavior Groups

Leader1 Leader2	Leader Info + Resolute State	Leader Info + Irresolute State
Resolute Resolute	Leader 1: z=0.236 p=0.813 Leader 2: z=1.768 p=0.077	Leader 1: z=4.227 p=0.000 Leader 2: z=2.644 p=0.008
Irresolute Irresolute	Leader 1: z=-2.482 p=0.013 Leader 2: z=-0.833 p=0.405	Leader 1: z=2.558 p=0.011 Leader 2: z=1.746 p=0.081
Irresolute Resolute	Leader 1: z=-2.342 p=0.019 Leader 2: z=0.603 p=0.546	Leader 1: z=2.385 p=0.017 Leader 2: z=2.538 p=0.011
Resolute Irresolute	Leader 1: z=1.436 p=0.151 Leader 2: z=0.085 p=0.932	Leader 1: z=6.160 p=0.000 Leader 2: z=0.625 p=0.532

Table 30: Perceptions of Resolve across State Interest Groups

Leader1 Leader2	Leader Info + High State Interest	Leader Info + Low State Interest
Resolute Resolute	Leader 1: z=-1.568 p=0.117 Leader 2: z= -1.477 p=0.140	Leader 1: z=4.058 p=0.000 Leader 2: z=1.610 p=0.107
Irresolute Irresolute	Leader 1: z=-2.721 p=0.007 Leader 2: z=-0.720 p=0.472	Leader 1: z=0.036 p=0.971 Leader 2: z=0.700 p=0.484
Irresolute Resolute	Leader 1: z=-1.793 p=0.073 Leader 2: z=2.090 p=0.037	Leader 1: z=1.194 p=0.232 Leader 2: z=3.557 p=0.000
Resolute Irresolute	Leader 1: z=-0.535 p=0.592 Leader 2: z=-1.516 p=0.129	Leader 1: z=4.887 p=0.000 Leader 2: z=1.305 p=0.192

Table 31: Reputation for Resolve across State Interest Groups

Leader1 Leader2	Leader Info + High State Interest	Leader Info + Low State Interest
Resolute Resolute	Leader 1: z=-1.297 p=0.195 Leader 2: z=2.004 p=0.045	Leader 1: z=3.299 p=0.001 Leader 2: z=1.977 p=0.048
Irresolute Irresolute	Leader 1: z= -1.068 p=0.285 Leader 2: z=-0.414 p=0.679	Leader 1: z=-0.266 p=0.790 Leader 2: z=0.747 p=0.455
Irresolute Resolute	Leader 1: z=-0.254 p=0.780 Leader 2: z=-0.095 p=0.925	Leader 1: z=0.673 p=0.501 Leader 2: z=2.365 p=0.018
Resolute Irresolute	Leader 1: z=-1.048 p=0.294 Leader 2: z=-1.223 p=0.221	Leader 1: z=3.933 p=0.001 Leader 2: z=-0.511 p=0.610

Table 32: Perceptions of Resolve across Regime Information Groups

Leader1 Leader2	Leader Info + Democracy	Leader Info + Non-Democracy
Resolute Resolute	Leader 1: z=-0.365 p=0.715 Leader 2: z=-1.103 p=0.270	Leader 1: z=-0.976 p=0.329 Leader 2: z=-0.752 p=0.452
Irresolute Irresolute	Leader 1: z=-1.436 p=0.151 Leader 2: z=-1.226 p=0.220	Leader 1: z=-1.996 p=0.046 Leader 2: z=0.769 p=0.442
Irresolute Resolute	Leader 1: z=-0.521 p=0.603 Leader 2: z=2.407 p=0.016	Leader 1: z=-1.487 p=0.137 Leader 2: z=0.471 p=0.638
Resolute Irresolute	Leader 1: z=0.246 p=0.806 Leader 2: z=-0.260 p=0.795	Leader 1: z=-2.438 p=0.015 Leader 2: z=-0.805 p=0.421

Table 33: Reputation for Resolve across Regime Information Groups

Leader1 Leader2	Leader Info + Democracy	Leader Info + Non-Democracy
Resolute Resolute	Leader 1: z=0.821 p=0.412 Leader 2: z=1.451 p=0.147	Leader 1: z=-2.293 p=0.022 Leader 2: z=0.402 p=0.687
Irresolute Irresolute	Leader 1: z=0.097 p=0.923 Leader 2: z=0.655 p=0.513	Leader 1: z=-0.899 p=0.369 Leader 2: z=1.074 p=0.283
Irresolute Resolute	Leader 1: z=-0.429 p=0.668 Leader 2: z=0.000 p=1.000	Leader 1: z=-1.719 p=0.086 Leader 2: z=-0.917 p=0.359
Resolute Irresolute	Leader 1: z=1.715 p=0.086 Leader 2: z=-1.026 p=0.305	Leader 1: z=-2.122 p=0.034 Leader 2: z=-3.063 p=0.002

Table 34: Perceptions of Resolve across Military Capability Groups

Leader1 Leader2	Leader Info + Stronger Military	Leader Info + Weaker Military	Leader Info + Equal Military
Resolute Resolute	Leader1: z=-1.512 p=0.131 Leader2: z=-1.351 p=0.177	Leader 1: z=2.061 p=0.039 Leader 2: z=0.720 p=0.471	Leader 1: z=-0.937 p=0.347 Leader 2: z=-1.292 p=0.196
Irresolute Irresolute	Leader 1: z=-2.923 p=0.004 Leader 2: z=-1.712 p=0.090	Leader 1: z=-0.009 p=0.993 Leader 2: z=0.983 p=0.325	Leader 1: z=-1.433 p=0.152 Leader 2: z=-0.753 p=0.452
Irresolute Resolute	Leader 1: z=-2.772 p=0.006 Leader 2: z=-0.622 p=0.534	Leader 1: z=-1.699 p=0.089 Leader 2: z=2.082 p=0.037	Leader 1: z=-1.501 p=0.133 Leader 2: z=0.152 p=0.879
Resolute Irresolute	Leader 1: z=-0.075 p=0.941 Leader 2: z=-2.365 p=0.018	Leader 1: z=3.073 p=0.002 Leader 2: z=0.699 p=0.484	Leader 1: z=-0.546 p=0.585 Leader 2: z=-1.150 p=0.250

Table 35: Reputation for Resolve across Military Capability Groups

Leader1 Leader2	Leader Info + Stronger Military	Leader Info + Weaker Military	Leader Info + Equal Military
Resolute Resolute	Leader 1: $z=-0.167$ $p=0.868$ Leader 2: $z=-0.091$ $p=0.927$	Leader 1: $z=2.123$ $p=0.034$ Leader 2: $z=0.418$ $p=0.676$	Leader 1: $z=-0.862$ $p=0.389$ Leader 2: $z=-0.283$ $p=0.777$
Irresolute Irresolute	Leader 1: $z=-2.345$ $p=0.019$ Leader 2: $z=-1.984$ $p=0.047$	Leader 1: $z=0.465$ $p=0.642$ Leader 2: $z=1.353$ $p=0.176$	Leader 1: $z=-1.262$ $p=0.207$ Leader 2: $z=-0.273$ $p=0.785$
Irresolute Resolute	Leader 1: $z=-3.193$ $p=0.001$ Leader 2: $z=-2.008$ $p=0.045$	Leader 1: $z=-1.047$ $p=0.295$ Leader 2: $z=1.206$ $p=0.228$	Leader 1: $z=-2.266$ $p=0.024$ Leader 2: $z=0.000$ $p=1.000$
Resolute Irresolute	Leader 1: $z=-1.037$ $p=0.300$ Leader 2: $z=-2.922$ $p=0.004$	Leader 1: $z=3.172$ $p=0.002$ Leader 2: $z=0.845$ $p=0.398$	Leader 1: $z=-0.006$ $p=0.995$ Leader 2: $z=-1.057$ $p=0.291$

Appendix C

This appendix supplements the second set of experiments presented in Chapter 4 and provides additional information to the survey design presented in the previous appendix. This appendix contains three tables reporting the exact wording for each piece of information participants may access at each stage of the survey. The title of the information, as indicated in italics, is the same as participants would see when choosing which information to access. The text following the italics, in each table below, presents the information that would be presented to participants, based on the condition to which they are assigned, who chose to click on that piece of information.

Table 36: Summit Stage Information Options

Intelligence Reports About the Opposing Leader: Your advisors indicate that the leader is indecisive about his state's position and may be not be firm in his demands./Your advisors indicate that the opposing leader will be a tough negotiator and will most likely be very firm in his positions.

Opposing Leader's Press Statements About the Upcoming Summit: In a press conference and speech last month, this leader seemed unconfident about the summit and shared his hope that a compromise can be reached quickly during the summit./In a press conference and speech last month, this leader promised that he would be tough during the summit and make sure that his state's position is heard.

State Action During Previous Summits: In the past this state has been weak and indecisive during summit negotiations and tends to be very willing to compromise./In the past, this state has been tough and wavering in its position during summit negotiations. This state tends to stand firm in its demands during these conferences.

Priority of the Summit to the Opposing Leader: In press statements, the opposing leader has stated that the disputed border is a high priority for his state./ In press statements, the opposing leader has indicated the disputed border may not be his state's top priority.

Opposing State's Form of Government: The opposing state is a democracy./The opposing state is not a democracy.

Opposing State's Military Strength: The opposing state's military is stronger than your military./The opposing state's military is weaker than your military./The opposing state's military is of equal strength to your military.

Table 37: Negotiation Stage Information Options

Opposing Leader Press Statements about Negotiations: In a speech this month this leader said he wanted to quickly reach a compromise and seemed to waver in his position./ In a speech this month, this leader said that, while he would like to reach a compromise, he would continue to be tough and strong during negotiations.

Opposing Leader Actions with Other Leaders: In negotiations with other leaders, this leader has been weak in asserting his demands and is often very willing to compromise./In negotiations with other leaders, this leader has been strong and unwavering in making sure his state's positions are heard.

Additional Leader Summit Behavior Information: Your advisors believe the opposing leader was quite weak during the summit negotiations. They suggest that in the future he may continue to act passively. Throughout the summit, the leader seemed to be unsure of his position./Your advisors believe the opposing leader was very strong during the summit negotiations. They suggest that in the future he may continue to act assertively. Throughout the summit, the leader was firm in his positions.

State Action During Previous Negotiations: In the past, this state has been less tough and more indecisive during similar negotiations. During negotiations, this state tends to be very willing to compromise./In the past, this state has been tough and unwavering during similar negotiations. During negotiations, this state tends to stand firm in its demands.

Priority of Negotiations to the Opposing State: The opposing leader has repeatedly stated that the disputed border is the top priority for his state right now. You advisors believe the opposing state will take negotiations very seriously./The opposing leader has repeatedly indicated that the disputed border is not a top priority for his state right now. You advisors believe the opposing state may not negotiations as seriously.

More Information on Opposing State's Government Type: As the opposing state is a democracy, the opposing leader was elected by the people./As the opposing state is not a democracy, the opposing leader came to office by taking power. He was not democratically elected.

More Information on Opposing State's Military: The opposing state's military is stronger than your military. They have both more troops and weapons than your military./The opposing state's military is weaker than your military. They do not have as many troops or weapons as your military./The opposing state's military is comparable in strength to your military. You have roughly the same amount of both troops and weapons.

Table 38: Crisis Stage Information Options

Opposing Leader Press Statements about Crisis: In a press conference last month, this leader said he would like to avoid further conflict over the disputed area./In a press conference last month, this leader warned that he would not be intimidated into a compromise if he felt the terms of a settlement were unacceptable.

Opposing Leader Response to Previous Threats: In the past, this leader has been willing to back down when threatened by other leaders./In the past, this leader has stood firm in the face of threats from other leaders.

Additional Leader Negotiation Behavior Information: Throughout the negotiations, the opposing leader has appeared unsure of his position and has, at times, been unclear in his demands./Throughout the negotiations, the opposing leader has presented his position strongly and has not wavered in his demands.

State Response to Past Threats: In the past, this state has backed down when threatened by other states./In the past, this state has stood firm and acted tough when threatened by other states.

Priority of the Dispute to the Opposing State: The disputed area remains a high priority for the opposing state./While the other state would like to control the disputed border, it is clear that there are other foreign policy issues that are of a higher priority right now.

More Information on Opposing State's Government Type: As the opposing state is a democracy, the opposing leader was elected by the people./As the opposing state is not a democracy, the opposing leader came to office by taking power. He was not democratically elected.

More Information on Opposing State's Military: The opposing state's military is stronger than your military. Their troops are better trained than yours./The opposing state's military is weaker than your military. Their troops are not as well trained as your troops./The opposing state's military is equal in strength to your military. Both your troops and their troops are equally well trained.

Appendix D

This appendix accompanies Chapter 5, the statistical analysis chapter. In this appendix I present the coding mechanisms for each of the variables included in the analysis as well as the results of the robustness checks. To begin, in Table 39 below are the individuals who are coded as the leaders of their respective states for those events that occurred after 2004.

Table 39: Country-Leader Pairings

Country	Leader
Central African Republic	Idriss Deby
Eritrea	Isaias Afewerki
Ethiopia	Meles Zenawi
France	Jacques Chirac
Lebanon	Emile Lahoud
North Korea	Kim Jong-Il
Sudan	Umar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir
United Kingdom	Tony Blair
United States of America	George W. Bush

As discussed in the chapter, I utilize multiple measures for resolve. To begin, I utilize the Crisis Management (CRISMG) variable. The ICB dataset defines this as “primary crisis management technique used by a crisis actor.” The original dataset codes this variable with the following values: (1) negotiation, (2) adjudication or arbitration, (3) mediation, (4) multiple not including violence, (5) non-military pressure, (6) non-violent military, (7) multiple including violence, and (8) violence only. I recode these measures as the following: (1) negotiation, adjudication or arbitration, and mediation, (2) multiple not

including violence, non-military pressure, and non-violent military, (3) multiple including violence, and (4) violence only.

For the relative resolve measure, I recode the crisis trigger (TRIGGR) and major response (MAJRES) variables in the ICB dataset. The crisis trigger is defined by the dataset as “the specific act, event or situational change which leads decision-makers to perceive a threat to basic values, time pressure for response and heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities.” This variable is coded by the ICB dataset as follows: (1) verbal act, (2) political act, (3) economic act, (4) external change, (5) other non-violent act, (6) internal verbal or physical challenger to regime or elite, (7) non-violent military act, (8) indirect violent act, (9) violent act. I recode this variable as: (1) verbal act, (2) political act, economic act, external change, other non-violent act, internal verbal or physical challenger, (3) non-violent military act, (4) indirect violent act and violent act. The major response variable (MAJRES) is defined by the dataset as the “specific action which captures the major thrust of [the target’s] behavior.” This is originally coded in the ICB dataset as: (1) no-response or inaction, (2) verbal act, (3) political act, (4) economic act, (5) other non-violent act, (6) non-violent military act, (7) multiple including non-violent military act, (8) violent military act, and (9) multiple including violent military act. I recode this variable as: (0) no-response or inaction, (1) verbal response, (2) political act, economic act, and other non-violent act, (3) non-violent military act and multiple including non-violent military act, and (4) violent military act

and multiple including violent military act. I then subtract the recode trigger value from the recoded major response value. All negative values were assigned a -1, indicating the target had a less resolute response than the crisis trigger, while all positive values were assigned a 1, indicating a more resolute response. Finally, all values of 0 were maintained, indicating the target had an equally resolute response to the crisis trigger.

The time until the target responds is included in the ICB dataset. It is measured as “the number of days which elapsed between the perception of the trigger and the major response by the crisis actor.”

Capability is calculated from the COW dataset CINC index for each state for each year. This is calculated by taking adding the CINC score of the target and challenger. The target’s CINC score is then divided by this total value. A score great than 1 indicates the target is relatively more powerful than the challenger while a score less than 1 indicates the challenger has the advantage. I also use the COW databases coding of the major power status of the target and the challenger. A value of 1 indicates the state is a major power, while a score of 0 indicates it is not a major power.

To measure state interest, I rely on the ICB dataset’s GRAVITY variable, which accounts for the “object of gravest threat at any time during the crisis, as perceived by the principal decision-makers of the crisis actor.” This variable is coded on a 7 point scale of increasing severity: (0) economic threat, (1) limited military threat, (2) political threat, (3) territorial threat, (4) threat to influence in the international system or regional

subsystem, (5) threat of grave damage, (6) threat to existence, and (7) other. Those events coded as other (7) were recoded as missing data as it was unclear which category they should fall into.

For the outcome of the crisis, I also recode the ICB dataset variable. The OUTCOM variable measure the way in which a crisis was terminated. It is originally coded as: (1) victory, (2) compromise, (3) stalemate, (4) defeat, and (5) other. I recode this variable as: (1) victory, (2) compromise and stalemate, and (3) defeat. Those included in the other category are coded as missing from analysis.

For the lost security threat variable, I relied on the ISSUE variable capturing the issue under dispute. This variable is originally coded as follows: (1) Military or security, (2) political or diplomatic, (3) economic or developmental, (4) cultural or status, and (5) other. I recode this variable as a dummy variable with a 1 indicating a military or security issue and a 0 capturing all other issues. Those events which are coded as a 1 for the issue variable and a 3 for the outcome variable are given a 1, indicating the loss of a security threat. All other values are given a 0.

For the distance variable, I rely on the COW dataset's coding of the distance between the capitals between the target and challenger leader.

For the regime type variable, I rely on Polity IV measures of democracy. I recode the original -10 (non-democracy) to 10 (democracy) scale to make all values positive.

Accordingly I add 11 to each score creating the following scale: (1) full non-democracy to (21) full democracy.

Finally, to measure the context of the crisis, I utilize the ICB's intra-war crisis variable (IWC). This variable is originally coded as: (1) Not intra-war-crisis, (2) entry of a major actor into an ongoing war, (3) perceived high probability of a major actor entering a war, (4) exit of a major actor, (5) perceived high probability of major power exiting a war, (6) technological escalation of a war, (7) major non-technological escalation, (8) defeat in a significant battle, (9) internal deterioration, and (10) other. I recode this variable such that a 0 indicates it is not an intra-war crisis and a 1 indicates the crisis took place during war (original values 2-9). Values coded in the original scheme as a 10 are recoded as missing.

The tables presented starting on the next page, Tables 40-44, compare the results of the original Cox models and the time-interacted models for those variables which violate the proportional hazards assumption.

Table 40: Model 1 Robustness Test for Time Dependency

Independent Variable	Original Model		Time Interaction Model	
	Hazard Ratio (SE)	P-Value	Hazard Ratio (SE)	P-Value
Model 1a				
Target Major Power	2.171 (0.479)	0.000	1.0001 (0.0002)	0.466
Intra-War Crisis	1.740 (0.327)	0.003	0.999 (0.0003)	0.739
Model 1b				
Target Major Power	2.054 (0.414)	0.000	1.0001 (0.0002)	0.551
Intra-War Crisis	1.599 (0.326)	0.021	0.999 (0.0003)	0.417

Table 41: Model 2 Robustness Test for Time Dependency

Independent Variable	Original Model		Time Interaction Model	
	Hazard Ratio (SE)	P-Value	Hazard Ratio (SE)	P-Value
Model 2a				
Target Major Power	1.737 (0.332)	0.004	1.000 (0.0001)	0.547
Gravity of Issue	1.085 (0.049)	0.074	1.000 (0.00003)	0.105
Democracy	0.991 (0.009)	0.309	1.000 (0.000007)	0.523
Distance	0.999 (0.00004)	0.040	1.000 (0.000002)	0.944
Intra-War Crisis	1.750 (0.292)	0.001	1.000 (0.0001)	0.925
Lost Security Threat	1.233 (0.403)	0.521	0.999 (0.0003)	0.054
Model 2b				
Target Major Power	1.618 (0.285)	0.006	1.000 (0.0001)	0.760
Gravity of Issue	1.101 (0.048)	0.026	1.000 (0.00003)	0.039
Democracy	0.996 (0.008)	0.602	1.000 (0.000005)	0.081
Distance	0.999 (0.00003)	0.014	1.0000 0.0000008	0.466
Intra-War Crisis	1.532 (0.273)	0.017	0.999 (0.0001)	0.634
Lost Security Threat	1.362 (0.429)	0.327	0.999 (0.0002)	0.220

Table 42: Model 3 Robustness Test for Time Dependency

Independent Variable	Original Model		Time Interaction Model	
	Hazard Ratio (SE)	P-Value	Hazard Ratio (SE)	P-Value
Model 3a				
<i>Relative Resolve</i>				
Less Resolute	1.083 (0.114)	0.449	1.000 (0.00007)	0.125
More Resolute	1.170 (0.187)	0.327	0.999 (0.0001)	0.261
<i>Crisis Outcome</i>				
Defeat	0.668 (0.188)	0.951	0.999 (0.0001)	0.532
Victory	0.728 (0.095)	0.370	0.999 (0.00007)	0.126
Distance	0.999 (0.00003)	0.038	1.000 (0.0000002)	0.022
Lost Security Threat	1.064 (0.261)	0.801	0.999 (0.0001)	0.505
Model 3b				
<i>Crisis Outcome</i>				
Defeat	0.987 (0.215)	0.321	0.999 (0.00009)	0.600
Victory	0.909 (0.097)	0.174	0.999 (0.00006)	0.112
Distance	0.999 (0.00003)	0.048	1.000 (0.0000002)	0.051
Lost Security Threat	1.269 (0.210)	0.313	0.999 (0.00009)	0.957

Table 43: Model 4 Robustness Test for Time Dependency

Independent Variable	Original Model		Time Interaction Model	
	Hazard Ratio (SE)	P-Value	Hazard Ratio (SE)	P-Value
Model 4a				
Target Major Power	1.583 (0.222)	0.001	0.999 (0.00003)	0.187
Challenger Major Power	1.116 (0.148)	0.409	0.999 (0.0003)	0.000
Distance	0.999 (0.00002)	0.538	1.000 (0.0000007)	0.172
Intra-War Crisis	1.371 (0.185)	0.020	0.999 (0.00004)	0.087
Lost Security Threat	0.781 (0.176)	0.273	0.999 (0.00004)	0.009
Model 4b				
Target Major Power	1.500 (0.196)	0.002	0.999 (0.00002)	0.254
Challenger Major Power	1.168 (0.146)	0.216	0.999 (0.00003)	0.000
Distance	0.999 (0.00002)	0.219	1.000 (0.00000007)	0.041
Intra-War Crisis	1.311 (0.182)	0.051	0.999 (0.00004)	0.038
Lost Security Threat	0.943 (0.204)	0.788	0.999 (0.00003)	0.050

Table 44: Model 5 Robustness Test for Time Dependency

Independent Variable	Original Model		Time Interaction Model	
	Hazard Ratio (SE)	P-Value	Hazard Ratio (SE)	P-Value
Model 5a				
Target Major Power	2.244 (0.254)	0.000	0.999 (0.00004)	0.712
Democracy	0.994 (0.005)	0.225	1.000 (0.000002)	0.438
Intra-War Crisis	1.453 (0.084)	0.001	0.999 (0.00003)	0.142
Lost Security Threat	0.806 (0.150)	0.246	0.999 (0.00003)	0.013
Model 5b				
<i>Crisis Management Technique</i>				
Violent Military	1.149 (0.117)	0.172	1.000 (0.00003)	0.015
Target Major Power	2.257 (0.237)	0.000	1.000 (0.00004)	0.966
Democracy	0.999 (0.005)	0.773	1.000 (0.000001)	0.941
Intra-War Crisis	1.387 (0.163)	0.005	0.999 (0.00003)	0.089
Lost Security Threat	0.825 (0.141)	0.261	0.999 (0.00003)	0.029

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Biography

Danielle L. Lupton was born in South Dakota in 1987. In 2008, she graduated *summa cum laude* from Furman University with a B.A. in political science, where she was the recipient of the S. Sydney Ulmer Political Science Medal. Danielle received the Duke Scholar Fellowship, a full merit-based scholarship, to attend Furman. While at Furman, Danielle was also the recipient of two Furman Advantage Summer Research Scholarships and was inducted into Phi Beta Kappa in 2008. At Duke University, she received her M.A. in 2011. During her graduate studies at Duke, Danielle was the recipient of multiple fellowships, including a Summer Research Fellowship from the Robert K. Steel Family Graduate Fellowship Endowment, a Summer Fellowship from the Duke Program for Study of Democracy, Institutions, and Political Economy (DIPE), and the Hartman Center Internship in the David M. Rubenstein Library. She is also the double recipient of the Aleane Webb Dissertation Research Fellowship and is a two-time Bradley Fellow. In addition to these fellowships, Danielle received research grants from both the Duke Program for Study of Democracy, Institutions, and Political Economy and the Duke University Social Science Research Institute. Danielle also received the Alona Evans International Law and International Relations Award in 2012. In the fall of 2014, she will join the faculty at Colgate University as an Assistant Professor of Political Science, specializing in International Relations and American Foreign Policy.